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Abstract;
The exploration of the epistemological assumptions 
necessary for the interpretation of Luis de Gdngora's 
"Soledades" is an area of critical attention that has gone 
virtually neglected since his 1927 "rehabilitation.” This 
study offers an approach to understanding the long, 
difficult poem and the bitter critical reaction against it 
in the context of the seventeenth-century shift of 
predominant epistemologies discussed by Michel Foucault in 
The Order of Things. An approach that focuses on how the 
world is known is most appropriate to a study of the 
"Soledades" for several reasons, one being that those 
writers who attacked the poem did so on the basis of its 
resistance to understanding. Another justification is that 
the poem's narrative is the story of a protagonist who 
interprets the strange world in which he is shipwrecked. A 
third reason is that in Gbngora's “Carta" in defense of the 
work he plaoes unusual emphasis on the process of 
interpretation. An epistemological focus is also 
appropriate since questioning the very basis of one's 
knowledge of the world is, I believe, precisely what the 
"Soledades" required of their seventeenth-century readers.
The dissertation is an attempt to substantiate that 
belief. The first chapter discusses the Golden Age change 
in epistemological assumptions, laying the basis for my 
analysis. Chapters Two and Three examine the writings of 
participants— both attackers and defenders— in the vicious
iv
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critical polemic that erupted when the poem appeared, 
exploring the role of the writers’ epistemological 
assumptions as a foundation for their disagreement. The 
final chapters are a dual reading, both of the "Soledades" 
(which is its protagonist’s "reading" of the world), and of 
a hypothetical reader’s attempts to interpret the poem by 
imposing on it an ordering structure. The reading reveals 
how the poem tightly controls the reader’s hermeneutic 
activity, and also forces the reader to be aware of his/her 
responsibility for the construing of meaning, a posture 
alien to predominant assumptions about meaning and knowing 
the world in the seventeenth century.
v
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Introduction
Since the 1927 rehabilitation of Luis de Gdngora as a 
poet to be considered worthy of critical attention, 
criticism of his work, particularly of the "Soledades, ” has 
undergone an evolution, as have the theory and practice of 
criticism itself. Attempts to understand the long, 
enigmatic poem have employed various approaches. Miguel 
Artigas, whose work actually predates Gdngora’s much 
publicized "resurrection," wrote what is still considered 
to be the definitive biography of the Cordovan poet.
D&maso Alonso’s contributions to the study of the 
"Soledades" were monumental and focused on language. Among 
them are an edition of the poem that served for decades as 
the edition most scholars used, a prose version that helps 
to make decipherment of the poem less difficult, and 
exhaustive analyses of the poet’s language and style. 
Antonio Vilanova’s historical investigations established 
Gdngora’s debt to various literary traditions. The 
emphasis on language of most early studies allowed E. M. 
Wilson to write in 1965 that the plot of the "Soledades"
“is merely a convenient peg on which Gdngora could hang his 
superb descriptions, elaborated by all the arts of metaphor 
and hyperbole, and interpersed with beautiful lyrics" (xv).
All critics, fortunately, did not assume (as Wilson 
appears to have done) that DAmaso Alonso had exhausted all 
the possibilities and that there was nothing left to
1
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2understand about the poem. Other studies were oriented 
more toward seeking meaning in the poem beyond the alleged 
superficiality of its brilliant poetic language. R. 0. 
Jones proposed a Neopiatonic "preconception" as one of the 
bases for the "Soledades" ("Neoplatonism" 15), a theme 
developed by Robin Louis McAllister in an allegorical 
reading. Jones and John R. Beverley, located the poem in a 
historical context of social and economic systems.
Alexander A. Parker’s study of the Gbngora’s other major 
poem, the "FAbula de Polifemo y Galatea," established an 
intellectual dimension to Gdngora’s work by redefining him 
as a poet of conceptos. Maurice Molho closely analyzed 
G6ngora’s use of the concept in terms of structure. Andrde 
Collard discussed the storm of critical debate that 
accompanied the poem’s appearance in 1613.1
The search for understanding of the "Soledades" and 
their context is, of course, also the purpose of this 
study, and it is the process of understanding itself that 
will be used as a point of departure. I believe that the 
"falta de una reflexidn epistemoldgica suficiente" in 
modern Gdngoran criticism, noted by Mauricio Molho in 1969 
(22), has continued to be the general rule. I also 
consider that a regard for (or awareness of) 
epistemological differences between the present and 
seventeenth-century Spain can result in a different basis 
for understanding. The aims of this dissertation are to 
demonstrate that an awareness of ordinarily invisible
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3epistemological assumptions becomes necessary in the 
process of interpretating the "Soledades," and to signal 
their importance in the interpretation of the hostile 
polemic that surrounded the poem are aims of this 
dissertation.
The appearance of Gdngora’s "Fibula de Folifemo y 
Galatea" and "Soledades" in the early seventeenth century 
evoked strong emotional reactions among his contemporaries, 
which ranged from enthusiastic proclamation of Gdngora as 
the Spanish "Homer" to personal attacks labelling him 
heretic and Jew. The resulting literary war involved most 
of the major writers of the epoch. Principal among 
Gdngora’s attackers were Lope de Vega and Francisco de 
Quevedo. Emilio Orozco Diaz has clearly shown that some of 
the vitriol in the heated polemic that revolved around 
Gdngora’s work resulted from personal rivalry, and was not 
always directly connected with the poetic works themselves 
(Lope y Gdntfora). Andrde Collard’s documentation of the 
controversy in her 1967 study, Nueva Poesia. considers "la 
atmdsfera de intereses polltico-sociales, de religidn y de 
pensamiento en que ese proceso transcurrid" (53), and she 
demonstrates that its roots lay deeper than mere 
personality differences. Collard finds hostility toward 
Gdngora’s innovations that were defiant of the authority of 
national poetic traditions, conflict over stylistic clarity 
and obscurity, and horror at the absence of a docent moral 
utility in his poems. She delineates two fronts of attack
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4in the "guerra civil”: "Contra lo defectuoso de la
sustancia poetica y contra los excesos de su poesia, su 
oscuridad y confusidn" (84). In other words, she 
classifies the objections to the poems according to the 
categories of content and form. Indeed, the dispute could 
be described as one over whether Gdngora’s poetic language 
embodied a content or not and whether it accurately 
transmitted (or not) that which it did embody. Beneath 
such a conflict lie fundamental assumptions as to the 
separability of thought and language, the existence and 
knowability of truth that is perceived to lie beyond both 
thought and language, and the ability of language to 
represent adequately thought which is seen as separate from 
it. These epistemological assumptions and how they figure 
into both Gdngora’s "Soledades” and the polemic that 
surrounded them are the topics of the present 
investigation.
In order, however, for a modern reader to approach the 
epistemological assumptions that underlie literary works of 
another epoch, he or she must be aware that understanding 
in itself is a function of epistemology. Modern versions 
of understanding carry with them their own presuppositions 
of which one must attempt to be aware. In contemporary 
discourse, for example, "to understand" something often 
means in practice "to stand over" it in the sense of "to 
control" or "to possess knowledge of" it. For the modern 
interpreter to understand Gdngora in the etymological sense
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5of “standing under" Gdngora, it would be necessary to
leave behind the body of intellectual assumptions, or 
2
"episteme," of his or her own society in order to stand 
upon the discursive ground that underlies Gdngora's work; 
in other words, it would require the interpreter to share 
the poet’s intellectual assumptions. Of course, such an 
attempt could never succeed completely. Timothy Reiss 
explains in The Discourse of Modernism that:
One cannot escape . . . the objective fact that
one is oneself inserted in a particular episteme: 
that fact must needs be fully accepted before 
there can be the slightest hope of deflecting a 
condition which is after all our life situation. 
(47-48)
Thus, one can analyze other intellectual systems only in 
terms of one’s own epistemological priorities; one cannot 
recapture it as it was. It is possible, however, to 
identify dissimilarities in intellectual assumptions by 
striving to recognize and remain cognizant of the 
underlying thought structures that one ordinarily assumes 
to be natural.
The systematic exploration of such epistemological 
variation holds much promise for Gdngora studies. To 
demonstrate the affinities and differences between 
Gdngora’s epistemology and that of modern interpreters will 
help in avoiding the temptation to attribute to Gdngora and 
his contemporaries intentions that are historically
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6inaccurate. Moreover, to seek evidence of epistemological 
differences between Gdngora and his critics can 
significantly expand contemporary understanding of that 
debate by going beyond the partial, historical explanations 
that are generally o f f e r e d .  ^ For example, rather than 
being seen as separate phenomena, the underlying causes of 
contention cited by Collard— the differing attitudes toward 
authority, the disagreement over style, and dissension as 
to the role of art in the propagation of morality— could 
all be interpreted as manifestations of a conflict between 
different ways of knowing and ordering the universe.
A reading of Gdngora’s works and of the critical works 
of his opponents and defenders that seeks to uncover 
epistemological assumptions and differences is appropriate 
since questioning the very basis of one’s knowledge of the 
world is, I believe, precisely what Gdngora required of the 
seventeenth-century readers of his "Soledades." He called 
them to leave behind the security of received authority (in 
language and poetic tradition) and join him in what Juan de 
J&uregui termed ‘‘la misma nada" (Discurso 134) to construct 
meaning out of the stuff of their imaginations. This self- 
conscious construction of meaning was what some of his most 
virulent critics rejected. They attacked Gdngora because 
his poetic language violated their understanding of the 
universe as something to be seen and not constructed.
In order to delineate the epistemological differences 
that separate Gdngora’s "Soledades" from the predominant
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7epistemology of his epoch, it is necessary to describe 
those intellectual systems in terms of broad tendencies.
An episteme cannot be precisely defined for two reasons, 
the first being that it is by necessity the construct of an 
alien who can only operate from within his or her own 
epistemological structuring system, paraphrasing in a 
parallel discourse. The second reason is that, as an 
intellectual construct, an episteme cannot accurately 
represent the diversity and fluctuation of the intellectual 
assumptions of a society of individuals. Nevertheless, 
differences between epistemologies are demonstrable, and, 
as Reiss observes, defining those differences is what 
matters, not the seeking after "some impossible 
comprehension of a past structure of thought 'in its own 
terms’" (48).
The task of the first chapter will be to discuss the 
shift that took place in Spain near the beginning of the 
seventeenth century. The many explanations that have been 
offered for the phenomenon vary greatly, but the focus of 
my study will be an approach that treats the change as an 
epistemological one. Michel Foucault’s discussion of two 
predominant epistemological systems that preceded and 
followed the shift is fundamental to the chapter. Other 
authors are cited in order tc tailor Foucault’s theory to 
the needs of this investigation.
The two chapters that follow examine selected writings 
from the debate over the "Soledades," demonstrating
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8evidence of some of the epistemological assumptions of 
their authors. Passages that can be interpreted as 
indicative of the writers' attitudes about language and 
knowledge are analyzed and compared. Gdngora’s attackers, 
whose principal theme is the charge that the poem is 
obscure, are treated in Chapter Two; his defenders, who 
either deny the charge or offer explanations justifying it, 
are the subject of the third chapter. Gdngora’s own 
defense, his "Carta en respuesta, " in which he offers some 
explanation of his poetic project, is also included in 
Chapter Three.
Chapters Four and Five are a reading of the first and 
second "Soledades” as a process of understanding. Not only 
do I examine the protagonist as he interprets the world 
into which he has been cast by a shipwreck; I also posit 
(and interpret the hermeneutic efforts of) a reader as he 
or she attempts to constuct an interpretation of the events 
of the poem’s narrative. Limited to understanding only 
what he/she is allowed to "see" by the poem, this 
hypothetical reader makes visible the restrictions that the 
poem can be interpreted to impose on readers who approach 
it with certain epistemological assumptions. The reading 
of the two "texts"— the poem and the reader’s interpretive 
effort— demonstrates how the "Soledades" resist an 
interpretation based on assumptions held by Gdngora’s major 
critics. In a brief Conclusion, I discuss those 
restrictions and their relation to a transitional period of 
history.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Notes
1 This list of criticism is, of course, not meant to 
be exhaustive, nor are the descriptions of the works 
mentioned adequate assessments of their contents. I have 
merely chosen the ones I consider to be more important in 
determining the course of twentieth-century Gdngora 
studies, and have signalled what I believe to be their
major contributions.
2
The term episteme," Michel Foucault’s theoretical 
construct embodying the epistemological system or structure 
of a culture in a defined time period, will be explained in 
the second chapter. I do not wish to adopt it (for the 
reasons I discuss on pages 6-7 and 19-20, however, and I 
use it here only to explain its signification in the 
quotation from Timothy Reiss that follows.
3
In using the word "partial," I do not mean to 
suggest that any theory can ever wholly explain a n y  
phenomenon, only that a more broadly inclusive theory may 
be constructed.
9
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Chapter 1
Toward a Historical Context- of Epistemological Change
The seventeenth century in Europe was a time of great 
changes that transcended and transformed broad categories 
of human experience. Changes in political, social, and 
religious institutions, economic systems, science, 
philosophy and the arts, among others, are generally 
described in terms of a shift from a "Renaissance" period 
to a “Baroque” era of history. On the one hand, no theory 
has been successful in accounting for these changes as a 
monolithic phenomenon issuing from a single cause. At the 
same time, the many explanations that have attempted to 
deal with various changes in isolation from one another 
have also fallen short. The idea of a single cause is too 
broad for efficient analysis and management of information 
and denies the mutual influences of multiple causes, as 
does the practice of examining changes in particular 
categories of experience as isolated events, a project too 
narrow in scope. Elizabeth Eisenstein’s sweeping claims 
for the invention and dissemination of print as the cause 
of much change across Europe can serve as an example of the 
first error. For the second, Stephen Gilman’s explanation 
of the "Ideology of the Baroque in Spain," while 
persuasively written, attributes the change in literature 
to a shift in spirituality from Neoplatonic mysticism to
10
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Stoic asceticism that he sees resulting from the Council of 
Trent. He does not take into account the influence of 
other great changes in the economic and political situation 
in Spain that did not result from the Council of Trent.1 
While causes of the changes may be myriad and the 
complexity of their interaction may may lie beyond the 
scope of analysis, description is always possible. Michel 
Foucault pioneered the description in epistemological terms 
of the seventeenth-century shift that is often associated 
with the beginning of the Baroque period. Rather than 
seeking historical causes for the change, Foucault searched 
for what he called "the mute ground upon which it is 
possible for entities to be juxtaposed" (xvii). The term 
"episteme" is Foucault’s label for this ground which 
provides the intellectual "inner law" of the universe (xx) 
and manifests itself in the culture as the "natural" order. 
The episteme furnishes, according to Foucault:
a definition of the segments by which the 
resemblances and differences can be shown, the 
types of variation by which those segments can be 
affected, and lastly, the threshold above which 
there is a difference and below which there is a 
similitude. (xx)
Foucault’s description of the episteme is synchronic; 
therefore his historical account is marked by epistemic 
discontinuities that separate one epoch’s organizing 
structure from that of another. His early Seventeenth-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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century placement of the shift of thought structures from 
what he calls the “Renaissance" episteme to the "Classical" 
episteme coincides with and provides the context for the
appearance of Gdngora's "Polifemo" and "Soledades" and the
2
resulting furor.
The Renaissance episteme Foucault describes embodies 
the principle of similarity or resemblance as the 
foundation of knowledge. Resemblance is based on a variety 
of fundamental similitudes by which all things could be 
shown to resemble each other, either by contiguity, 
reflection or repetition (or a combination of these), or by 
the free play between sympathy (a quality that draws things 
together) and antipathy (which maintains their 
separateness). This universal, unifying oneness precludes 
modern ideas of meaning as something fixed. In order to 
produce meaning, one would need to do one of two things: 
either to define the ground for order by establishing 
experientially or empirically all possible resemblances 
between things, a goal Foucault calls "the unattainable end 
of an endless journey" (30), or one would need to posit 
such a ground. Meaning was thus guaranteed by positing the 
principle of resemblance itself: everything was a sign
resembling something else, pointing away from itself toward 
another thing that was a sign and which in turn resembled 
yet another entity. God was the ultimate resembled thing 
that served as the fixed end point which all other things 
signalled. Yet every sign was complete in that it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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resembled every other thing. Resemblance signaled a unity; 
there was no "other." All was one in the sense that there 
was ultimately only one meaning to be discovered, 
resemblance itself.
According to Foucault, the sign in the Renaissance 
episteme was ternary in nature; that is, sign and referent 
were joined by the perception of their actually resembling 
each other. It had not yet become binary; the signifier 
was not seen to be the indicator of a referent to which it 
was arbitrarily and properly attached. The Renaissance 
sign signified only because it resembled. Knowledge 
depended on one’s ability to recognize those similitudes 
that were presumed to preexist as marks left by God as his 
signature when he created the world. These divine 
signatures were more than mere signs, however; they were 
essences. According to Croilus, in addition "to the shadow 
and image of God that they bear," things contain an 
"internal virtue, which has been given to them by heaven as 
a natural dowry" (qtd. in Foucault, 26). The magical, as 
it were, divine signatures were to be interpreted by the 
means of divinatio.
The other path to knowledge was eruditio. a reading of 
the transcribed knowledge contained in sacred scriptures 
and in the writing of the ancients. For the sixteenth 
century, according to Foucault, written language itself 
embodied a signature:
In its original form, when it was given to men by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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God himself, language was an absolutely certain 
and transparent sign for things, because it 
resembled them. The names of things were lodged 
in the things they designated , . . (36)
Language and things were intimately interwoven; God had 
written what Foucault calls the “primal Text" (41) and had 
hidden it in the world, but it was a text that could be 
interpreted if its signatures were discovered. All 
discourse written by humans was secondary, language trapped 
in the space between the primal Text and interpretation 
(41), merely a commentary that promised to reveal the 
meaning that lay hidden in the primal Text. Thus, the 
commentaries written on ancient texts and sacred scriptures 
were an effort to interpret those writings, texts which 
were in themselves commentaries.
One notices the visual images Foucault employs in 
describing the Renaissance epistemology: the hidden nature
of essences, the visibility of signs, the transparency of 
language as sign. Knowledge of the world ultimately was 
not dependent on vision; it pre-existed as the unseen 
essence of things. The task of interpretation was not to 
know the thing but to make visible the hidden resemblances 
so that that resemblance (not the thing) might be known. 
Understanding the world was the equivalent of seeing in 
that sense, but the vision was achieved only by 
disregarding (not looking at) the concealing qualities of 
things. The object of seeing, then, was to see essence,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the true nature of the thing, not its appearance.
After the shift to the Classical episteme that 
Foucault describes, signification was based on the 
principle of representation rather than that of 
resemblance. Although still the ultimate basis for 
juxt&positioii, sisiili'fcudw uoc XonoSr concsiysd s.s
situated in the world, but rather in the faculty of 
understanding where the imagination continued to group 
elements in terms of similarity. The new epistemological 
structure allowed for the selection and privileging of a 
single element in the group as a fixed point of departure 
for a qualitative comparison of order. One element was 
perceived as the simplest and set up as the norm against 
which to compare the other elements of the group. What 
were now important were identities and differences.
Foucault explains that in the Classical system:
The activity of the mind . . .  no longer 
consist[s] in drawing things together, in setting 
out on a quest for everything that might reveal 
some sort of kinship, attraction, or secretly 
shared nature within them, but, on the contrary, 
in discriminating. (55) 
in imposing on cognition the primary task of seeking 
difference. The differences between things that were 
previously disregarded became visible in the newer way of 
looking at the world.
Since knowledge was now something which lay in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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imagination rather than in the world, signs were also 
intellectual in nature. Foucault notes that in the 
previous episteme, signs were things that resembled other 
things; now they were ideas of things (word images of 
ideas) that represented (made present again) ideas of other
+ u  ■; n  ^  - 4 - u  <; ^  / c q \
l / U J L U g d  V KsLJLKSJ. K J &  O . W C L J .  X l U a £ C O  U X  V U X U g O  JU X X  W i l O  n w i  X U /  V  w w  /  .
Before, both the sign and its referent retained their 
meaning because they shared the same meaning. Now, since 
only one idea could be entertained at any one time, the 
signifying idea replaced the signified idea in “re­
presenting" it, but was itself void of content, having no 
function other than that of representation. The idea of 
the word, transparent, was subsumed to the concept of the 
thing, and the concept of the thing was seen to be subsumed 
by the thing itself. All representations were 
interconnected in an endless network, each one taking its 
being from its function as a sign for something else. This 
interminable chain is reminiscent of that of the resemblant 
episteme, but it is different in that, in the earlier 
system, all signs pointed to one central, posited truth 
that put an end to the process. With the later episteme, 
the chain is not visible because of the perception of 
representations (signifiers) as the things they represent. 
In addition, since the signifier existed (as a signifier) 
only because of its representational function, 
signification was assumed to be always already in place.
For that reason, no signification could be generated by a
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conscious act (65-66). There could be
[n]o meaning exterior or anterior to the sign; no 
implicit presence of a previous discourse that 
must be reconstituted in order to reveal the 
autochthonous meaning of things. Nor, on the 
other hand, any act constitutive of signification 
or any genesis interior to consciousness. This 
is because there is.no intermediary element, no 
opacity intervening between the sign and its 
content. . . . [A]ny analysis of signs is at the 
same time, and without need for further inquiry, 
the decipherment of what they are trying to say. 
(66)
In other words, the sign not only was understood as being
the equivalent of the thing, but was also treated as if it
3
were the thing.
As a result, knowledge and language became identical. 
Foucault points out that language was no longer understood 
as rooted in the world but rather as a transparent 
representation of thought, which was considered to exist 
independently of languaige. Syntaux, as a logical ordering 
system, lay in thought, not in language; language was 
merely an expression of that order. In effect, language 
ceased to exist as an entity and was held to be purely a 
function: it only represented. In the earlier episteme,
metalinguistic examination of language had consisted of 
commentary, exegesis, and erudition, based ultimately on
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the "primal Text" inscribed and hidden in Creation. Since 
■there was no longer a primal Text to be discovered, these 
forms gave way to criticism or analysis of the discourse of 
representation. Foucault explains that:
one no longer attempts to uncover the great 
enigmatic statement that lies hidden beneath [the 
signs of discourse]; one asks how it functions: 
what representations it designates, what elements 
it cuts out and removes, how it analyses and 
composes, what play of substitutions enables it 
to accomplish its role of representation.
(79-80)
Language was questioned as to whether it expressed truly or 
falsely what it purported to represent and whether it was 
transparent or opaque in its representation. Foucault 
lists four ways in which criticism was manifested: (1) as
a critique of words for adequacy, often resulting in a call 
to augment the vocabulary of language used for a designated 
task; (2) as an analysis of syntax and composition in terms 
of their representative values; (3) as an examination of 
figures and tropes to determine their relations with their 
representative content; and (4) as a critique to define the 
relation of language with what it represented (80-81).
Since language was important only in its capacity as a 
vehicle for the representation of knowledge, it was only in 
that functional capacity that it could be the object of 
analysis.
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Again the visual metaphor is important in Foucault's 
explanation of his ‘‘Classical” episteme, which differs from 
the earlier one in that things are here visible, and thus 
knowable, in their appearance. No longer is the 
foreknowledge of an unseeable, essential truth necessary 
for knowledge; one knows what one sees. The act of 
representation itself, that which makes a signifier a 
signifier, is now the unseen (disregarded) element. What 
is known intellectually but not seen operatively is the 
fact that the signifier is not the equivalent, is not an 
adequate representative, of its signified referent.
Knowing as seeing is taken to be a receptive activity, and 
the task of interpretation consists in removing any 
obstacles that might obstruct one’s vision of the world as 
it can be seen.
One could say that for Foucault, the seventeenth 
century witnessed the emergence of a mode of knowing that 
was intellectual, but was not consciously so. The ability 
to know things in the world was considered an 
unquestionable, natural human capacity, requiring no effort 
nor tools. Language served as an instrument for 
consciously representing that independently existing 
knowledge to others, and, in its written mode, offered the 
possiblity of storing represented knowledge outside the 
mind.
Foucault does not attempt, however, to account for the 
causes of the shift, nor does he describe the transition as
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anything more than a discontinuity between two predominant, 
static epistemologies. His "episteme" is problematic in 
that it claims to represent a recovered (he subtitles his 
book "An Archaeology of the Human Sciences") positive 
structure that defines the thinking of an age. Although 
Foucault denies that he intended his construct to be 
understood as a picture of an apparently uniform, static 
epistemological structure, that is what it becomes in 
practice. ^
While in basic agreement with the time frame and 
general description of the two epistemologies, Timothy 
Reiss focuses on what he terms "classes of discourse." 
Foucault's "episteme" is a purely theoretical structure 
that orders thought and knowledge in society. In a move 
toward the empirical that reflects the shift described by 
Foucault in which discourse and knowledge became 
transparently intertwined, Reiss examines discourse as the 
material, and thus more accessible, manifestation of the 
episteme. He also adds a diachronic dimension to the 
theory by documenting a transitional period of discursive 
tension between what Foucault described as discontinuous 
epistemes, showing how one class of discourse emerged from 
the other. Reiss speaks of "a passage from what one might 
call a discursive exchange within the world to the 
expression of knowledge as a reasoning practice upon the 
world" (30). The class of discourse characterised by 
exchange within the world, must be located within because.
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ontologically speaking, there is no outside space, no 
"other," no external privileged vantage point from which 
utterances can be made. Everything takes place within part 
of a whole which can be known only partially. The elements 
of Renaissance discourse (to quote Reiss),
may . . .  be available to a continuous 
interpretation, but they cannot be grasped as a 
whole from within and thereby known in the same 
sense as they may be by a discourse based on a 
practice of difference and alterity. (32)
Reiss sees a new kind of discourse eventually emerging 
in the sixteenth century that allows one to stand outside 
the world to view it and speak of it in a language apart 
from it. A new and different sort of partial knowledge 
emerges through alterity and perspective, a view created by 
opposing oneself to the world but limited by one’s being 
apart from the whole. It is a knowledge that cannot only 
see, separate, seize, possess, and use, but can also be
represented in a language that is taken to be a neutral,
transparent mediator between the world and the mind. Reiss 
labels this class of discourse "analytico-referential, " 
explaining that it is a
discursive order . . . achieved on the premise
that the ‘syntactic’ order of semiotic systems
(particularly language) is coincident both with 
the logical ordering of ‘reason’ and with the 
structural organization of a world given as
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exterior to both these orders. (31)
This perception of the "logical identity" of world and mind 
with discourse permits one to operate on the premise that 
concepts can adequately "represent objects in the world" 
and that words can adequately "represent those concepts" 
(31). In such an epistemology, however, the enunciator is 
unself-conscious, not aware that the mind, by manipulating 
language, is imposing order on the world. Reiss notes that 
an "awareness within discourse of the individual's 
'enunciative responsibility' is an indication that the 
analytico-referential discourse is as yet but emergent, and 
still far from dominance" (34). It is precisely such an 
awareness that Gdngora's "Soledades" demand of their 
readers, and in the seventeenth century, that awareness was 
especially disturbing to those who assumed that meaning 
lies on the other side of language.
The idea of a time of tension during the transition 
between periods of two different dominant epistemes or 
classes of discourse is the principal subject of Richard 
Waswo's Language and Meaning in the Renaissance. He begins 
by describing a second discontinuity in the history of 
epistemology, a shift from referential to relational 
semantics. Waswo does not see a clear epochal connection 
with this second discontinuity; indeed, he believes that 
the transition is still struggling to take place (22). He 
maintains, however, that attempts to make the same change 
occurred in the earlier transitional period, but were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
thwarted by the inability of Renaissance theorists to 
escape from referential terminology. Waswo’s focus on 
semantics in the three epistemologies differs from Reiss 
and Foucault. While Foucault treats invisible ordering 
structures, and Reiss examines visible representations of 
ordering structures, Waswo is interested in the structuring 
phenomenon of interpretation on the part of a 
receiver/perceiver of language, and in Renaissance 
theorists’ awareness of meaning as that kind of 
constitutive activity.
Waswo employs the distinction between signification 
and meaning which he says came into being with the second 
shift he describes. In using the term "referential,” he 
includes both Foucauldian epistemes, for in both the 
resemblant and the representational systems words refer to 
something other than language for their meaning: either to
things in the world or to concepts in the imagination. For 
Waswo, this shift changes “nothing at the level of semantic 
theory, where words are still presumed to mean by referring 
to whatever lies over the dualistic divide" (35). In 
"relational, " non-referential semantics, most clearly 
articulated by Saussure in the early twentieth century, 
language shifts from being a thing with an outside referent 
to being an activity in which words derive their meaning 
from their use value in relation with other words. Waswo 
defines meaning as:
the act of construing the multiple relations of
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the linguistic units that compose the utterance 
or text in terms of the multiple relations that 
utterance or text may be perceived to have with 
others— that is, in the context in which the 
interpreter both finds and places it. (15) 
Language can thus no longer be seen as the outward form of 
a content independent of it (21), as a transparent mediator 
between world and reason; it now is an activity in which 
its interpreters construct that world. The result is, 
according to Waswo, a new vision of ourselves and of the 
world and a redefinition of knowledge and truth, not as 
being found somewhere "beyond or above or beneath language, 
but as being made by the semantic activity of language" 
(21).
The designation of the interpreter as the active, 
self-conscious creator of meaning eliminates the 
possibility of a single method or a single result of 
interpretation. Language, long seen as capable of 
accurately representing a reality that had an independent 
existence, no longer possesses the certainty that it 
enjoyed in that respect. As Waswo points out, it is not 
that the speakers or interpreters lose control but rather 
gain more control of the world (14). Meaning and order, no 
longer seen as determined by an authority beyond the world 
or beyond language, is instead socially determined by 
ordinary users of the language. When the multiplicity of 
possible meanings becomes evident, it often results,
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according to Waswo, in "considerable hostility and fear” 
(14). And when there is a "deliberate and public violation 
of a linguistic taboo," it is perceived as “a direct 
assault not on issues or policies, or even individuals, but 
on the whole system of order in the society, the entire 
form of its life" (26-27). The Gbngoran polemic in Golden 
Age Spain that resulted in charges of heresy, accusations 
of racial impurity, and intimations of homosexuality— each 
of which was believed to be detrimental to the perceived 
"system of order" and the "form of life" of society— was 
anchored in controversy over polysemy and the failure (or 
refusal) of his poetic language to adequately represent to 
the understanding the imaginative concepts of the world.
The difference between relational semantics and both 
of the referential epistemologies can also be demonstrated 
by a continuation of the visual metaphor of knowing that 
Foucault applied. In his first episteme, knowing is 
equated with "seeing through" appearances to discover the 
underlying hidden resemblances. For the Renaissance 
interpreter, things are not what they seem to be at first 
sight; they are only signs that point to the truth that 
lies elsewhere. In the second structure, knowing is 
equated with a receptive seeing. Things are what they are 
on a material level, and as such they can be perceived. It 
is not necessary to interpret further what one sees; one 
must merely perceive correctly. With relational semantics, 
knowing is seeing in the sense of an active visualization.
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Things are what they are seen to be, what they are 
construed (interpreted) to be by the observer. Although 
interpretation is common to both the Renaissance system and 
relational semantics, the two epistemologies are 
fundamentally different. The referential knower perceives 
him/herself as discovering meaning. The relational 
interpreter, on the other hand, is self-aware that he/she 
is constructing meaning. This point of difference will be 
important to keep in mind in the analysis of critical 
writings in the chapter that follows.
So far, the focus of this chapter has been 
epistemological changes in the seventeenth century. Now I 
would like to address Arnold Hauser’s discussion of one of 
the artistic manifestations of that shift. Hauser 
describes the mannerist style of art, placing it in the 
transitional period between the Renaissance classical style 
and the Baroque style of painting, and he is careful to 
point out that all three of these styles coexisted for a 
while (19). Hauser offers an epistemological basis for the 
differences in style that can be accounted for by 
Foucault’s description, but he concentrates on the 
phenomenon of Mannerism.
Mannerism is characterized by Hauser as a revolt 
against the classical vision of the universe, a synthesis 
of essences in balance and harmony that is complete in 
itself. The classical work of art is microcosmic in its 
completion:
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The threads connecting it with external reality 
seem to have been broken; all those that run 
through its texture are connected with each other 
and form a self-contained unity complete in 
itself. Nothing in it points to anything outside 
it, and there is no indication of anything that 
is missing or needs to be added. (25)
The concepts of microcosmic resemblance, completion, and 
essences correspond to Foucault's resemblant episteme. The 
artist’s disregard (not seeing) of elements that do not 
point to a unity is consistent with the metaphor of 
knowledge as vision. Furthermore, the principles according 
to which the Renaissance classical artist eliminated those 
elements that might be perceived to disrupt classical order 
depended on the artist’s knowledge of ancient sources 
through eruditio or traditio. The commentaries of 
classical authorities defined the essential that had been 
discovered in the primal Text of the world and presented 
them as ideas that were understood as being universally 
valid.
The aim of the mannerist artist, according to Hauser, 
was to put into doubt the validity of things that were held 
to be objectively "natural" (29). For the mannerist, "the 
essence of things [is] unstable and inconstant and all is 
in a state of flux and perpetual change" (276). The 
mannerist poet takes it as his task to make evident that 
instability. One of the characteristics of mannerist
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poetry is the use of multiple and difficult metaphors in 
order to detach language from things. The use of metaphors 
reflected
a sense of perpetual flux and transition, a sense 
of impermanence so strong that it is hardly 
possible to do more than establish the 
continually shifting relations between all 
things. Metaphorism, being directed, not to 
things themselves, but to the involved network of 
relations between them, is the only way of doing 
justice to the unstable, dynamic nature of a 
reality perpetually clothing itself in new forms. 
(295)
According to Hauser, metaphorism is grounded in the 
philosophical concept of relationism in which all is seen 
as "comparable to and replaceable by everything else"
(295). Again, this concept is reminiscent of Foucault’s 
resemblant episteme. The difference, however, is that 
metaphorism is the principle of resemblance carried to its 
logical consequence in the absence of the central 
organizing principle. There is no center around which the 
world is ordered, nor firm ground upon which to construct a 
system of order. The ultimate guarantor of meaning, the 
ultimate resembled thing that puts an end to endless 
journeys through all things in search of meaning, is 
missing. God no longer serves that function for the 
mannerist. Thus
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nothing is centred in itself and . . . there is 
no fixed centre anywhere. Everything can be 
partially explained by everything else, but 
nothing can ever be completely explained by 
anything. Everything is a cipher; but all the 
symbols in the secret code refer only to other 
symbols. (295)
In mannerist discourse language is liberated. Hauser 
explains:
As every description is replaceable by another, 
and the latter is not necessarily better or more 
accurate, the result is a feeling of being 
unfettered by the means of expression, a sense of 
the free and unhampered exchangeablility of 
symbols, and finally of being on a slippery 
slope, guided by the affinities of words rather 
than of things. Such a condition virtually 
implies the end of the dominance of reason, 
linguistic logic, and all external disciplines to 
which the poet might be prepared to submit. 
(295-296)
Unlike the analytico-referential discourse of the 
“representative" epistemology, which must become 
transparent by taking on the form of the concepts it 
represents, language for the mannerist is more than merely 
a representative function. While most of Hauser’s 
assessment of mannerist art is applicable to the
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"Soledades," his remark about "the end of the dominance of 
reason" is not. The "slippery slope" merely challenges the 
interpreter’s assumptions about how things are known and 
necessitates a different kind of reason. Not only is the 
language of the "Soledades" freed from the bondage to the 
intellectual concept to which the representative 
epistemology condemns it; it also inverts that 
relationship. Concepts become patently dependent on words 
for their existence. In my reading of Gdngora’s 
"Soledades," it will be evident that this liberation of 
language was what G6ngora accomplished. My discussion of 
the criticism of four of his adversaries will also show 
that the "slippery slope" of linguistic uncertainty Hauser 
describes was what received their most hostile criticism.
The above described theories of Foucault, Reiss,
Waswo, and Hauser, provide a point of departure for 
entering upon the task of reading both G6ngora and his 
critics. An idea of the unsettled epistemological 
situation in the first few decades of the seventeenth 
century in Europe provides a contextual perspective for 
examining the appearance of both Gdngora’s "Soledades" and 
the vicious reaction they provoked. It was an age in which 
many of his readers still looked to Greek and Roman 
authorities for explanation of how language was supposed to 
function although the older idea of language was based on 
an epistemology different from their own. The Spanish 
critics looked at language, not to question language
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itself, but to question its user's competency; the function 
and adequacy of language in representing the imagined 
concepts of the world was unquestionable. Their writings 
focus on the use of the language: the adequacy of the words 
chosen, syntax, figures, and the nature of linguistic 
representation.
Into this literary world in which the newer 
epistemology was firmly but not yet fully established, came 
the poetry of Gdngora. Gdngora’s poetic language is not 
the transparent function Reiss described as representing 
adequately and simultaneously both thought and the world. 
His cultismos by their strangeness call attention to 
themselves as words rather than invisibly pointing to a 
concept they represent. The syntactical distortions and 
imported grammatical constructions also serve to make 
Gdngora’s language opaque, causing the interpreter to pause 
and examine the structure of the utterance. The “metdforas 
de metdforas” that Lope de Vega attacked (qtd. in Collard 
36) present further obstacles to arriving at a signified 
meaning, while Gdngora’s play with polysemy and ambiguity 
provides false clues for interpretation, thus increasing 
the opacity of his language. He simply did not use 
language to represent concepts clearly.
Gdngora’s use of language questioned the very nature 
of language itself, which implied two very serious 
consequences. First, since he used language for purposes 
other than those of representing concepts clearly to the
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understanding, the role of interpretation became very 
important, thus putting into question knowledge as being 
universally valid. And second, because his use of language 
implied that language was incapable of adequately 
representing to the understanding what was taken to be an 
adequate concept of the world, then the conceptual basis 
for understanding of the world and consequently all 
knowledge were placed in doubt. The chapter that follows 
treats the reactions of some of his critics to that 
perceived threat.
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1 Jose Antonio Maravall cites depopulation, inflation, 
"monetary confusion," the laws of "pureza de sangre" as 
social and economic problems of the time (10). Elias L. 
Rivers also mentions the decline of Spanish military power
and social disintegration as other changes in the epoch.
2
The term "Classical" is used by Foucault, as it is 
in French literary history, to designate the period that 
followed the "Renaissance." It should not be confused with 
the Roman and Greek Classical periods.
Walter J. Ong traces the origin of the merger of 
thing and sign in written language to the change of a 
society from predominantly oral to literate. For him, as 
writing becomes interiorized, the written representation of 
the word is taken to be the word itself, that is, is taken 
to be a sign of not the word but the word's referent, and 
language, now materially visible, becomes invisible in 
cognition. Writing, which Ong calls "a particularly pre­
emptive and imperialist activity that tends to assimilate 
other things to itself" (12), co-opts language.
4
Foucault explains:
It was not my intention, on the basis of a 
particular type of knowledge or body of ideas, to 
draw up a picture of a period, or to reconstitute 
the spirit of a century. What I wished to do was 
to present, side by side, a definite number of 
elements: the knowledge of living beings, the
33
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knowledge of the laws of language, and the 
knowledge of economic facts, and to relate them 
to the philosophical discourse that was 
contemporary with them during a period extending 
from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, 
(x)
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Gdngora’s Critics: An Indictment of Obscurity
Differences in epistemological assumptions were, in 
large part, the basis for the attacks on Gdngora’s 
"Soledades." A reading of several of the more theoretical 
documents of the literary debate over the poem, the project 
of this chapter, establishes a foundation for demonstrating 
that thesis. By showing differences between the 
epistemological assumptions of the polemicists, and even, 
in some cases, inconsistencies within the writings of a 
single critic, my analysis portrays an unsettled and 
confused epoch of epistemological transition. Although the 
writings examined are primarily founded on the principle of 
representation described by Foucault, some of them will be 
shown to exhibit discursive remnants of the unitive, 
resemblance-based epistemology.
The most obvious source of evidence concerning basic 
assumptions occurs in statements about the nature of 
knowledge, meaning, and language. Although the four 
writers I have chosen to analyse— Lope de Vega, Francisco 
de Quevedo, Francisco Cascales, and Juan de JAuregui— treat 
mainly language, their presuppositions about how language 
relates to knowledge and meaning permit one to infer their 
epistmological assumptions. The statements of these 
writers, whom I chose for their position as central figures
35
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in the seventeenth-century controversy, display different 
degrees of analysis in approaching Gdngora’s poems, and I 
have arranged them according to the profundity of their 
analysis. Lope de Vega, the least theoretical of the four, 
also appears to be the writer who remains closest to the 
resemblant epistemology. While the criticism of Francisco 
de Quevedo reveals a more profound reflection on the 
problematic poems, it is slight in quantity. Neither Lope 
nor Quevedo wrote extensively of their theoretical ideas on 
poetry. Francisco Cascales and Juan de J&uregui, however, 
authored general treatises on poetics in addition to their 
specific criticism of Gdngora. Cascales’ Tablas Podticas 
and Jduregui’s Discurso noetico lay out in an orderly 
fashion their authors’ theoretical understanding of poetic 
language. J&uregui’s Antldoto contra la pest.ilents Bfiesla 
de las "Soledades" is important both for the detailed 
analysis of the controversial poem it presents and for the 
reaction it provoked among G6ngora’s defenders.
Gdngora’s most notable opponent was Lope de Vega, who 
engaged him in an ongoing war that began with their early 
mutual sniping in the romanceros of the late 1580’s (Orozco 
ch. 2) and ended with Lope’s death in 1635, eight years 
after that of Gdngora.1 Orosco Dias convincingly 
attributes much of the rivalry to Lope’s jealousy of the 
acceptance and prestige Gdngora achieved in the genre of 
lyric poetry among significant courtiers. The writings I 
examine here, three letters, contain attacks of a personal
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but they also offer significant literary criticism.
The "Carta de un amigo de don Luis de Gdngora que le 
escribid acerca de sus ‘Soledades*" is addressed directly 
to Gdngora, and appeared at Court in 1615 while the 
"Soledades" were being circulated there in manuscript form 
by Andres de Mendoza. Although written anonymously, the 
letter is generally attributed to Lope or to a member (or 
members) of his politico-poetical camp (Mille 1188, Orozco 
Diaz 172). The direct attacks on the poem are few; rather, 
the stricture is veiled as a friendly warning to Gdngora 
that Mendoza was circulating "un cuaderno de versos 
desiguales y consonancias errAticas" at the Spanish Court, 
claiming that they were written by Gdngora (198). Lope 
assumes the posture that Gdngora, if indeed he had written 
the verses, could not have been serious and must have 
invented the "jerigonza" merely as a joke to confuse 
("rematar el seso de") Mendoza.
The topic of language arises only briefly when Lope 
imputes to Gdngora a converso background, reporting that 
"se cree que V. m. no ha participado de la gracia de 
Pentecostds" (169). The absence of the Pentecostal grace, 
the ability to speak in various languages in such a way 
that all could understand (Acts 2, 4-6), in addition to 
hinting that Gdngora had not truly received the sacrament 
of Confirmation, suggests that he was indeed writing in 
various foreign languages. Not having received the gift, 
however, he wrote works that were not intelligible to his
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readers. A further contention that Gdngora has been struck 
by some "ramalazo de la desdicha de Babel" (169), a
reference to the Genesis account of the confusion of
tongues (11, 1-9), gains more importance when it is taken 
up by Gdngora in his reply and is further elaborated by 
Lope in the second letter treated below.
The appeal to authority is also indirect. Lope 
condemns the poems for being neither useful, honorable nor 
delightful, but does not mention the source of those 
criteria. The accusation of "novedad" places Gdngora in 
the camp of the "moderns" in the ancient vs. modern 
controversy discussed by Collard (53-56) and accuses him of 
violating traditional precepts without being specific.
Lope's second letter, "Respuesta a las cartas de don 
Luis de Gdngora y de don Antonio de las Infantas," was a 
much longer and more considered piece, written in response
to Gdngora's defense of his poem and his poetics, and to an
apology written by an ally of his. The letter purports 
Lope's defense of "un caballero soldado amigo" (238) who he 
claims wrote the first letter and who, now in Italy, cannot 
defend himself against his detractors. In the "Respuesta," 
Lope attacks more substantially, discussing language and 
censuring Gdngora's conceptos. Here, again, Lope does not 
use preceptive classical references although he does 
mention a few exemplary authors.
The "Respuesta" offers more insight into Lope's ideas 
on language than does his first letter. The original
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reference to a "ramalazo de la desdicha de Babel" had given 
Gdngora occasion to defend his diction as Castillian and 
not a polyglot mixture. He explained that the biblical 
confusion of tongues had not been one in which a profusion 
of different languages had confounded the people, but 
rather it was within their own language that they were 
unable to understand the significance of words, "tomando 
piedra por agua y agua por piedra" ("Carta" 173). Neither 
the signifying language nor the signified object had 
changed, only the connection between them, the third 
element in the Renaissance ternary conception of the sign. 
Shifting from the historical cause of the confusion at 
Babel to the confusion claimed by certain of his readers, 
Gdngora treats understanding as an act, maintaining that 
the problem lies in the ill will of those who cannot 
understand: "las malicias de las voluntades en su mismo 
lenguaje hallan confusidn por parte del sujeto inficionado 
con ellas" (173).
Lope’s reply is also concerned with understanding. He 
does not focus on the cause of Babel, but rather on the 
result, equating the problem between Gdngora and his 
listeners or readers to the confusion of tongues in which 
"entendiendo los unos que decian una cosa, los segundos 
entendiesen otra" ("Respuesta" 241). Lope’s use of the 
word "cosa" here certainly can not be interpreted to 
eliminate the possibility of conceptual signs; "thing" is a 
versatile word that can refer to thing, sign, or conceptual
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referent, and Lope did not seem to be practicing the 
niceties of philosophical discourse. It is thus impossible 
at this point to determine much about Lope's understanding 
of signification. Had he offered an explanation of the 
breakdown of understanding at Babel, his vision of the sign 
would perhaps be clearer. One can only determine from this 
passage that, in the situation he describes, the signifier 
is universal, but there are two different signifieds that 
are understood, one by the speaker, the other by the 
interpreter.
Since the objective to be understood is the concepto, 
a mental image, it can be said that, for Lope., 
signification is located in the intellect and not in the 
world. Lope never gives a clear definition of the 
concepto. but by reading closely passages in this second 
letter, one can determine more about his perception of it. 
He appears to be using “concepto" here in the sense of the 
mental signifier of the signified thing-in-the-world, 
similarly to that described by Saussure in his model of the 
linguistic sign (66). In 1596, Alonso Ldpez Pinciano had 
defined the concepto as "una imagen que de la cosa el 
entendimiento forma dentro de sf“ (qtd. in d ’Ors 186), and 
SebastiAn de Covarrubias, in 1611, explained it as "El 
discurso hecho en el entendimiento y despues executado, o 
con la lenguna [sic] o con la pluma" (345).2
This idea of the concepto as a pre-linguistic, 
intellectual image of things that exist beyond thought is
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evidently held by Lope also. In attacking the erudition 
and knowledge of other languages of which Gdngora had 
boasted in his "Carta en respuesta," Lope states that being 
able to write in a second language is extremely difficult, 
so difficult, he maintains, that “pocos o ninguno han 
escrito en lengua ajena conceptos propios que merezcan 
nombre de Poema, o trabajo de importancia" (242). Here it 
can be inferred that Lope holds the concepto to be 
something which exists prior to its expression in language, 
if he believes that it can be expressed in more than one 
tongue, or if its expression can be blocked by an 
inadequate command of the language. Later, in criticizing 
Italian poetry, Lope claims that the Italians are envious 
of the Spanish language
por la excelencia de haber hallado cdmo decir en 
una redondilla un concepto, ya a veces mfiis sin 
necesidad de otra para acabar de explicarle; y 
por haber adelantado tanto la perfeccidn de los 
versos endecasfiabos despuds que se usan en 
Espana, que casi cada uno construyendole sin 
dependencia de otro hace sentido, y explica 
enteramente un concepto . . . .  (244)
Lope's clause, "cdmo decir en una redondilla un concepto," 
appears to agree with Covarrubias’ description of the 
concepto as preexisting independently of language, as does 
the idea of the concepto as something that is to be 
explained by language.
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In the next passages, Lope notes that Gbngora claims 
to be imitating Latin grammatical structure, but that the 
writings of Virgil and Cicero (in real Latin) never caused 
similar confusion (244-245). For Lope, those acceptable 
Latin authors whose works could be considered obscure
i
"escribieron tan misteriosos sus conceptos que se les puede
perdonar la oscuridad y confusibn" (245). Lope, then, |
recognizes two ways of achieving obscurity with conceptos.
one acceptable and one unacceptable. He explains that in
the intricate and problematic ("escabrosas") "Soledades"
the "misterios" which Gbngora obscures are so superficial
that "entendiendo todos lo que quieren decir, ninguno
entiende lo que dicen" (245). Gbngora’s conceptos are
easily penetrable; what is difficult is arriving at them.
At this point, one can say that Lope recognizes a separate 
existence between language and thought, and that he 
censures Gbngora for his intricate language that obscures 
conceptos.
The third treatise to be examined is Lope’s "Respuesta 
a un papel que escribib un sehor de estos reinos en razbn 
de la nueva poesfa" published in 1621 but considered by 
Orosco Diaz to have been written in 1617 (295). While this 
piece is not addressed to Gbngora as were the two previous 
letters, Gbngora and his works are nevertheless the 
principal targets of censure, although Lope feigns 
admiration for his rival and disdain merely for those who 
imitated the "culterano" style.
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Lope declares that the whole foundation of "el arte de 
hacer versos . . . es la filosoffa, como consta de los 
antiguos" (137), and cites the authorities Tasso, Danielo, 
Vida and Horace, only one of whom is truly an “ancient", as 
being founded on Aristotelian aphorisms (138). Indeed, in 
this work he scarcely goes beyond an appeal to authority to 
show that Gbngora’s poetics are condemned by both classical 
and derivative Renaissance theorists. His denial that the 
moderns have a similar philosophical foundation indicates 
his refusal to recognize the existence of a valid 
theoretical intention on the part of the practitioners of 
the nueva poesfa.
As in the letter treated above, here Lope 
distinguishes between two types of obscurity, only one of 
which is admissable, but there is no analytical explanation 
of the distinction, only the citation of classical 
condemnation or approval of the two forms. The 
unacceptable version is, of course, exemplified by 
Gbngora’s poetic language. Lope points to Gbngora’s 
project of "enriquecer el arte y aun la lengua con tales 
exornaciones y figuras, cuales nunca fueron imaginadas ni 
hasta su tiempo vistas" as the cause of the obscurity and 
locates the resulting difficulty in the reception of the 
attempt: "la dificultad estA en el recibirlo" (138). This
mention of the reader’s role in interpretation is not 
followed through in an analytical fashion because Lope’s 
analysis does not go beyond the naming and condemnation of
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the vices that were censured by the ancients. Citing Aulus 
Gelius, Lope states that the most bothersome and culpable 
source of obscurity and ambiguity is the use of "new, 
unknown and previously unheard words" ("verba nova, 
incognita et inaudita") (138), but, again, he offers no 
examples or further explanation. He concedes, with 
Quintillian, that the limited use of neologisms is 
acceptable as long as it does not appear to be affectation 
(138). Other sources of confusion Lope cites are frequent 
syntactical transposition and the excessive use of figures 
and tropes, both of which are admitted by authorities, but 
only if they are used sparingly.
In a parenthetical insertion of just over two
paragraphs, Lope identifies the acceptable type of
obscurity as that dealing with certain types of thought:
“En las materias graves y filosbficas confieso la breve
escuridad de las sentencias" (138). He connects this
obscurity with the Neoplatonic hermetic tradition’s
intentional concealment from the uninitiated of the
3
powerful secrets of life and of creation. Lope cites a 
statement that Pico della Mirandola made to Hermolaus 
Barbarus: "We did not write for the vulgar, but for you
and those like you" ("Vulgo non scripsimus, sed tibi et 
tuis similibus" (138; my translation). Lope adds that Pico 
spoke "admirablemente," thus indicating that this type of 
obscurity goes beyond being merely admissible; it is 
desirable.
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Lope further illustrates the validity of this 
principle of concealment of inner mysteries of great value
with two examples from antiquity; "Y acuerdase de los
silenos de Alcibiades: Erant enim simulacra, por lo
exterior fiera y hbrrida; pero con deidad intrlnseca"
(138). This reference is to a passage from Plato’s 
Symposium in which Alcibiades, in praising Socrates, 
compares him to statues of Silenus, which, "when their two 
halves are pulled open, they are found to contain images of 
gods" (219).^ Socrates is like the satyr statues, 
Alcibiades states, in that with lovers he outwardly feigns 
stupidity and ignorance. "Is this not like a Silenus?" 
Alcibiades asks, and he answers:
Exactly. It is an outward casing he wears,
similarly to the sculptured Silenus. But if you
opened his inside, you cannot imagine how full he 
is . . .  of sobriety. . . . Whether anyone else 
has caught him in a serious moment and opened 
him, and seen the images inside, I know not; but 
I saw them one day, and thought them so divine 
and golden, so perfectly fair and wondrous . . . 
(223)
A third instance of comparison is even more appropriate to
Lope’s intention in that it is concerned with discourse.
Alcibiades continues:
For there is a point I omitted when I began— how
his talk most of all resembles the Silenuses that
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are made to open. If you chose to listen to 
Socrates' discourses you would feel them at first 
to be quite ridiculous; on the outside they are 
clothed with such absurd words and phrases— all, 
of course, the hide of a mocking satyr. . . . 
[A]nyone inexpert and thoughtless might laugh his 
speeches to scorn. But when these are opened, 
and you obtain a fresh view of them by getting 
inside, first of all you will discover that they 
are the only speeches which have any sense in 
them; and secondly, that none are so divine, so 
rich in images of virtue . . . .  (239)
As to whether Lope was referring simply to the first 
passage quoted above, which would be sufficient to 
illustrate his intention, or whether he had in mind the 
whole of Alcibiades' reference to the Silenus statues, one 
cannot determine. The points to be taken are that there 
are hidden within things divine natures or virtues, and 
that it is acceptable to refer to them in a manner that 
maintains or reflects their concealment.
Lope follows the Platonic reference with a Heraclitean 
one that has different implications: "Y acuerdase de . . . 
donde HerAclito dijo que estaba escondida la verdad” (138). 
Heraclitus, who was given the epithet, "the obscure," by 
the Greeks on account of his difficult style (Kirk 183), 
held that the unity of things was hidden beneath the 
surface (192). Wilbur and Allen explain that,
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For Heraclitus, the nature of the truth is not 
obvious; indeed, it can only be expressed in 
terms of metaphor, paradox, and riddle. . . .
[T]he nature of truth is such that language 
cannot express it directly, but only by "giving a 
sign”. Such would also undoubtedly be 
Heraclitus* explanation Of the "dark" character 
of many of his own pronouncements. (65-66)
The reference to Heraclitus tells what ultimately underlies 
appearances: the truth that all things are one. With
Heraclitus, however, the truth is hidden not so much 
deliberately, but because there can be no adequate 
linguistic expression of it, only a parallel discourse that 
hints at it. One may conclude, then, that for Lope 
obscurity is not only desirable in order to keep the truth 
hidden from those unworthy of it, but also acceptable 
because obscure references to truth are inevitable; 
discourse is incapable of anything more than insinuating 
truth.
Further evidence for Lope's hermetic leanings are 
abundant in his literary production. The use of 
astrological inclinations and influences in his comedias, 
the role of the virtues of precious stones and of plants as 
important clues to interpreting his plots and the actions 
of his characters, the references to magic, and the entire 
Arcadia (as Frederick A. DeArmas has shown) all attest to a 
great familiarity with the secret philosophy. Further,
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DAmaso Alonso has drawn attention to the fact that the 
famous sonnet which first appeared in 1613 in La dam» boba. 
"La calidad elementar resiste,“ (and which Lope considered 
so important as to publish it in three different works and 
to explicate it twice) is based on Pico della Mirandola's 
Heptaplus (Poesia 457-459)."’ Lope admits as much in his 
explication,^ but whether his literary use of hermetic 
Neoplatonism can be taken to demonstrate a personal embrace 
of it is impossible to know for certain.7
The following passage from Lope's "Papel" would seem 
to indicate a hermetic (resemblant) approach to 
interpretation, but since it is employed ironically, it is 
difficult to ascertain how much of the statement can be 
taken as assertion:
Platon dijo que todas las ciencias humanas y 
divinas se incluyeron en el poema de Homero; 
puede ser que aquf suceda lo mismo, y que de 
faltar Platones no se ha entendido el secreto 
deste divino estilo. (139-140)
If the first part is interpreted as sincere, Lope accepts 
Plato's statement and is thus operating on the resemblant 
idea that discourse is a commentary parallel to, 
inseparable from, and inclusive of, the primal text of the 
universe. Taken as irony, the second half suggests that 
since no one is able to interpret Gbngora's style, he has 
written a discourse that is not a parallel discourse, but 
rather a monstrosity that points to nothing beyond itself.
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It is "jerigonza" because it is meaningless, which is a 
theoretical impossibility.
Gbngora has somehow defied the order of the universe. 
Lope maintains that Gbngora and his followers, "con . . . 
transposiciones, cuatro preceptos y seis voces latinas b 
frasis enfAticas, se hallan levantados adonde ellos mismos 
no se conocen, ni aun se si se entienden” (138). They have 
succeeded in destroying the referential relationship that 
language has with the world and with thought.
The picture of Lope’s ideas on language and his ideas 
about obscurity both in language and in the concept remains 
vague. While his view of language as subsequent to thought 
and his use of the word "concepto'1 would seem to indicate 
an intellectual dimension that exists only in the 
analytico-referential epistemology, the hermetical nature 
of his defense of conceptual obscurity points toward a 
resemblant understanding of the world. That Lope’s ideas 
of knowledge and language would include characteristics of 
both epistemologies is not surprising in an era of 
epistemological transition. It is even more understandable 
if one accepts DAmaso Alonso’s assessment that “La 
actividad filosbfica de Lope era, pues, no nos enganemos, 
bien modesta: la de un simple resumidor" (Poesla 457). It
seems only fair to Lope, however, to remember that analysis 
was not characteristic of the resemblant epistemology to 
which he, at least in part, belonged.
An author who was analytic in his limited body of
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criticism of Gbngora was Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas, 
one of the most prominent writers in seventeenth-century 
Spanish letters, and perhaps the most vitriolic. Although 
he, like Lope, directed many burlesque and satirical verses 
against Gbngora, both personally and in condemnation of his 
poetry, they yield relatively little information about his 
epistemological assumptions. Quevedo's writing referential 
to Gbngora’s poetry is more often satirical hyperbole of 
Gbngora’s stylistic exaggerations than rational exposition 
of what he saw as defects. In the satire "Aguja de navegar 
cultas" that circulated in manuscript form before being 
published in 1631 (Martfnez Aranc6n 75n2; Blecua 339n), 
appears the "Receta para hacer Soledades en un d£a, " a 
catalogue of Gbngora’s cultismos. Quevedo’s technique in 
the poem consists of the accumulation of Gongoran diction, 
almost without comment. In the sonnet "£Que captas 
nocturnal en tus canciones," however, Quevedo exaggerates 
the use of neologism in attacking Gbngora personally: 
tu forastereidad es tan eximia, 
que te ha de detractar el que te rumia, 
pues ructas viscerable cacochimia. 
Farmacophorolando como numia, 
si estomachabundancia das tan nimia, 
metamorphoseando el Arcadumia. (Artigas 374)
As with Lope, there is no analytical exposition. The 
satire demonstrates that Quevedo has read Gbngora closely, 
but his assumption in writing is that the Cbrdoban’s
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stylistic exaggeration is self-evidently ridiculous and 
necessitates no further commentary.
In the romance. "iPoeta de oh que lindicoi," Quevedo 
does offer some criticism of Gbngora’s use of words, 
calling him "verdugo de los vocablos, / que a puras 
vueltas de cuerda / los haces que digan algo" (Martinez 
Arancbn 93-94). There are clues to Quevedo’s idea of the 
nature of languge in the image of the verdugo and his 
instruments. The "verdugo," according to Covarrubias, was 
"El ministro de justicia que executa las penas de muerte, 
mutilaci6n de miembro, apotes, vergtienca, tormento" (1001). 
In addition, a military verdugo was called "maestro de 
altas obras, porque el ahorcar y deseabeQar y dar tratos de 
cuerda, se haze en alto porque todos lo vean" (1001-1002).
Two possible significations of "vueltas de cuerda" 
allow for two interpretations of the indictment. If 
"vueltas" signifies "repetitions," then the cuerda is a 
whip, and Gbngora is accused of forcing the words to reveal 
things they do not wish to in the same way that a torturer
O
forces his victim to divulge information. The complaint, 
then, is that Gbngora uses words in such a way as to force 
them into signifying concepts that they do not ordinarily 
signify. (That Quevedo sees words as signifiers of 
concepts and not of things is made clear in his remarks on 
decorum that are discussed below.)
If, however, "vueltas" signifies “turns" or "loops," 
then the image is that of a hangman’s noose, a complicated
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knot turned round upon itself, much like Gbngora's 
syntactical structures. The noose used by the poet 
(violent hyperbaton) does violence to words, forcing out 
significance by "ex-pression" (“exprimir"). However, since 
the executioner's function is to kill, the only possible 
"algo" that the poet can squeeze out is the "nada" of 
death. And if Gbngora kills the meaning of words 
(separates them from their proper referent) by syntactical 
misplacement, then his language does not adopt the form 
that occurs on the level of thought. His use thus denies 
the principle of the analytical epistemology that language
has no syntax of its own and receives its form from the
9
syntax of the thought that it embodies.
Quevedo's most theoretical treatment of culterano 
poetry does not occur in his satire but in the letter in 
which he dedicates his edition of the poetic works of Fray 
Luis de Le6n to the Conde-Duque de Olivares in 1631, four 
years after Gbngora's death. 10 One of only two statements 
of Quevedo's poetics (Blecua 8), ^  the dedication begins 
with praise for Fray Luis’ poetry as an example of clear 
and decorous writing. From that point of departure,
Quevedo wastes no time in turning his attention to poetry 
that does not conform to classical stylistic prescriptions. 
He writes of Fray Luis’ work:
Todo su estilo con majestad estudiada es decente 
a lo magnffico de la sentencia, que ni ambiciosa 
se descubre fuera del cuerpo de la oracibn, ni
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tenebrosa se esconde; mejor dire, que se pierde 
en la confusibn afectada de figures, y en la 
inundacibn de palabras forasteras. (97)
In the second of the two abuses of stylistic propriety he 
cites, the concept ("sentencia")12 is lost in confusing 
mannerisms and in the inundation of exotic words. If 
language is considered capable of preventing the 
transmission of the concept to the receiver's 
understanding— either by the use of figures or by the use 
of words that do not indicate a signification intelligible 
to the reader— then the concept is an entity that exists 
independently of language.
In Quevedo's view, however, language in discourse is 
not independent of the concept. In order for an author to 
achieve adequate representation of concepts, language must 
be made appropriate to the concept in the etymological 
sense of "belonging to" or "being the property of." Only 
through this co-option can language function transparently. 
Stylistic propriety, the variation of style for the purpose 
of conforming language to different kinds of concepts, is 
the necessary means of achieving clarity in representation. 
Quevedo continues, "La locucibn esclarecida hace tratables 
los retiramientos de las ideas, y da luz a lo escondido y 
ciego de los conceptos" (97). A return to the metaphor of 
vision for understanding is particularly helpful for 
interpreting this passage, since the words "esclarecida, " 
"luz," "escondido," and "ciego" all relate to vision.
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Discourse that is made transparent— that is, discourse 
which has been so informed by its conceptual referent that 
only the concept (and not the language) is "visible"— makes 
the gaps (“retiramientos") between concepts ("ideas") and 
their referents (things) not only visible but palpable. It 
also makes visible ("da luz a") what is hidden ("lo 
escondido") and what is unseeable ("lo ciego") in the 
concept, that is, the inadequacies of the concept to 
immediately and faithfully represent its referent. Any 
obscurity should lie in the concept itself and its referent 
in the world. There should be no space between language
and concept if the language is transparent as it should
, 13be.
Quevedo carefully validates his theorizing by placing 
it within the classical tradition:
Esto mandaron con imperio los que escribieron 
artes de poesla, y escribieron desta suerte los 
que tienen el imperio de los poemas. Y en todas 
lenguas aquellos solos merecieron aclamacidn 
universal, que dieron luz a lo oscuro, y 
facilidad a lo dificultoso . . . .  (97-98)
Having gained more authority by this subsumptive act, he 
returns to his theoretical analysis, adding to his 
knowledge/vision metaphor by stating that "oscurecer lo 
claro, es borrar, y no escribir . . . "  (98). I take “lo 
claro" here to mean "the obvious" (that which is clearly 
seen), rather than "the transparent" (that which is seen
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through clearly), because of the similar use of "lo oscuro" 
and "lo difieultoso" in the previous clause, quoted above. 
Obscuring one’s "vision" of a concept that is by nature 
obvious is the equivalent of erasing, since the purpose of 
writing is to make concepts visible by putting them into 
language. The reference to "lo claro" indicates thoughts 
that are not obscure, namely those concepts which are 
perceived as adequately and immediately representing their 
referent in the world. To impede arriving at such a 
concept by using language that does not equally represent 
the concept is to erase what is already legibly written, 
the connection between concept and thing in the world.
The remainder of the dedication consists primarily of 
citations of Greek and Latin writers of treatises on 
poetics and rhetoric pertinent to Quevedo's condemnation of 
stylistic obscurity. The passage examined above, however, 
is sufficient to establish that his fundamental assumptions 
about language were more thoroughly reasoned than Lope’s 
and that they are clearly identifiable with the analytico- 
referential epistemology. His statements on stylistic 
propriety reveal a vision of the linguistic sign as binary, 
and his idea of the concepto is that of the conceptual 
element of the sign. He locates his criticism of culterano 
poets not in the obscure concept but in the severance or 
attenuation of the link between word and concept within the 
sign. Although his writing is not an analytical exposition 
of poetic theory, it presents the fruits of clear and
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consistent analysis.
The humanist author, Francisco Cascales, offers both 
an attack on Gbngora's poetry and a systematic account of 
poetic theory. The censure occurs in his Cartas 
filolbtficas (published in 1634, but written earlier), a 
collection of thirty letters on various topics organized 
into three "decadas.” The last three letters of the first 
decade are of interest to this study as they deal directly 
with Gbngora’s "Polifemo" and "Soledades." The Tablas 
poeticas. written in 1604 and published in 1617, are the 
first Spanish treatment of poetics that fuses “plena y 
conscientemente" Aristotelian theoretical and Horatian 
practical precepts (Brancaforte x). I will begin by 
examining Cascales' attack on the poems, and will later 
employ the Tablas poeticas to interpret his understanding 
of the nature of language.
Written not to Gbngora but to the humanist poet Luis 
Tribaldos de Toledo, the "Epistola VIII" is entitled "Sobre 
la obscuridad del ‘Polifemo' y ‘Soledades’ de Don Luis de 
Gbngora." Cascales begins with an anecdote suggesting that 
Gbngora, on whom he lavishes praise, is merely toying with 
his fellow poets and is solely interested in demonstrating 
his poetic prowess (177). After establishing that 
obscurity is "absolutely vicious" by citing Cicero and 
QuintiIlian (179), Cascales asks:
iQue otra cosa nos dan el Polifemo y Soledades y 
otros pcemas semejantes, sino palabras
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trastornadas con catacreses y metaforas 
licenciosas, que cuando fueran tropos muy 
legftimos, por ser tan continuos y seguidos unos 
tras otros, habian de engendrar obscuridad, 
intricamiento y embarazo? (180-181)
The wording of the question reveals an assumption of 
natural laws underlying language and its use. Just as the 
English term "upside down" assumes a prior correct 
position, so does the word "trastornadas. " Cascales' 
definition of "catachresis"— "una abusibn de la propria 
significacibn del nombre" (Tablas pobticas 106-107)— refers 
to a signification that is proper to a word, implying that 
words have, as a property, a given signification. It also 
states that catachresis is an act that violates that 
aprioristic situation. Further, he describes Gbngora’s 
metaphors as "licenciosas," thus labelling them as 
disregarding some unspecified rule or precept.' Lastly, he 
indicates that G6ngora's tropes are not "legltimos," that 
is, not allowed by law.
This preoccupation with legality points to an unnamed 
and unquestionable power outside of language as author of 
the laws by which meaning— the fixed relation between word 
as signifier and its signification— was guaranteed. It 
appears, however, that the reference is no more than a 
remnant of the metadiscourse of the resemblant epistemology 
since Cascales, like Quevedo, places the blame for 
Gbngora’s obscurity strictly on the level of language: "Y
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el mal es, que de sola la colocacibn de palabras y abusi6n 
de figuras nace y procede el caos de esta poesia“ (181).
For Cascales, it is Gbngora’s syntactical innovation and 
highly figured language that, by causing opacity between 
word and concept, disrupt the natural order of things and 
result in chaos. He elaborates his claim, explaining that: 
el velo que entenebrece los conceptos de esta 
fibula es sola la frasis. iHarta desdicha, que 
nos tengan amarrados al banco de la obscuridad 
solas palabrasI Y esas, no por ser antiguas, no 
por ser inauditas, no por ser ficticias, no por 
ser nuevas o peregrinas, sino por dos causas: la
una por la confusa colocacibn de partes, la otra 
por las continuas y atrevidas metiforas, que cada 
una es viciosa si es atrevida, y juntas mucho 
mis. (192-193)
It is interesting to note that Cascales does not find fault 
with Gbngora here for his vocabulary. Indeed, as Dimaso 
Alonso has demonstrated, the cultismos that Gbngora
employed were not words as foreign to the Spanish literary
14
tradition as were claimed at the time. The two sources 
of obscurity that he cites are syntactical distortion and 
the frequency and difficulty of metaphors. His comparison 
of Gbngora's poetic discourse to a veil that obscures 
concepts is a version of the same vision/knowledge metaphor 
commented on previously.
Cascales comments on the obscurity of culterano
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poetry, saying that it moves "como el lobo, que da unos 
pasos adelante y otros atrAs, para que, as£ confusos, no se 
eche de ver el camino que lleva" (188). The wolf simile 
here is unusual in that the animal has valid, practical 
reason for hiding his tracks. Generally, Gbngora’s 
obscurity is considered either the unintended by-product of 
his project of enriching the language, or, as Cascales 
charged, it is seen as part of a trick that Gbngora is 
playing on his fellow poets.
Like Quevedo and Lope, Cascales finds obscurity 
acceptable in those cases in which it results from the 
reader’s ignorance and is not the fault of the author, 
"habiendolo dicho dildcida y claramente como debe" (181). 
His list begins with obscurity that has as its source 
"alguna doctrina exquisita" (190), the recondite 
philosophical concepto accepted by both Lope and Quevedo. 
Legitimate examples of secret knowledge include "los 
secretos de naturaleza, . . . las fibulas, . . . las
historias, . . . las propriedades de plantas, animales y 
piedras, . . . [y] los usos y ritos de varias naciones"
(181), but these are only permitted if used infrequently 
(190). For Cascales, then, an acceptably difficult concept 
is one that requires further interpretation of its referent 
as a sign— secrets of nature, virtues of plants, stones, 
and animals, exquisite doctrine— or that requires a prior 
knowledge— history, mythological fables. Another case of 
allowable obscurity occurs "cuando alguna palabra ignorada
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de los hombres semidoctos escurece la oracibn" (190), which 
again points to a lack of required prior knowledge. 
Deliberate obscurantism is permitted "cuando queremos con 
ella disimular algdn concepto deshonesto y torpe, porque no 
ofenda las orejas castas" (190-191), and also in the case 
of satire, when, in order to make "los viciosos tragar la 
reprehensi6n como pfldora, [los poetas] la doran primero 
con la perffrasis intricada, y fingiendo nuevos nombres, 
para que quede disimulada la persona de quien hablan 
satfricamente" (191). All other uses are vicious and 
should be abhorred "como a furia del infierno" and avoided 
"como a peste de la poetica elocucidn" (191).
"Epistola IX," a defense of Gbngora by Francisco del 
Viliar, and Cascales' reply in "Epfstola X" reveal little 
new about Cascales' basic assumptions in regard to 
language. Cascales does offer there a medical explanation 
for Gbngora's style by proposing that, "En fin, todo esto 
es un humor grueso que se le ha subido a la cabeza al autor 
de este ateismo y a sus sectaries, que, como humor, se ha 
de evaporar y resolver poco a poco en nada" (219). The 
reference to atheism quoted above is repeated with a 
description of Gbngora's poetic activity as "Volviendo a su 
primero caos las cosas; haciendo que ni los pensamientos se 
entiendsn, ni las palabras se conozcan con la confusion y 
desorden" (220).
The charge of atheism, along with that of returning 
things to the chaos in which they existed before God
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created order by naming them, is linked directly to the 
legal phraseology discussed above. These, together with 
references to the secrets of nature, the properties of 
plants, stones, and animals, appear to indicate an 
epistemology based on similitude with God as the author of 
meaning. Cascales* view of the task of language as 
transmitting independently existing thought nonetheless 
definitely belongs to the second epistmology. The apparent 
contradiction may have its foundation in Cascales* concept 
of poetry as a divine activity:
Que hable el poeta como docto, consientolo y 
apruebolo; y es bien que, ya por la divinidad de 
la poesia, ya porque los poetas son maestros de 
la filosofia y censores de la vida humana, hablen 
en sublime estilo y toquen cosas arcanas y 
secretas. (182)
It seems that while his linguistic theory has made the 
transition from the earlier epistemology, Cascales* 
poetics, taken unexamined from Aristotle and Horace, has 
not.
Evidence of just such epistemological difference can 
be found in Cascales’ discussions of tropes and of style in 
the Tablas poeticas. The trope, which Cascales defines as 
"una translacidn de la cosa propria a la agena, con alguna 
virtud y semejanca" (104), while admitting otherness, is 
based on similitude. Although he may be thinking in 
analytico-referential terms of resemblance as the basis for
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concepts imagined in the understanding, Cascales employs 
the language of the resemblant epistemology by speaking of 
similarity between things rather than between intellectual 
elements. In discussing the metaphor as one of the four 
kinds of tropes (along with metonymy, irony, and 
synecdoche), Cascales continues referring to things:
La met&phora es translacidn de una cosa semejante 
a otra. Este tropo es tan c-opioso, que se 
estiende a todas las cosas naturales, porque 
ningdn proprio y cierto vocablo ay que no se 
pueda en alguna manera sacar y traer a lugar 
ageno [Y ] hay otras infinitas metAphoras
que, como aya similitud dellas a la cosa propria, 
ilustran y hermosean la oracidn. (106)
The property of the metaphor that allows for the connection 
of all things is what Foucault describes as the universal 
applicability of the principle of resemblance, and what 
Hauser attributed to the philosphical concept of 
relationism (295). The fact that the trope is founded on 
similitude, however, does not necessitate that the affinity 
occur between things in the world. Whether Cascales' 
terminology is a confusion due to the parallel between the 
peculiar metasemiotic nature of the trope and the 
underlying assumptions of the resemblant epistemology, or 
whether the coincidental vocabulary points to Cascales’ 
presuppositions about the order of the cosmos is unclear.
A third possibility is that of imprecision due to his
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not having reexamined the Aristotelian and Horatian poetic 
theories he synthesizes in the light of the more recent 
linguistic theory that he embraces. As Brancaforte 
demonstrates, Cascales takes that theory directly from 
Torquato Tasso’s Disoorsi dell’Arte Poetica in discussing 
the origin of differences in style (232-233nll). The 
dialogic format of the Tablas has Castalio, the teacher, 
quoting Tasso to Pierio, his interlocutor, explaining that 
style does not proceed from words, as Dante proposed:
Los conceptos son el fin y, por consequencia, la 
forma de las palabras y de las vozes. La forma, 
pues no deve ser ordenada en favor y gracia de la 
materia, ni pender de las palabras, antes al 
reves. Las palabras deven pender de los 
conceptos y tomar ley dellos. (233)
For Tasso, as for Quevedo, language must become 
transparently subordinate to the concept, taking on its 
very form in order to represent it correctly, and indeed, 
the similarity between their statements on style suggests 
that Tasso may have been the source of Quevedo’s ideas.
The argument continues with mention of resemblance:
Las imagines deven ser semejantes a la cosa 
imaginada y imitada. Las palabras son imagines e 
imitadoras de los conceptos (como dize 
Aristdteles), luego las palabras deven seguir a 
la naturaleza de los conceptos. (234)
It is clear from these sentences that Tasso’s model of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
thought and language is not based on a resemblance thought 
to exist in the world but in the images of the 
entendimiento. He removes the need for inference by 
describing his epistemology:
ay grandlssima diferencia entre las cosas, 
conceptos y palabras. Cosas son aquellas que 
est&n fuera de nuestros Animos y que estAn en sf 
mismas. Conceptos son las imagines de las cosas 
que se forman en nuestra alma diversamente, segdn 
es diverse la imaginacidn de los hombres. Las 
palabras son imagines de las imagines; quiero 
dezir, aquellas que por medio del oydo 
representan [al?] alma los conceptos sacados de 
las cosas. (234-235)
Tasso's clear exposition leaves absolutely no doubt about 
the nature and locus of language’s referent. It is likely, 
since Cascales does distinguish between thing and concept, 
that his use of "cosa" as referent in the discussion of 
tropes is no more than an example of the imprecise use of 
terms.
A feature of knowledge that emerges in Tasso’s 
explanation is the idea that concepts are transmissible.
His definition of conceptos as being “diversely" formed, 
"segdn es diversa la imaginacidn de los hombres" (234-235), 
establishes that they are not universally uniform, but 
rather are unique products of individual imaginations.
Such an idea presupposes— and assumes to be universal— the
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transmissibility of the concept. That is to say, if the 
concept itself is not universal, but it can be interpreted 
with accuracy (provided that the language is made to 
conform to it), then the faculty of understanding (with 
necessary prior knowledge) is capable of interpreting all 
concepts. In addition, the understanding of both the 
conceiver and the receiver of the concept must needs be 
structurally identical, that is, they must operate on 
universal principles of order.
With this clarification, Cascales’ view of the problem 
of obscurity can be described more precisely. There are 
three sites of obscurity: in the concept itself, in the
language that transmits it, and in the ignorance of the 
receiver’s faculty of understanding. Obscurity that occurs 
in the concept because some truths can not be 
conceptualized is unavoidable if one is to allude to those 
truths. Also, that difficulty due to the reader’s 
ignorance of some prior knowledge necessary for 
interpretation is not the fault of the writer and exempts 
him from blame. In language, deliberate obscurity is 
acceptable if the concept is one that should be concealed 
for legitimate moral (to protect chaste ears and eyes) or 
rhetorical reasons (to satirize someone indirectly). If, 
however, language, which should conform transparently to 
the concept it represents, instead impedes or prevents 
transmission of the concept because of the author’s efforts 
to beautify it, -chen it is to be censured. In poetry and
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rhetoric, some embellishment of the language is desirable 
in order to teach, delight, or move the listener or reader, 
but when the author's stylistic devices cover rather than 
adorn the concept, they are damnable.
Tasso’s brief statement of the purpose of language—  
"la naturaleza no nos dio la habla para otra cosa sino para 
significar los conceptos del Animo" (qtd. in Cascales,
Tablas 233-234)— has important implications for this study. 
If language functions other than to transmit concepts, then 
the transmissiblity of the concept is jeopardized. Under 
such conditions, accurate transmission becomes a conscious 
choice rather than a natural phenomenon, and the validity 
of the transmitted and interpreted concept is always in 
question. And since transmissiblity serves as the basis 
for the communication of knowledge, the accuracy of 
knowledge itself is threatened. It is therefore 
understandable that Gbngora’s intentional linguistic 
obscurity (if not opacity) in the name of poetry would 
provoke Cascales’ accusation, cited earlier, of Gbngora as 
"Volviendo a su primer caos las cosas; haciendo que ni los 
pensamientos se entiendan, ni las palabras se conozcan con 
la confusibn y desorden" (Cartas 220).
Disorder is the central concern of Juan de JAuregui, 
an author who was even more vigorous and thorough in his 
condemnnation of the “Soledades." In 1616 he published a 
detailed analysis of the first "Soledad," the Antldoto 
contra la pestilente poesla de las Soledades, aplicado s £u
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
autor para defenderle de sf mismo. Although a somewhat 
hastily written, emotional reaction to the poem, the 
Antldoto served as a catalyst for further criticism.
Miguel Artigas lists sixteen authors who responded with 
either attacks on the Antfdoto or defenses of Gdngora’s 
style, or who wrote commentaries to explain the poem (232- 
233).^ A second text, the brief "Introducidn" to a 
collection of his own poetic works published in 1618, 
contains a succinct, epistemological description of the 
roles of thought and language in poetry. In 1624, JAuregui 
published the more extensive Discurso poetico: Advierte el
desorden y engafio de algunos escritores. which offers a 
more reasoned discussion of poetics than the Antidoto. 
Directed not specifically against G6ngora, but in censure 
of those among "nuestros poetas" who practiced the nueva 
poesfa. the Discurso exposes clearly the epistemological 
assumptions of its author.
JAuregui begins the Antidoto with a brief introduction 
in which he identifies his purpose in writing as that of 
dissuading Gdngora from further attempts at poetry. The 
remainder of the book consists of his attack on the poem 
and is divided into forty-three numbered sections. The 
organization of the parts is not clear; he begins with 
title, plot and setting, and then goes on to address vices, 
seemingly at random, giving examples of such things as 
puns, falsehoods, stylistic inconsistencies, accentuation 
problems, the use of unfamiliar words and unfamiliar
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meanings for familiar words, and hyperbole. Throughout are 
scattered brief, general comments on the obscurity of the 
poem.
At the beginning of his analysis, JAuregui establishes 
the absence of a readily discoverable, fixed meaning as his 
major objection to the poem. The title, he says, is 
deceptive, since the protagonist is not alone, but rather 
finds himself surrounded by "legiones de serranas i 
pastores" (86). The setting is unidentified, and the plot 
is indefinite and without order ("concierto"). The 
protagonist, a "mirAn" who has neither name nor history, 
does not do anything that would further define him or the 
plot. Although GAngora situates the poem temporally in 
spring, his descriptions of the weather indicate both 
summer and winter. The elevated style of the dedicatory 
would lead one to expect a sublime action of heroic 
proportions, but it refers to an ordinary hunt, a mere 
entertainment. All of these objections are indictments of 
the uncertainty of interpretation due to misleading signs 
for unexpected or undefined referents.
Passing from the "mala disposiciAn de esta obra en 
general" (92), JAuregui examines particulars. In parts 10 
through 15, he cites passages he considers to be totally
false (93). In section 10 (93), citing GAngora’s reference
16to the North Star as the one that shines most in the sky, 
JAuregui points out that other stars and planets are 
brighter. Pedro Diaz de Ribas explains that the star not
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only is brighter from the point of view of the mariners who 
look to it for direction, but also that it shines most in 
the sense that it is visible the whole year (qtd. in Gates 
93nl7). J&uregui next cites (section 11, 94) Gdngora’s 
image, "vaga Clicie del viento" (1. 371), which he 
interprets as referring to a ship. He sees falsehood in 
that sunflowers turn toward the sun but ships face away 
from the wind. Diaz de Ribas justifies the figure, 
pointing out that "Clicie" represents a sail rather than a 
ship (Gates 94nl8). In a third passage quoted in section 
12 (94), the ocean is pictured as being so great that even 
the sun cannot know it all.'*'7 J&uregui complains of the 
impossiblity of the image, and Dfaz de Ribas, agreeing with 
his assessment but not his condemnation, calls it hyperbole 
(Gates 94nl9). These objections (as well as the three not 
described here) are examples of Jduregui’s literal reading 
of figurative language. He seems to experience difficulty 
in defining limits between figured and transparent 
language.
The following excerpt from section 16 reveals a great 
deal about JAuregui’s ideas on language, as well as his 
feeling of frustration over Gdngora’s obscurity. In noting 
that "apenas ay perlodo que nos descubra enteramente el 
intento de su autor" (96), he indicates that, for him, the 
concept is transmissible, as it was for Lope, Quevedo, and 
Cascales. That he also shares with Cascales the same view 
of the concept and the site of Gdngora’s obscurity is
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evident in the next sentence:
Aun si alii se trataran pensamientos exquisitos i 
sentencias profundas, serfa tolerable que dellas 
resultase la obscuridad; pero que diziendo puras 
frioneras, i hablando de gallos i gallinas, i de 
pan i manqanas, con otras sernejantes raterfas, 
sea tanta la marana i la durega de el dezir, que 
la palabras solas de mi lenguaje castellano 
materno me confundan la inteligencia, ipor Dios 
que es braba fuerga de escabrosidad i bronco 
estiloi (96-97)
An obscure concept— one whose referent needs further 
interpretation— is acceptable. When the concept refers to 
a trifling thing or is one whose referent is something 
simple and ordinary, then it is intolerable that its 
transmission should be hidden by the tangle of "palabras 
solas." JAuregui agrees with Lope in claiming that, 
despite Gdngora’s language, his message can be interpreted: 
No se entienda por esto que a pesar de Vm. no 
entendemos quanto quiso dezir, aunque no lo dize, 
si bien se encuentran partes donde por largo 
espacio no alcanna la mAs profunda meditacidn a 
darles fondo" (97).
JAuregui obviously inserted this sentence to protect 
himself from charges of being incapable of understanding 
the poetry, but it contradicts what he claimed earlier. If 
Gdngora’s meaning can always be understood, then it cannot
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be true that few of the sentences in the "Soledades" reveal 
his intention, unless JAuregui is exaggerating his charge 
(which is not unlikely). In the former case, one could 
conclude that JAuregui considers GAngora’s language to be 
obscure but not opaque, since meaning can be finally 
discovered, and since language cannot simultaneously 
transmit and prevent transmission of the concept. He
asserts that it impedes but does not prevent
1 ftinterpretation.±a
Clues as to JAuregui’s vision of the interpretive 
process emerge in his complaint that “se encuentran partes 
donde por largo espacio no alcanpa la mAs profunda 
meditaciAn a darles fondo." Ordinarily this ground or 
context (although it must be provided by the interpreter) 
is not particularly noticed and is considered to be 
supplied by the clear language of the text. GAngora’s 
style is so obscure, however, that it necessitates the 
self-aware participation of the interpreter in construing 
meaning, indicated by the verb "dar." By providing the 
"missing" elements necessary for understanding the text, it 
is the interpreter and not the author who makes the 
connection between language and concept. This enhanced 
role for the interpreter is objectionable because it shifts 
the locus of truth from a location beyond or beneath the 
language of the text to the act of interpretation; 
signification occurs when word is connected with its 
conceptual referent. The shift in task from discovering
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connections to constructing them jeopardizes the idea of 
knowledge as a stable and permanent body of truth and 
returns language to the immediacy of its oral, ephemeral 
origins.
Francisco FernAndez de C6rdoba’s quotation of this 
passage in his response to the Antidoto differs from the 
manuscript edited by Eunice Joiner Gates, substituting 
"hallarles fondo" for "darles fondo“ (Examen 416).
According to Gates, FernAndez was reading an earlier 
version of the Antfdoto. which JAuregui subsequently 
revised (81). JAuregui’s decision to change the word from 
"find" to "give" is significant to this study in justifying 
my interpretation that he was conscious of the self-aware 
process needed to interpret the poem.
Continuing to base his critique on the theme of 
inconstancy, JAuregui next addresses stylistic unevenness, 
citing examples of a plebeian style that run counter to 
what he claims was Gbngora’s intention of writing heroic 
and grandiloquent verse (97-101). JAuregui sees further 
uncertainty in the more elegant passages where G6ngora not 
only uses new words, or familiar words with new meaning, 
but repeats them so frequently as to become cloying. It is 
interesting to note that two of the words JAuregui cites as 
being repeated to the point of irritation have an important 
connection with the theme of his attack. The word “senas," 
of which he quotes nine instances, serves to delay closure 
since signs are intentional displacements. They serve to
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increase the gap between signifier and signified by- 
inserting an intermediate step between them. For example,
if Gdngora writes "Senas diera de su arrebatamiento" (1.
19749), or "lisongear de agradecidas senas" (1. 77), he is 
pointing out the fact that these qualities— rapture and 
gratitude— can be seen only by interpreting actions that 
are visible. By not saying directly that the protagonist 
is grateful or ecstatic, the poet passes on to his reader 
the burden of interpretation. The other word, "errante," 
(of which he also cites nine occurances) signals 
semantically the absence of fixity that JAuregui finds so 
disturbing.
Not all of JAuregui’s criticism is rooted in 
objections to the indeterminacy of Gdngora’s language, but 
the principle motivation and emotional energy of his attack 
seem to flow from that source. In his treatment of 
Gdngora’s use of "el si. y el ne, " JAuregui groups without 
distinction several different mannerisms that Gdngora 
employs, those using "sf" and "no," "si . . . no," and "no 
. . . sino," which DAmaso Alonso classified (Lengua
Poetica). The condemnation in the Antidoto is founded on 
Gdngora’s frequent use of them rather than on any semantic 
objections. Although JAuregui is vituperative in speaking 
of "maldita anfibologfa" (117), he censures Gdngora’s puns 
not for their polysemy, but for their impropriety in the
elevated style he says Gdngora is trying to achieve (119-
20120). Gdngora’s hyperboles are condemned because they
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surpass "todos los lfmites de encarecimiento" (124), and 
not because they are indeterminate.
■
The attacks become more exaggerated and passionate, 
however, when JAuregui treats the inscrutibility of the 
poem. He reiterates his main objections in section 33 with
I
a general condemnation of the work:
Querer ahora senalar todos los lugares obscuros, |
broncos y escabrosos, serfa no acabar jam&s; i
tanbien lo serfa referir las vozes equivocas i
oracicnes anbiguas de esta Poesfa, porque toda
el la de barra a barra estd. quaxada de
esto; . . . .  (124-125)
This he follows with an exaggerated attack on ambiguity:
“Casi no tiene Vm. frasis que no se pueda entender de 
catorce o quince maneras" (126). Explaining that only 
through much hard work can poetry appear to be simple and
clear, as it should be, he accuses Gdngora of having
written without much effort. In the "Soledades," he says, 
no ay cuidado si la oracidn va recta or
corcobada, si se entiende o dexa de entender, si
las palabras son humildes o soberbias, vulgares o 
latinas, griegas o mahometanas. En fin, imaldita 
sea de Dios la ley a que Vm. se sujetd en el 
progresso de estas sus Soledades1 (127)
No stronger indictment than this could be made of what 
J&uregui saw as the maleficence of Gdngora’s poetics. The 
invective continues, however, as J&uregui refers to the
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"pestilencia detestable de los negros versos" (131).
JAuregui approaches the end of the Antldoto by 
treating ambiguity:
De estos modos [ambiguos] tiene Vm. a mi11ares.
Y aunqun es verdad que en algunos dellos se 
conoce luego la significacidn, con todo eso, ya 
Vm. haze de su parte lo que puede para echarlos a 
perder; y eso basta por culpa . . . (133)
Here, once more, JAuregui protests against language that 
does not allow for immediate, unself-conscious arrival at 
signification, and he accuses Gdngora of deliberately 
attempting to prevent interpretation. He cites the 
“eternal" use of appositives by which "se obscurece o se 
ciega de el todo la elocucidn" (137), again suggesting 
opacity.
In the final section, JAuregui returns to his original 
stated purpose of exhorting Gdngora not to exercise further 
the art of poetry. He cautions:
Deviera Vm. . . . ponderar las muchas 
dificultades de lo heroico, la constancia que se 
requiere en continuar un estilo igual i 
magnffico, tenplando la grabedad y altega con la 
dulQura y suabidad intelegible, i apcyando la 
elccucidn a ilustres sentencias i nobles i al 
firme tronco de la buena fAbula o cuento, que es 
el alma de la Poesfa. (139)
The necessary “firme t ronco " that is missing from the
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"Soledades" is a fixed referential ground to which one can 
attach signification. JAuregui objects obliquely that 
Gdngora's poetic language refuses to signify transparently 
and with certainty a static truth that lies beyond 
language.
Examination of JAuregui’s other writings shows that 
almost all of the objections to the "Soledades" in the 
Antfdoto are based ultimately on the poem’s frustration of 
his epistemological assumptions. In the "Introducidn" to 
his Rimas. published two years after the Antfdodo. JAuregui 
describes a poem as being composed of three parts. The 
alma is the "asunto y bien dispuesto argumento” of the 
poem, the cueroo consists of “las sentencias proporcionadas 
y concetos esplicadores del asunto," and the adorno is 
comprised of the words which "visten ese cuerpo con aire y 
bizarrla” (4).
In epistemological terms, alma corresponds to a plot, 
seen as existing in the world outside of language and 
thought. The cueroo is composed of two parts, the 
intellectual embodiment ("concepto") of the alma’s 
argument, and the "sentencia." JAuregui, unlike Quevedo, 
distinguishes between "concepto" and "sentencia." It is 
unclear what JAuregui means by the term "sentencia." 
Cascales’ second definition of the word, as a "dicho moral 
y agudo . . . de cosas universales, no limitadas del 
tiempo, lugar y personas . . . "  (Tablas 86), is possible, 
as is the Latin “sententia" with its signification of a
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period. A later reference in the Discurso poetico (136) 
adds to the confusion, indicating that the "sentencia" is 
pre-linguistic and even pre-conceptual in nature, 
explaining it as "la materia y argumento mismo" which the 
concepts and thoughts embody. Adorno. is a quality of 
poetic language that separates it from ordinary discourse, 
and it may succeed to a greater or lesser degree. There 
are cases in which poets
acertaron con la buena sentencia, mas no se 
acomodan a esplicarla en terminos elocuentes, ni 
distribuirla cabal y justa en los versos; antes 
la desalinan y abaten con voces humildes, o ya la 
tuercen y desavfan con frases violentas, 
duramente amarradas al metro y consonancias. (5) 
It can be inferred that adorno is a quality independent of 
the ordinary epistemological linguistic function of clear 
representation of thoughts.
Poems without alma are without "fundamento" and have 
only a body "disforme de pensamientos y sentencias vanas, 
sin propdsito fijo ni trabazbn y dependencia de partes"
(5). What is necessary for good poetry and most difficult 
to achieve is an equilibrium among the three parts. The 
poet seeks to
ajustarse al buen asunto y senalado tema, 
reforzAndole siempre con pensamientos y 
sentencias vivas; y sobre este fundamento sdlido, 
ir galanteando el adorno de argentadas frases,
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sin que la obligacidn de darse a entender 
y decir precisamente buenas cosas nos 
violente y quebrante la continua dignidad del 
lenguaje; . . . .  (6-7)
Thus JAuregui seems to recognize three functions of 
language— embodiment, transmission, and decoration of the 
concept— which also must be maintained in balance. Here 
too, as he was in the Antfdoto. JAuregui is concerned with 
the solidity of the foundations and the fixity of the 
purposes that, for him, must underlie good poetry.
The longer Discurso Poetico. whose subtitle proclaims 
that it is written against "the disorder and delusion of 
some writers," continues the theme. In a much more orderly 
and less emotional manner than he used in the Antidoto. 
JAuregui develops at length his arguments against the 
"culterano" style, dividing the book into six chapters:
(1) "Las causas del desorden y su definicidn"; (2) "Los 
enganosos medios con que se yerra"; (3) "La molesta 
frecuencia de novedades”; (4) "El vicio de la desigualdad y 
sus enganos"; (5) "Los danos que resultan y por que modos"; 
and (6) "La oscuridad y sus distinciones." I will proceed 
through the book in the order in which it is written, 
citing and analyzing those passages that are pertinent to 
this study.
JAuregui’s use of the word "disorder" in the title of 
the first chapter to describe the poetry of Gdngora and his 
followers indicates a continued concern with what JAuregui
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perceives as the absence therein cf a central organizing 
principle. He states as much in explaining his purpose in 
writing the Discurso to satisfy those who might wonder 
si este modo de escribir . . . es en alguna 
manera acertado, si esconde misterios de ingenio, 
si alguna utilidad o circunstancia oculta por 
donde merezca estimarse y ser admitido de los 
nuestros. 0 ya que nada merezca, desean saber en 
que se funda, de que causas procede y por que le 
apetecen sus autores, pues no es crefble que sin 
ningdn fin o interes — aunque sea engaftoso—  
nadie elija y abrace un error. (61)
His answer to the first part is emphatically negative, and 
he goes so far as to suggest that the effects of the style 
are "en extremo dafiosos a nuestra lengua y patria" as it 
introduces verses of questionable “lineage" (62). The 
second part provides the object of the book, to demonstrate 
that there is nothing legitimate "en que se funda."
In the first chapter as J&uregui begins to clarify his 
definition of obscurity, approving it when it occurs in 
"conceptos sublimes y arcanos" (67) and condemning it when 
it is due to merely the "vacfo de las palabras" (68). He 
establishes a difference in terminology, between the two 
types, calling the first "difficulty" and the second 
"obscurity." The third kind of obscurity that Cascales 
names, whose site lies in the ignorance of the reader, is 
considered by J&uregui to be a characteristic of the
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definition of poetry. Poetry, which is not for the vulgar, 
should be so difficult as to require "gran fuerza de 
ingenio, estudios copiosos, artificio y prudencia 
admirable" (68). Any failure to interpret a poem that is 
due to the reader's lack of preparation, exertion or 
capabilities is not to be considered the fault of the poet.
The second chapter, a discussion of various means by 
which these poets err, is a list of ways in which the 
transmission of concepts is impeded. The first error 
JAuregui treats is the poets’ loathing ("aborrecimiento") 
of common words (71). While admitting that poetic language 
should ordinarily "huir las dicciones humildes y usar las 
mAs apartadas de la plebe," (71), and that sometimes 
imported Latin words allow for "greater expression and 
efficacy" (75), JAuregui accuses the new poets of abusing 
those principles. Differing from Cascales, JAuregui sees 
as a cause of obscurity words “del todo ignoradas en 
nuestra lengua y trafdas en abundancia de las ajenas" (71). 
The use of alien words should not only be limited as to 
frequency, but the borrowed words should be among the 
better known in their original language. Further, the 
intended meaning ("inteligencia") of a clause should not 
depend completely on understanding the foreign word (or 
neologism), so that one might be able to determine its 
significance by its context (76). Words whose significance 
is obscure because of their origin cannot transmit 
intelligence to an interpreter.
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Metasemiotic abuses constitute another error.
JAuregui accuses the “culterano“ poets of going beyond 
desirable boldness in figured language to the point of 
rashness:
Todo lo desbaratan, pervierten y destruyen; no 
dejan verbo o nombre en su propio sentido, sino 
remotos cuanto es posible; siempre los fuerzan a 
que sirvan donde nunca pensaron, del todo 
repugnando al oficio que los ocupan. (78)
The idea of a meaning proper to a word recalls the 
analytico-referential principle of a fixed and transparent 
connection in the sign between word and concept. Not only 
do the poets impede signification by comparing concepts 
whose connection is obscure and remote in itself, they pile 
figure on figure so that ”aun las mismas metAforas 
metaforizan" (79). He explains that the poets "No juzgan 
suficiente un disfraz en la voz y oracidn, sino la revisten 
con muchos y queda surmergido el concepto en la corpulencia 
exterior" (79). This twofold (or more) displacement of 
signifying word from signified concept obscures by making 
laborious the process of interpretation.
The remainder of the errors result from the poets’ 
abuse of the characteristic elements of heroic style to 
avoid direct and straightforward sentences. They
porffan en trasponer las palabras y maranar las 
frases de tal manera, que aniquilando toda 
gramAtica, derogando toda ley del idioma,
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atormentan con su dureza al m&s sufrido leyente, 
y con ambiguedad de oraciones, revolucibn de 
cl&usulas y longitud de perfodos, esconden la 
inteligencia al ingenio mis pronto. (79-80)
The result of their misbegotten efforts is, expressed in 
terms of the metaphor of vision and knowledge, a hiding of 
the knowledge ("inteligencia") from the wit of the 
interpreter.
The new poets are not able, according to Jauregui, to 
construct their poetic attempts on firm ground. He 
describes analogically the process of writing:
El efectuar un escrito es ajustar las voces de un 
instrumento, donde se le da a cada cuerda un 
temple firmfsimo, torciendo aquf y alii la 
clavija hasta fijarla precisa en el punto de su 
entonacidn y no en otro, porque si alii no 
llegase o excediese, quedaria el instrumento 
destemplado y destruida la consonancia y la 
mdsica. Los nuestros, pues, euando escriben, no 
conociendo en su oido el punto fijo de la 
templanza siempre la pasan de punto, de que 
resulta el destemple y la destruicidn de sus 
obras. (84)
The recurring emphasis on the lack of a foundation for 
esthetic principles and for meaning points to 
epistemological differences as a main source of J&uregui’s 
criticism. The absence of a fixed point, necessary in the
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"representative" epistemology for the construction or 
ordering of knowledge, is reflected not only in the 
metaphor, but throughout J&uregui’s attacks.
The next two chapters offer relatively little of 
interest to this study. Chapter III treats the overuse of 
"novedades," which, although vices, may delight the reader 
when used skillfully and with moderation. The new poets, 
however, repeat them until they become bothersome and 
contribute to the poem’s obscurity, "embarazando" the work 
(89). The overuse of any figure is reprehensible as well; 
J&uregui offers the following catalogue of frequent 
offenses of the poets he criticizes:
La comdn retbrica dice corales o claveles a los 
labios, estrellas a los ojos, flores a las 
estrellas; quita a las cosas sus nombres y dales 
otros distantes por traslacibn; dice roble y 
abeto en vez de nave; pasa los lfmites de toda 
verdad con las hiperboles; aplica a una piedra 
sentimiento y palabras; trueca y remueve el orden 
de la oracibn; oculta con rodeos lo que 
sencillamente pudiera exprimir; altera la medida 
de las dicciones, usa las de otra lengua, 
revbcalas de la antigiiedad y alguna vez las 
inventa. (92-93)
Each of the cited transgressions serves to make language 
visible, calling the reader’s attention to it. The three 
functions of language that were inferred from Jburegui’s
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“Introducidn" are not balanced. The embodiment and 
transmission of concepts have been sacrificed in the name 
of decoration. The fourth chapter treats unevenness of 
style and JAuregui discusses the mixture of sublime and 
humble discourse. Although he makes no claims here that 
the fluctuation impedes interpretation, stylistic 
inconsistency is yet another example of disorder.
JAuregui begins the fifth chapter by repeating his 
charge that the abuses of the language by the new poets are 
serious threats to it (109). He accuses them of squeezing 
the language with too much violence, as did Quevedo later 
in calling Gdngora "verdugo de los vocablos" (discussed 
above). The undesirable results of such torture are that: 
"En vez de sacar del idioma el licor que buenamente puede 
exprimirse, le hacen verter heces y amargura como a la 
naranja; no ha de ser tanto el aprieto" (110). These 
violators constitute a heretical sect against "the poetic 
religion and its strict laws,“ and corrupt the youth, 
having them believe that poetry is no more than "un 
exterior fantAstico, aunque carezca de alma y cuerpo"
(U4).
JAuregui’s view of the separability of language and 
thought underlies his perception of danger, which extends 
beyond language and patria to the realm of truth and 
knowledge. He quotes Lucian’s dialogue in which Licino 
reproaches his interlocutor:
Cometes . . . un vicio no como quiera, sino el
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mayor y es que no preparas primero las sentencias 
para adornarlas despues con las palabras sino al 
contrario, porque en el punto que hallaste una 
palabra peregrina o que enganado la juzgas por 
selecta, o esa tal palabra procuras despues 
acomodar la sentencia y te parece gran perdida no 
insertarla en algdn lugar, no obstante que no 
venga a propdsito y sea del todo impertinente a 
lo que se trata. (115-116)
If thought is formed before its embodiment in language, 
then to begin with words and to base concepts on them is to 
upset the assumed order of things and to concede to 
language a mere important epistemological role. Poets who 
do so “vienen a ser, por esta flaqueza, siervos y esclavos 
de la locucidn que los desavfa y los arrastra por donde 
quiere, habiendo de ser dueiios y senores para servirse 
della con magisterio" (116). Language writes discourse, as 
it were; and instead of being subject to concepts which 
represent a truth to be found outside of it, language 
rejects its function of representating that truth and 
constitutes its own rival truth. J&uregui continues:
El dltimo material en la ejecucidn de labores 
poeticas deben ser las palabras, asf dice el 
italiano que las ha de hallar prontas el escritor 
sotto la penna (debajo de la pluma), no 
acord&ndose dellas hasta tomarla en la mano. Los 
poetas que decimos, en vez de tenerlas debajo de
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la pluma, las tienen encima de la cabeza y estAn 
de manera gravados, que no aciertan a dar un paso 
sino por donde imperan las palabras a cuya 
potestad se entregaron. (116-117)
The authority of truth is usurped; language, which should 
be subordinated to concepts that imitate that truth, now 
determines it. The implications of this revolution in 
epistemology are clearly serious.
Words, JAuregui later explains, are nothing without 
the things they declare, and in support of the claim, he 
cites classical writers. Cicero asked, "iCuAl vanidad mAs 
furiosa . . . que el sonido vacio de las palabras, aunque 
sean las mejores y mis adornadas, si no contienen sentencia 
ni ciencia?" (121). Aureus Gelius devoted an entire 
chapter to the condemnation of “esta vanidad" (121).
Horace also wrote on the subject: "El principio y fuente
del recto escribir . . . es el saber. Sabidas y prevenidas 
las cosas, despues no hace resistencia al decirlas y 
exponerlas al estilo de las palabras" (121). Intellection 
is definitely seen to precede language and to exist 
independently of it. JAuregui goes on to explain that, on 
the other hand, words are necessary vehicles for the 
transferral of knowledge, "aunque la sentencia y concepto 
es lo poderoso y primero" (22).
The sixth chapter, "La oscuridad y sus distinciones," 
defines poetic obscurity and discusses it in great detail. 
JAuregui reaffirms that obscurity is not "el no dejarse
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entender de todos" and adds that "a la poesfa ilustre no 
pertenece tanto la claridad como la perspicuidad" (125).
He distinguishes between the two: "Que se manifieste el
sentido, no tan inmediato y palpable, sino con ciertos 
resplandores no penetrables a vulgar vista: a esto llamo
perspicuo y a lo otro claro" (125). Language which is 
claro is that which transparently, with immediate 
obviousness, transmits its signification. Perspicuous 
language is the acceptable way of slowing the process of 
interpretation through "las gallardlas de su estilo, del 
brio y alteza de sus figuras y tropos, de sus conceptos 
grandes y palabras mis nobles" (126-127).
Again, JAuregui makes it clear that unacceptable
obscurity does not lie in the ignorance of the interpreter,
but he does delimit an interpretive community for whom the
21text would be appropriate. He writes:
As! que, para entender ilustres versos supongo, a 
lo menos, los buenos juicios y alentados ingenios 
cortesanos de suficiente noticia y buen gusto, y 
sobre todo inclinados al arte; porque si carecen 
desta inclinacidn, o la poesfa les enfada como 
vemos en muchos, aunque sean muy doctos y sabios, 
son impropios oyentes, cuanto los aficionados son 
digno teatro, aunque no lleguen a eruditos y 
doctos. (126)
For JAuregui, the writing and interpreting of sublime 
poetry is an elitist activity, not for the untrained or
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22unwilling ear, and some difficulty is expected. The more 
learning one has, the greater one’s ability to understand: 
"los mis doctos y pricticos en la facultad penetran al 
fntimo conocimiento de lo compuesto, complaciendose mis que 
todos en lo superior de sus meritos" (128).
The community of interpreters should not be so narrow, 
however, that it does not incorporate a "numeroso 
auditorio" (133). Jiuregui turns his attention to modern 
writings which exclude from understanding even the most 
erudite and skillful poets. Of these poems he says, "No 
basta decir son oscuros, aun no merece su habla, en muchos 
lugares nombre de oscuridad sino de la misma nada" (134). 
This is a total lack of interpretable signification, he 
claims, that baffles even the offending authors themselves, 
and he accuses them of having been aware of it at the time 
of composition: "Elios mismos, al tiempo de la ejecucibn,
vieron muchas veces que era nada lo que decfan (no me 
nieguen esta verdad), ni se les concertaba sentencia dentro 
del estilo fantAstico" (134). Instead of applying their 
words to a good end, "las derramaron al aire sin 
consignarlas a algtin sentido" (134), violating the 
principle of the primacy and independence of the signified 
thought. As another explanation, he offers the possibility 
that “el furor del lenguaje los forzb a decir despropbsitos 
que no pensaban, y por no alterar las dicciones los 
consintieron" (134). The result is that "las sentencias y 
cosas que se dicen desvarfan, [que] es lo mismo o peor que
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si no se entendiesen, porque no dan luz a lo escrito, sino
mayor ceguedad" (134). This result, in which a sign points
to something that is not its proper referent, is more 
culpable than when a referent is merely not understood 
because not only does it not convey truth, but it transmits 
untruth instead.
Jauregui definitively addresses the distinction 
between obscurity and difficulty that he raised in the 
first chapter:
la una consiste en las palabras, esto es en el
orden y modo de la locucidn, y en el estilo del
lenguaje solo; la otra en las sentencias, esto 
es, en la materia y argumento mismo, y en los 
conceptos y pensamientos del. (136).
Difficulty is acceptable for Jauregui in part because of 
the exclusivist, aristocratic view he holds of poetry; "la 
grandeza de las materias trae consigo el no ser vulgares y 
manifiestas, sino escondidas y dificiles" (136).
Obscurity, on the other hand, is "eternally abominable" 
since it thwarts "el dnico fin para que las palabras fueron 
inventadas, " (136), the transparent or perspicuous 
representation of concepts.
Representation requires that language perform the dual 
epistemological function of embodiment and transmission of 
concepts. Language (frasis) is condemnable "si niega a la 
inteligencia el concepto que abraza," refusing to transmit 
that which it has embodied, or "si . . . emplea [el
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concepto] en desacuerdos que despues de entendidos son 
tambien vaguedades," failing to accurately embody that 
which it transmits (137). Those concepts which, because of 
their difficulty, can not be embodied by language—  
"ciencias ocultas y materias en sf diffciles, naturales o 
filosdficas"— are not to be condemned for their obscurity 
since they "traen abrazada consigo la oscuridad'* (138).
The difficulty lies embedded in the concept itself, and 
language is capable of clearly and accurately transmitting 
the concept. Conceptual obscurity is intrinsic, and thus 
acceptable, an attribute of the concept and not a fault of 
bad artifice.
Of all the criticism examined in this chapter, the 
Discurso poetico provides the clearest enunciation of the 
epistemological basis of objections. Lope de Vega, his own 
epistemological stance appearing somewhat ill-defined in 
terms of Foucault’s description, does not develop his 
criticism of Gdngora in ways that readily lend themselves 
to theoretical analysis. Francisco de Quevedo’s discussion 
of the roles of the concept and of language as the basis of 
stylistic variation affords insight into his own 
assumptions, as does his description of acceptable 
obscurity. The Tablas poeticas of Francisco Cascales gives 
a clear description of the roles of thought and language in 
the structure of knowledge and truth with its quotation 
from Tasso, and Cascales’ "Carta" develops its charge of 
obscurity on that basis. It is Jduregui’s Discurso.
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however, that discusses at greater length and with more 
profundity how the new poetry violates the predominant 
understanding of the universe and how threatening it is to 
the structure of society.
JAuregui's reading of the ‘‘Soledades" in the Antidote 
is constructed on the differences between his own 
epistemological assumptions and those aspects of the poem 
that challenge those assumptions. He is concerned with 
Gdngora's violation of his understanding of the nature of 
the sign, of language, and ultimately of knowledge of the 
world. In treating transgressions against these 
assumptions, he pens the most passionate passages of the 
work. His assessment of the "Soledades" as uncertain 
because of obscurity, however, contrasts with that of 
Gdngora and his defenders who admitted uncertainty but 
denied that it lay in the poem.
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1 In his reading of the sonnet Lope composed upon 
Gdngora’s death, C. Christopher Soufas finds "Lope's 
attitudes [toward Gdngora] essentially unchanged in the
wake of Gdngora’s death" (26).
2
There is no evidence to support an understanding of 
concepto in the sense of the literary "conceit" in Lope. 
Collard’s discussion of the evolution of the term 
"concepto" considers it "en sus dos sentidos: en el de 
pensamiento profundo o agudo y en el de un modo peculiar de 
metAfora" (24). A passage she quotes from Garcilaso, 
however, uses concepto in describing a wound to the tongue, 
“en aquella que declara / los concetos del alma, fui 
herido" (25), showing the clear realtionship between the 
mental concept of the thing in the world and language that 
expresses it. Collard is correct in stating that "Para 
Lope, los conceptos no son figuras retdricas" used for 
aesthetic purposes, but she errs in her belief that they 
are for him and JAuregui associated with a moral purpose 
(32).
Miguel d ’Ors and Antonio Garcfa Berrio also discuss 
the evolution of the term. Garcfa Berrio, who traces the 
idea back to the Greeks and examines a broad spectrum of 
documents, notes that, although the word "concepto" was 
being used at the time in Spain to refer to the "tecnicismo 
poetico," Gdngora’s commentators do not employ it in that 
sense (394). D ’Ors formulates the following three "datos
92
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
fundamentales":
1) El concepto pertenece al campo del 
entendimiento, es decir, al campo del 
significado. Aunque tenga manifestaciones 
verbales mAs o menos caracterfsticas, es algo 
mental: una concepcidn.
2) El concepto es una concepcidn en el sentido 
etimoldgico de la palabra: consiste en conectar
mentalmente realidades distintas.
3) Cuanto mAs alejadas esten estas, mAs llamarA
la atencidn su conexidn en el concepto. Se
considera muy aguda la relacidn fundada en una 
correspondencia imperceptible a primera vista, 
que exige reflexidn detenida. (187-188)
Gdngora’s concentos that are criticised by the authors
examined in this chapter are concepts of things in the
world that are self-consciously constructed (or 
"misapplied”) in order to bring to light certain aspects of 
the images for which they are substituted, but they are 
fundamentally intellectual images of things in the world.
To describe a concepto as primarily a comparison between 
two images is to disregard the epistemological function of 
the concepto. of which the authors of the works examined 
here were evidently aware.
3
In discussing secrecy in the hermetic tradition, 
Paolo Rossi cites the following exhortation from Bono of 
Farrara:
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But I ask and adjure all men of understanding in 
these matters into whose hands this precious, 
new-found pearl may fall that they pass it on to 
those whose energies are employed at full stretch 
by this question, who are hungry for art and 
acomplishment in the principles of natural 
science, but that they should conceal it from 
fools and children since they are unworthy. <28) 
See also Elizabeth Eisenstein, 76-77, and Edgar Wind’s 
Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance.
 ^In his sixteenth-century commentary on the adage, 
“Sileni Aicibiadis, " Erasmus noted that the images "seem to 
have become proverbial among the learned, . . . used either 
with reference to a thing which in appearance (at first 
blush, as they say) seems ridiculous and contemptible, but 
on closer and deeper examination proves to be admirable, or 
else with reference to a person whose looks and dress do 
not correspond at all to what he conceals in his soul" 
(269).
 ^Alonso further claims that Lope wrote the poem as an 
example of conceptual obscurity in reaction to the 
attention that Gbngora was achieving with what Lope viewed 
as the linguistic obscurity of the "Soledades" (Poesla 
456).
6 In his commentary on the sonnet, published in La 
Circe con otras Rimas y prosas in 1624, Lope again 
distinguishes between types of obscurity, locating the
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desirable kind on the level of thought and the unacceptable 
kind in language:
Si estuviera la dificultad en la lengua (como 
ahora se usa), confieso que se quejaran con 
causa; pero estando en la sentencia, no se por 
que razbn no ha de tener verdad lo que no 
alcanzan. Para el ingenio de vuestra merced 
. . . excusada fuera esta exposicibn; pero para 
el desengano de los que se apasionan de los 
terminos nuevos de decir, aunque sean b&rbaros, y 
no reparan en el alma de los concetos, no sera 
fuera de propbsito. (Obras 1311).
Francisco Rico's treatment of Lope in El pequeno 
mundo del hombre. James E. Holloway’s article, "Lope’s 
Neoplatonism: La dama boba.” and De Armas’ article argue
strongly for such an assumption. However, one must keep in 
mind Barbara Hernnstein Smith’s admonition that "No matter 
how closely the statements in . . .  a composition resemble 
statements the poet himself as a historical creature might 
have truly and truthfully uttered, they remain fictive 
statements in the poem" (10). Alban K. Forcione, in 
discussing Cervantes’ Novel as e.iemn lares, rejects the idea 
of Lope as one who would "look for truth beneath the 
surface," stating that he was "a man of radically different 
disposition [from Cervantes] and a man whose spiritual 
formation was the product of very different historical 
circumstances, [who] was temperamentally unprepared to




I am endebted to Professor Oscar Rivera-Rodas for 
the reading of "vueltas de euerda" as repeated lashes of a 
whip.
9
Refer to page 17 for a discussion of syntactical
coincidence between language and thought in Foucault’s
"Classical" episteme.
^  Quevedo’s enthusiasm for Fray Luis’ poetry, in
spite of the latter’s Jewish heritage, belies the notion
that Quevedo’s attacks on Gdngora, while quite often racial
in character, were based merely on antisemitic attitudes.
^  Blecua identifies the other as Quevedo’s prologue
to his edition of Francisco de la Torre’s poetry (8n4).
12 Cascales gives two definitions of the sentencia. 
the first and less common of which, is "el concepto del 
Animo" (86). This seems to be the signification Quevedo is
employing.
13 If Quevedo is speaking here of the concepto 
(conceit), which doesn’t seem likely, then any obscurity 
should lie in the concepto as the unobvious connection in 
the space between its intentionally paired elements.
Clear, appropriate language should make evident the 
structure of the concepto. enabling the reader to discover
the hidden connection.
14 Alonso states that
lo dnico que hi2o Gdngora fud populariaar, 
difundir, una serie de vocablos, de los cuales la
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mayor parte eran ya usados en literatura y habfan 
conseguido entrada en los vocabularies de la 
epoca, y sdlo los menos— en realidad una minorfa 
reducidfsima— podfan ser considerados como raros, 
aunque aun estos estaban implicitos en la 
conciencia gramatical de fines del siglo XVI. 
(Lengua 45).
Those he lists are Francisco de Amaya, Francisco 
FernAndez de CArdoba, el abad de Bute, “un curioso,“ el 
alferez Estrada, Angulo y Pulgar, Diaz de Rivas, Diego de 
Pisa y Ventimilla, Andres de Mendoza, Martin VAzquez 
Siruela, Antonio CalderAn, Alonso Cavanillas, N. de Cuenca, 
Andres de Cuesta, along with the well-known commentaries of 
Pellicer, Salcedo Coronel, and Salazar y Mardones.
The entire clause reads:
Nautica industria investigo tal piedra,
Que cual abraea iedra 
Escollo, el metal ella fulminante 
De que Marte se viste, i lisongera 
Solicita el que mAs brilla diamante 
En la nocturna capa de la esphera,
Estrella A nuestro polo mAs vecina: . . . (11.
379-385)
This citation is taken from the "ChacAn" edition of Alfonso 
Callejo and Maria Teresa Pajares, as are all other 
quotations from the "Soledades" unless otherwise indicated.
Lines 405-409:
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Al padre de las aguas Oceano 
(De cuya monarchia 
El Sol, que cada dia
Nace en sus ondas, i en sus ondas muere,
Los terminos saber todos no quiere) . . . .
1 Q
x In the following section, JAuregui states that "en 
muchas partes de esta Soledad me he visto atormentado el 
entendimiento, i aun no se si las acabo de rastrear" (97), 
which seems to contradict his claim of being able to 
interpret completely Gdngora’s signification. In his 
vituperative style, he exaggerates obscurity by treating it
as opacity.
1Q JAuregui quotes this line as “Senas diera de su 
atrevimiento” (107).
op
One could, of course, interpret this violation of 
decorum as a deliberate undermining of fixed affective 
associations. See Paul Julian Smith’s PMLA article,
“Barthes, Gdngora, and Non-Sense" for similar examples.
21 Stanley Fish defines interpretive communities as 
being "made up of those who share interpretive strategies 
not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing 
texts, for constituting their properties and assigning 
their intentions" (Fish 182).
22 For a treatment of aesthetic hermetism see Angelina 
Costa Palacios’ discussion of Carrillo de Sotomayor’s Libro 
de Erudicidn Poetica (37-56).
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Gbngora and His Apologists: Denial and Defense of
Obscurity
While Gdngora and his defenders generally admitted the 
existence of a degree of obscurity in his writing, they 
viewed it as a positive rather than a negative attribute. 
Their explanations and treatments of the source of 
obscurity varied little from those of their adversaries, 
but they consistently referred to difficulty as a justified 
poetic end. Even though granting that the obscurity was an 
obstacle to interpretation, they found means to account for 
it in terms compatible with current thinking about 
language. The aim of their project was to prove that the 
poetic obscurity was epistemologically legitimate, just as 
the goal of Gdngora’s critics had been to demonstrate its 
illegitimacy. A primary means of making Gdngora’s 
difficulty acceptable was to advance poetic discourse as an 
exceptional linguistic case, denying the possibility of 
obscurity in a discourse whose representative function was 
different from that of ordinary language.
Paul Julian Smith treats the topic of linguistic 
excess, the means by which the new poetic language was 
accomplished, establishing it solidly within the classical 
rhetorical tradition. He explains that because of Spanish 
anxiety about inferiority to other European cultures in the
99
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area of letters, there was an effort to elevate through the 
use of ornamentation what was generally considered to be a 
complete but impoverished poetic diction. Of course, such 
an effort “assumes the possibility of a natural or neutral 
language untainted by the ravages of figuration" (Writing 
14). Smith traces a trajectory through Golden Age lyric 
poetry from Garcilaso de la Vega, in whose plain language 
the reality represented by the poet’s voice is perceived to 
be transparently present, to Gdngora, whose profusion of 
“ornamental" language culminates in "culterano" poetry.
The elevated poetic language that raised Spanish poetry to 
new heights was achieved by what Smith calls a "rhetoric of 
excess, " in compensation for what was seen as a lack. The 
addition of an ornamental function to language, which had 
been perceived as primarily a transparent vehicle of 
meaning, had the result of making that language visible. 
Expressed in terms of the vision/knowledge metaphor, the 
highly embellished language, by coming between the 
interpreter and the material that was to be transmitted, 
obscured one’s view of its referential "content."
The critics who defended and praised Gbngora and his 
poetry generally by-passed the question of how language 
represents, concentrating on proving that G6ngora’s 
language ultimately does represent. Their tactics ranged 
from denial of the existence of any obscurity on the 
linguistic level in the works, to explanation of the origin 
of the obscurity, to the metaphorical assertion that the
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negative obscurity is really a positive splendor. Others 
were comentaristas who saw it as their role to facilitate 
the interpretation of the difficult passages. Of Gdngora’s 
many defenders, I have chosen to analyze four whose 
writings treat the uncertainty of the poetry from a 
positive point of view. Francisco FernAndez de Cdrdoba, 
Abad de Rute, wrote, at Gdngora’s request, a "Parecer 
acerca de las Soledades" in which he condemned the 
obscurity of the poem, but in 1617, he defended the poet 
against JAuregui with his Examen del Antfdoto. Pedro Dfaz 
de Ribas was both defender and commentator, writing 
Discursos apologeticos pqk si estylo del ‘Poliphemo’ y 
*Soledades’ and Anotaciones y defensas & la Primera Sfllfidfld 
de Don Luis de Gdntfora. Jose Garcia de Salcedo Coronel, 
perhaps the best known seventeenth-century comentarista. 
discusses the interpreter’s role and gives practical 
reasons for some obscurity in the introduction to his 1636 
edition of the "Soledades." Martin VAzquez Siruela’s 
“Discurso sobre el estilo de don Luis de Gdngora" alters 
the metaphorical vocabulary of the debate, renaming the 
kind of obscurity that occurs in Gdngora’s work as 
“esplendor." Each of the four critics endeavors to 
legitimate the sublime style.
A convert to the doctrine of "nueva poesia" whom 
Collard calls a "fervente gongorista" (35), Francisco 
FernAndes de Cdrdoba, the Abbot of Rute, wrote one of the 
earlier documents of the polemic. His "Parecer acerca de
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las ‘Soledades' a instancias de su autor," written in 1614 
(Orozco 152), effusively praises Gbngora’s poetry, but 
criticizes its obscurity. Following the lead of Pedro de 
Valencia, who first voiced disapproval of the poem's 
difficulty, and whose "Carta” FernAndez de Cdrdoba mentions 
having read (40), the Abad considers all deliberately 
cultivated obscurity to be vicious (30). The obscurity 
that results from the elevated style is not excusable here 
because that style is inappropriate to subject matter that 
is not "grave, trAgico, heroico, o otro semejante" (38). 
Neither is it the justifiable case of religious mysteries 
or prophecy that should be hidden from the multitudes (35). 
FernAndez states that it would be "menos mal" if the 
obscurity resulted from brevity, but in the "Soledades" its 
source is the
demasfa de tropos, y esquemas, parentesis, 
oposiciones; contraposiciones, interposiciones, 
sinedocques, metAforas, y otras figuras 
artificiosas, y bizarras cada una de por si, y a 
trechos, y lugares convenientes; mAs no para 
amontonadas. (32)
This excess of figures and tropes not only excludes the 
vulgar from the "deleite" and "aprovecho" that the poem 
should give but also frustrates the "doctos.“ The erudite 
already know what is to be discovered and thus gain nothing 
from it (34). As for delight, he tells Gbngora that they 
"le entenderAn gastar el tiempo, y sus juicios en adivinar,
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que quiso decir Vm: . . .  reduciendo a trabajo lo que
habfa de ser meramente gusto, y matAndose por entenderlo o 
no entenderlo" (36). Fernandez describes his own 
frustration in a passage to be echoed later by JAuregui:
No por amor de Dios, que a la verdad es terrible 
cosa, que en mi lengua materna haya yo de andar 
como en un Aristdteles, o en un Perseo, o en otro 
autor diffcil griego, o latino, juntando partes, 
construyendo y adivinando, que quiso decir en 
aquello, o en esotro. (37)
Other echoes from the Abad’s criticism appear in that of 
GAngora’s attackers, and it is understandable that they 
would quote this categorical condemnation so well- 
substantiated with citations of the writings of classical 
and contemporary theorists.
It was Juan de JAuregui’s vicious continuation of this 
criticism that provoked FernAndez to write his Fyamen del 
Antldoto £ Apologia por las Soled ad ss de Den Luis de 
GAngora contra el autor de el AntldotQ in 1617. During the 
three years that had elapsed since he wrote the "Parecer, " 
FernAndez had revised his opinion of the poem’s obscurity. 
Now, he sees obscurity as the inevitable and acceptable 
result of the characteristics of the high poetic style, 
which before he had claimed was inappropriate to the 
subject matter. He explains that he made the change 
"valiendome de la autoridad de los doctos que aprueban el 
Poema de las Soledades y del exemplo de los que usaron
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stilo no para el vulgo" (427), and he lists at length those 
"doctos" (419-420). FernAndez now justifies the style 
generically, granting that although it is not dramatic, 
epic, or heroic, nor bucolic, piscatorial or cynegetic, 
that "porque introduce a todos los referidos es necesario 
confesar que es Poema, que los admite y abraza a todos: 
quAl sea este, es sin duda el Melico o Lyrico” (424).
As for his prior objection that the poem did not 
provide delight, but rather frustration and hard work to 
the learned, FernAndez again bows to the opinion of those 
who approve the poems, now claiming that the universal 
delight a poem must give does not have to be 
"Universalfssimo" (418). Since the exclusion of the vulgar 
from understanding poetry further elevates the poem by 
consecrating it as a thing intended for only some, he 
advises JAuregui that "nuestro Poeta cuando por levantar el 
estilo y realgar la lengua quiera no darse a comer a todos, 
y por conseguir este fin saiga con algunos Qelajes obscuros 
la bellfssima pintura de su Poema" (421). He maintains 
that the poem "no peca en la obscuridad" (418), and in 
cautioning JAuregui that he can not condemn GAngora for his 
obscurity, the Abad effectively equates obscurity and 
magniloquence:
Pero advierta V. m. de camino que si nos vende 
por obscuro las Soledades, le vende por grande y 
magestuoso, y si niega que lo es, le vende por 
inteligible y claro; es cosa la que mandare, que
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si lo primero, le darA lo que le toca de 
justicia; y si lo segundo, dexarA de eulparle de 
obscuro. (431)
Thus, Fernandez de C6rdoba embraces (as JAuregui would do 
to a lesser degree in his Discurso poetico) a poetics in 
which difficulty of interpretation is acceptable for two 
reasons: the achievement of the sublime style and the
exclusion of the vulgar. The degree of uncertainty caused 
by the language is relative to the degree of learning of 
the interpreter, but is ultimately resolvable. He 
effectively rejects the application of the metaphpr of 
obscurity, claiming that the poem can be understood.
A compatriot of G6ngora and FernAndez, Pedro Dfaz de 
Ribas, composed the Discursos apolotfeticos in 1618 for 
inclusion in Ldpez de Vicuna’s aborted second volume of his 
edition of Gdngora which was to have been
published in 1624 (Gates 30). Probably written as a reply 
to JAuregui’s Antfdoto. the Discursos were answered in 1624 
by JAuregui’s Discurso Poetico (Gates 27). The book is 
structured around eleven objections that critics had voiced 
to Gbngora’s "culterano'‘ style; after listing them, Diaz de 
Ribas refutes each one, quoting copiously from classical 
rhetoricians. The first four objections he considers to 
relate more to the new poetic style:
1. Las muchas voces peregrinas que introduce.
2. Los tropos frequentfssimos.
3. Las muchas transpossipiones.
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4. La obscuridad de estylo que resulta de todo 
eso. (34)
The rest are objections that he dismisses as simply lacking 
validity:
5. La dureqa de algunas metAforas.
6. La desigualdad de el estylo en algunas 
partes.
7. El uso de palabras humildes entretexidas con 
las sublimes.
8. La repetic?i6n freqtlente de unas mismas voees 
y frassis.
9. Algunas hyperboles y exagerapiones grandes.
10. La longitud de algunos perfodos.
11. La redundancia o copia demasiada en el degir. 
(34-35)
The objection of most interest to this study is, of course, 
the fourth, but since it is a result of the previous three, 
they bear treatment as well.
To counter the first objection, Dfaz de Ribas proposes 
that if the critics read classical and Italian poets they 
will see the debt that they owe to G6ngora,
porque enriquecib nuestra lengua con los thesoros 
de la latina, madre suya, no s61o en las vozes, 
sino en la gracia del decir, en la composigidn de 
las diqiones y en las demAs virtudes, que era lo 
que a nuestra lengua le faltaba para su policia y 
artificio. (43-44)
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Dfaz maintains, as does Gbngora in his "Carta," that, 
through the latter’s efforts, the Spanish language has 
arrived at the "cumbre de su perfecidn" (44). Diaz lists 
only eight words that Gdngora has introduced to the 
language and says that he can not be sure that those have 
not been used by other Spanish writers as well (44). The 
alien words, however, were imported for the legitimate and 
laudable purpose of enriching the language.
The shifting of the expected order of thought and 
language constitute the second and third objections 
respectively. Dias excuses Gbngora’s copious use of tropes 
as necessary to differentiate poetry from oratory, of which 
the trope is the principal ornament. Hyperbaton, which 
occurs when the ordinary "contextura" of the words is 
disrupted, is not violent, but as natural in Spanish as it 
is in Latin (48). The problem of obscurity arises with the 
conjunction and exuberance of the previous three qualities.
Like those who criticized Gdngora’s obscurity, Diaz de 
Ribas distinguishes between two types of obscurity: "una
nace de las historias, de los pensamientos delgados, de el 
estylo sublime; otra, de la contextura amphibolbgica de las 
dicciones" (49). The latter is, as it was with others, to 
be condemned. What is different about Diaz’s distinction 
is where he places the limit between the acceptable and the 
unacceptable; he accepts much of what has been called 
obscurity by others as an inevitable by-product of proper 
poetic language. He discusses nine elements of the sublime
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style that result in difficulty of interpretation, tending 
to blur the difference between what opponents saw as 
separate realms of thought and language.
As the first cause, Dfaz lists the commonly cited 
obscure topics of philosophy, "fAbulas oecultas" and 
history which only the truly erudite can understand (49). 
Any lack of understanding in such cases is not the fault of 
the poem but of the interpreter's ignorance. Wit and 
reading are also pre-requisites for the comprehension of 
the second cause, Gdngora's concepts, noted for their 
"agudeca y novedad" (49-50). Both of these cases, obscure 
referents and obscure concepts, are considered by Gdngora's 
critics to lie beyond language and are considered 
acceptable.
The remaining causes lie on the linguistic level and 
are direct results of the elevated style: "Pues tanbien la
alteca que pretendid en el estilo con las vozes peregrinas, 
con tropos, transposiciones, son (bien que virtudes 
necessaries para este fin) causa de obscurecer la oracidn" 
(50). In addition to foreign words, tropes, and 
transpositions mentioned here, Dfaz lists the ornate "modo 
de decir" in majestic speech that creates wonder with its 
extreme learning and wit (50). The use of transpositions 
to achieve elegant ("gallardo") and dignified (“grabe") 
speech obscures the sentence, making difficult its 
interpretation for the poet too "floxo" to understand it 
(53).
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The seventh cause of obscurity is the figure 
"circuigidn o conprehensibn." According to Hermogenes, 
this periphrastic figure is the main component of the 
sublime style, and Dfaz claims that it is also the main 
cause of obscurity in the "Soledades" since it occurs in 
almost all the sentences (54). In a marginal note, Dfaz 
explains that "circuicidn" causes obscurity by suspending 
the mind ("el Animc”) unlike in the clear style (Gates 
54n23). This suspension of the understanding’s search for 
closure, a detour through a level of discourse displaced a 
step further from its referent, accords with Gdngora’s 
description of interpretive activity and both intensifies 
and calls attention to that process.
Gdngora’s use of some devices not employed frequently 
by other poets causes obscurity "por el nuebo modo de 
contextura" such as "ayuntos o aposiciones" (54), the 
"apositibos" condemned by JAuregui in his Antfdoto (137). 
For Dfaz de Ribas, these appositives, which Gdngora uses 
with great frequency, lend the poem "grace and elegance" 
and perform the same function as the epithet in heroic 
poetry "con los quales se exornan mucho los Poetas" (54).
It is worth noting here (and throughout the Discursos) 
Dfaz’s displacement of "poem" by "poet"; he seems to equate 
work and author. Finally, although extraordinary devices 
based on the oblique cases result in obscurity, such as the 
use of the ablative absolute, they are appropriate to the 
elevated style and are thus acceptable (55).
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In his conclusion to the section on obscurity, Diaz 
exonerates the poet (again as the displaced site of the 
alleged obscurity). The source of the obscurity lies in 
excess and in lack, the result of a "sobra de virtudes 
poeticas y falta o de lecibn o de ingenio o de atencibn en 
el lector" (55). Such obscurity is acceptable for Diaz 
since it is the proper domain of poetry. Censurable 
obscurity results from "contexto amphibolbgico" because 
ambiguity (he quotes Quintilian) "incertum intellectum 
faeit" (56). Here, the blame for the failure to understand 
lies with the poet and not the reader (56). Thus Diaz 
maintains that the elevated poetic style, although 
difficult, can always be interpreted with certainty, given 
that the reader is properly prepared, capable and willing. 
When ambiguity does occur in Gbngora’s work, its intended 
signification ultimately may be determined; Diaz states it 
thus:
al fin puedese sacar con el estudio el 
entendimiento de su sentencia por la materia y 
por los antecedentes y conseqiientes, como por 
esta razbn se pueden tolerar otras muchas 
amphibologias semejantes en excelentes Poetas.
(56)
Diaz, then, denies the existence of any unresolvable 
uncertainty in Gbngora’s controversial poems. After 
dismissing the remaining objections as invalid, Diaz claims 
that the “Soledades” contain no flaws, only genuine poetic
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virtues and some excesses due to the "alteza de el ingenio 
verdaderamente poetico” (66).
In his Anotaoiones y defensas s Xa Ecirosca fiolaflafl de 
Don Luis de GAngora. Dfaz de Ribas addresses some of the 
specific objections to the "Soledades" that JAuregui had 
elaborated in his Antfdoto. Although I have not been able 
to examine the entire work, the selections quoted by Gates 
in the footnotes to her edition of the Antfdoto. are 
sufficient to demonstrate a level of uncertainty acceptable 
to Dfaz. In answer to JAuregui's charge that the heroic 
style, which GAngora seeks to employ, requires the "firme 
tronco" of a plot or story as a foundation (139), Dfaz 
replies paradoxically that the "firme tronco" of the 
"Soledades" consists of the "passos de un Peregrino en la 
Soledad" (Gates 86n4). The certain referent, the soul of 
the poem for JAuregui ("IntroduciAn" 4), is the uncertain 
peregrination of an unidentified wanderer in an unknown 
place. Dfaz defends GAngora’s lack of specificity in not 
naming the place or the protagonist as a means of creating 
suspense in the listener and heightening his or her desire 
t-o know the entire story, a device that delays the sure 
grasp of knowledge.
Further admission of uncertainty is made in Diaz’s 
explanation of GAngora’s use of the structure employing 
"si" and "no". In clarifying JAuregui’s misreading of "si" 
as "sf," he makes the point that the sense of the sentence 
is conditional, not oppositional. The "if" in the verse in
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question, "Si Aurora no con rayos, Sol con flores" (250) 
leaves the reader suspended between the two possibilities 
by "poner dudosa la oracidn adjunta" (112n44). Dfaz 
explains:
Y as£ quando dize: si HQ Aurora con rayos, no 
dice con certidumbre que no es Aurora, sino 
dudando, por virtud de la condicidn si. Por 
donde haze este sentido: 0 £s Aurora con rayos,
o Sol con flores: o este: Si QQ ffie concedeis que
es Aurora con ravos. es Sol con flores. De modo 
que sienpre va el Poeta [read "poem" ] devaxo de 
duda. (112n44)
Dfaz’s approval of this, type of deliberate and unresolvable 
ambiguity rests on its being part of the elevated style of 
poetry. Besides, although certainty is not possible, the 
language is not opaque; both epithets point to the same 
referent and neither is privileged as a superior 
representation or held to be true while the other is 
considered false.
Dfaz de Ribas justifies Gdngora’s obscurity as a 
natural result of the elevated diction he employs. His 
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable types of 
obscurity seems to be reducible to one between obscurity 
and opacity. Poetic language that does not allow 
understanding to be completed is judged to have failed in 
its epistemological function of representation. Such 
language is strained beyond the point of comprehensibility
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and 'transmission breaks down. Mo matter what preparation 
and intellectual capacity the interpreter brings to the 
text, he is no longer able to supply what is needed to 
"uncover" the elements necessary for closure that the poet 
is assumed to have written into the text. The limit which 
Dfaz has consistently claimed to be relative to the 
interpreter’s preparation and intellectual capacity is 
assumed to have a true fixed terminus. However, as for 
where to draw the limit beyond which language becomes so 
obscure as to be opaque, and who is to ultimately decide 
what lies beyond the pale of interpretibility and what is 
. merely difficulty resulting from elevated diction, are the 
undeclared points of contention between Gdngora’s 
adversaries and defenders.
One who took on the role of interpreting the new 
language was Jose Garcfa de Salcedo Coronel, a poet whose 
style is associated by literary historians with that of 
Gdngora, although he is better known for his commentaries 
of Gdngora’s poetry. It is the brief prologue to the 
reader of his edition of the "Soledades" that is of 
interest to this portion of the study. There, Salcedo 
declares his purpose as that of commentator or interpreter, 
offering help in the deciphering of the concepts to those 
who have run up against the obscurity of the poem’s 
"sentencias" (225). He says that even those who blame the 
poet for that obscurity must admit that he did succeed in 
elevating Spanish poetry and enriching the language (225).
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Salcedo's own opinion about obscurity is ambivalent:
No digo yo que es buena la oscuridad, ni la he 
seguido en mis escritos, pero en don Luis es 
venerable, por haber ilustrado nuestro idioma con 
frasis, con tropos y figuras no usadas antes de 
los castellanos poetas, hoy imitadas de tantos, 
bien que de pocos con felicidad. (226)
Obscurity that can be justified as functional, then, is 
considered praiseworthy.
Salcedo asserts that obscurity results from ambiguity, 
but he does not consider whether the ambiguity is 
ultimately resolvable or not, a point emphasized by Diaz de 
Ribas. The four figures he lists as the source of 
ambiguity are condemned by grammarians because they impede 
the perspicacity of the sentence. When used prudently 
("cuerdamente”), however, the same figures can embellish 
and beautify, and that, according to Salcedo, is how 
Gbngora employs them (226). Homonymy, the use of words 
with multiple significations, inevitably causes ambiguity.
A second figure, amphibology, is a construction that admits 
more than one interpretation, not making clear, for 
example, which noun is subject and which one object of the 
verb, or which noun is being modified by an adjective. 
Ambiguity may also result from brachylogy, or excessive 
brevity, which requires the reader to supply the elements 
needed for interpretation that have been omitted.
Salcedo names anastrophe, or syntactical inversion, as
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the obscuring figure employed most frequently by Gdngora, 
but he justifies its use as stylistic imitation of 
confused, indecisive or intricately ornate subject matter.
A poet, for example, "cuando quiere exprimir un Animo 
perturbado, perturba el orden de las palabras" (230), and 
when Gdngora describes
el adorno de las calles de una aldea, y cuAn 
impedidas estaban con los Arboles y flores, dice: 
Admira cortesano
a pesar del estambre, y de la seda
el que tapiz frondoso
teji6 de verdes hojas la arboleda:
y los que por las calles espaciosas
fabrican arcos rosas,
oblicuos nuevos, pensiles jardines
de tantos como violas jazmines.
Donde parece que los mismos versos con las 
trasposiciones de las voces, dicen lo entretejido 
de los Arboles, y forman los arcos que refiere 
estaban fabricados de rosas. (230)
Salcedo Coronel has fully accepted the obscurity that 
occurs in the "Soledades," justifying it with a poetics of 
functional uncertainty. For him, the challenge that 
Gdngora’s language poses to interpretation is not one that 
questions basic assumptions; the difficulties can be 
understood as the natural result of a special poetic use of 
language.
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Martfn Vazquez Siruela also finds acceptable what had 
been called Gdngora’s obscurity, but he rejects the term 
"obscuridad," redefining it by an inversion of the light/ 
darkness metaphor. In his "Discurso sobre el estilo de don 
Luis de Gdngora y cardcter legftimo de la podtica," which 
he wrote to Salcedo Coronel after he had read the latter’s 
commentary of the "Soledades" (before its publication in 
1636), V&zquez Siruela describes language as having three 
forms or species: popular, oratorical, and poetic (390).
Poetic language is farthest removed from the vulgar; 
oratory lies between them because, although it too is an 
elevated language, it must remain comprehensible to the 
people in order to function persuasively. The "intrfnsico 
y natural idioma de la poesfa" (388), having no need to be 
accessible to the public, should be ornate, and difficulty 
of interpretation should not be a consideration of the poet 
as he composes. V&zquez quotes Cicero to the effect that 
it is the necessary nature of poetry to possess two 
qualities: that the "materia del discurso" be hidden in
the "contestura i el ornato de las palabras, " and that the 
poem "mereaca la aprobacidn de pocos" (389). This does not 
mean, however that the poem should be sealed, as V&zquez 
asserts by employing the metaphor of seeing and knowledge. 
V&zquez writes that G6ngora has hung a veil "sobre sus 
escritos i que cada uno pudiera correr[lo] con el estudio i 
la diligencia" (392). It is the role of interpreters, such 
as Salcedo Coronel, to help in uncovering the concepts that
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Gbngora has hidden there.
As to how far removed from the popular language poetic 
discourse should be, VAzquez answers, citing a Ciceronian 
dialogue, “hasta parezer que habla en lengua extrana"
(390). VAzquez compares poetic language to a distinct 
dialect (390), and then paraphrases Pindar’s claim of 
writing "[a]l vulgo como a gente de otra naci6n i lengua 
estrana . . . "  (391). He presents poetry as different from 
ordinary language to the point of being a separate dialect 
with a distinct function. The purpose of the poetic level 
of discourse is still that of transmitting embodied 
concepts, but its second function of embellishment does not 
permit "transparent" communication of ideas.
JAuregui had charged that in the "nueva poesla" 
language usurped the primacy of thought, but VAzquez’s use 
of the term "conceptos" appears to demonstrate a belief 
that they are prior to language. He writes of Gdngora as 
hiding his concepts (392). He also treats words ("voces")
and concepts as separate in describing the task of the
commentator:
diciendo de las vozes lo que basta para no 
ignorar su contextura i significaciAn, a lo que 
atiende mAs es a los conceptos, sacAndolos de su 
retiro i descifrando lo misterioso dellos con 
tanta claridad i elegancia, que ya GAngora para 
los doctos . . .  es doctfsimo, popular para los
populares, i para nadie oculto. (393)
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When he writes of how Gbngora’s poetry has influenced the 
Spanish language, his description of the process of 
conception recalls the writings of Quevedo and Cascales:
ya las formas de su estilo estAn enbebidas en la 
lengua, i de unos en otros se an dilatado, sin 
sentir las concibe el entendimiento, i de allf 
pasan a la conversacibn i a la pluma, obrando con 
secreta causalidad, como la luz i el aire de que 
vivimos; . . . .  (383)
For Cascales and Quevedo, it was the concepto that gave 
form to language and determined its style. Style was the 
embodiment of concepts. Gdngora’s concepts, according to 
VAzquez, were so absorbed ("enbebidas") into the language 
and so widely disseminated that they had ceased to be 
recognizable as self-consciously conceived images. Thus, 
without being aware of the act of conception, speakers or 
writers of the language, reconceived his concepts and 
expressed them orally or in writing. These passages 
indicate clearly that, for VAzquez, thought is independent 
of, prior to, and transmissible by, its expression in 
language.
Although the primacy of thought over language was not 
seen as inverted in the elevated discourse, a revolution 
did result as control over, and access to, meaning were 
wrested from ordinary users of the language and shifted to 
those who were privy to the "new" language. With the three 
levels of discourse identified by VAzquez came a
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distribution of power. Those who could use and understand 
the elevated poetic discourse were themselves elevated, 
deriving power from their exclusive control over a 
sublanguage carved out of the mother tongue and set aside 
for themselves. Oratory, the purpose of which is to 
influence or exert power, participated in both the other 
levels, using the popular language to be able to 
communicate, and figures and tropes from the poetic in 
order to move the hearers. The frustration that both 
Fernindez and JAuregui expressed over the difficulty they 
experienced in interpreting poetry in their native language 
can be explained in terms of a sense of loss of power over 
their language.
Applying Waswo’s observation that such a shift is 
actually "an expansion of controls" available to the 
interpreter (14) appears to contradict their expressed 
feelings of loss of power. The interpreter’s control only 
increases, however, if he/she is aware of having control 
and is willing to exercise it. It is necessary to remember 
that the idea of the reader as construer of meaning was a 
radical departure from referential semantics; JAuregui 
mentions it only as an undesirable result of Gdngora’s 
poetry (Antfdoto 97). Meaning was referential, still 
considered to exist beyond, behind, or beneath the text.
The means of concealing the poem’s meaning are the 
same in VAzquez Siruela’s-"Discurso" as those that appeared 
in the attacks of Gdngora’s critics,
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senalando ellos mismos bien incautamente por 
causas desta su obscuridad la demasiada cultura 
de la oracibn, la osadla y freeuencia de las 
metiforas, las vozes esquisitas, las antithesis, 
los hyperbatos, con las otras figuras i 
amenidades que a costa de su mucho desvelo con 
rara industria de la lengua griega i Romana 
trasladb a la nuestra. (388)
These "ornaments" of the language, however, are lights—  
"lunbres de la oracibn"— that illuminate it and make it 
"esplendida.“ The difficulty of understanding, or seeing, 
is thus not the result of darkness, but of an "abundancia
de luz" (387), and "quien afirma que de aqui' naze su
obscuridad, forzado confiesa de camino que se enbaraza en 
la copia de luz y que la noche mis esti de su parte que en 
los objetos mismos. . . . (388). The blindness, formerly 
called obscurity, lies not in the poem, but in the 
interpreter whose vision is disrupted by so much light.
Vazquez distinguishes between esplendor and clarity, 
explaining that although they seem to be opposites they are 
not. He explains that Latin perspicuitas. Greek 
diaphaneia. the same as Spanish transparencia.
es una claridad de ningdn fondo, como una tela de
luz mui delgada i de raros hilos que admite los
ojos i francamente los dexa pasar a los objetos 
que tras ella se esconden. Mis esplendor es 
mucha luz condensada, que detiene la vista i aun
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la haze volver atrAs si no es mui valiente, i 
quando lo es, abiendo de penetrar por fondo como 
por un pielago de luz, llega mis tarde a los 
objetos. (388)
Covarrubias explains that in embroidery that shows relief, 
the fondo is the lower level of needlework (604); thus with 
clarity, there is no fondo while with esplendor the fondo 
is like a "pielago." In addition to signifying "ocean, " 
"pielago" is "por translacidn . . . un negocio dificultoso 
de concluir, que no le halla pie el que entra en el" 
(Covarrubias 870).
The image of the tapestry is in agreement with 
JAuregui*s concern over the lack of a fixed, readily 
accessible reality beyond the language. The diaphanous 
poem, like the sheer tapestry, allows the one who 
approaches it to view its carefully fashioned design, while 
also always allowing him/her to see the truth that lies 
beyond it. The splendid style, on the other hand, not only 
impedes the reader/viewer from seeing the underlying 
reality, but also provides a fondo. a false bottom, as it 
were, that misleads the interpreter. Both JAuregui 
(although with some vacillation) and V&zquez maintain that 
the poem is ultimately comprehensible, that one may discern 
what lies beyond after much work. Besides the terminology, 
the difference between them is, of course, that VAzquez 
finds the difficulty of interpretation not only acceptable 
but commendable.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
The four defenses examined above do not show 
significant epistemological differences from the four 
attacks in the previous chapter. The way one is thought to 
know the world in both cases is based on the intellectual 
concept as the image of the thing in the world. The 
ordinary function of language in communicating that 
knowledge from one person’s understanding to that of 
another is also the same. The difference is that language, 
formerly seen to be purely a function, becomes an entity 
which is to be beautified and then, as a thing of great 
beauty, removed from the grasp of ordinary people. For 
both qualities (function and entity) to have been 
attributes of one language, however, the epistemologically 
defined role of language would have had to change; the 
accurate transmission of knowledge would have been 
compromised by a legitimate language that could both 
transmit truth and resist or even deny its transmission. 
That danger was avoided by language’s division into 
distinct, parallel levels corresponding to the aspects of 
splendid entity and transparent function. The "nueva 
poesfa" was new in that it appeared to be an addition to an 
existing system rather than a change in the order of 
things.
Of course, the one writer who could best explain and 
defend that poetry was Luis de G6ngora. G6ngora was the 
poet who claimed to be (and who was acclaimed to be by 
many) the one who had raised Spanish lyric to an
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unsurpassed level of glory, the new Phoenix born from the 
ashes of Homer and Virgil (VAzquez 382). Like his chief 
opponents he wrote satirical and burlesque poems to attack 
them and defend his major works, and as in their case, his 
gibes reveal little about his poetics. In some decimas 
that Milie dates between 1614 and 1617, Gdngora places the 
obscurity in the malice of the interpreter as he had also 
done in the "Carta" he wrote in his defense (173): 
pues imputa oscuridad 
a una opaca Soledad 
quien luz no enciende en su casa.
Melindres son de lechuza, 
que en lo umbroso poco vuele 
quien en las tinieblas suele
no perdonar a una alcuza. ("Por la estafeta")
The critic— Mille indicates that JAuregui was intended 
(1131-1132), while Orozco also points up references to Lope 
de Vega (217-218)— is compared to an owl, which is noted 
for its poor eyesight and its predilection for drinking 
lamp oil (Covarrubias 756). The "Soledades," then, are 
imputed to be opaque by those who not only do not see well 
but who greedily and imprudently drink up the means by 
which they might be able to see better. Gdngora’s use of 
the metaphor of vision/understanding continues in the 
sonnet "De los que censuraron su ‘Polifemo.’" He writes 
that the critics of that poem, "A pesar del lucero de su 
frente, / le hacen oscuro." It is obvious that they, and
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not Polyphemus (the personified poem), are the source of 
the imputed obscurity. The Cyclops responds with "dos 
truenos . . . de su Occidente," "razones, " according to the 
poet, that would offer his adversaries closure to their 
lack of understanding.
In the "Carta en respuesta a la que le escribieron,“ 
the only piece of theoretical writing in which G6ngora 
discusses and defends his poetics, he does not define his 
use of the term "obscuridad," but his discussion gives an 
adequate picture of certain features of it he held to be 
true. In denying Lope’s charge that his poetry was neither 
useful, noble ("honroso"), nor delightful, Gdngora proposes 
that his poems are useful for educating students, because 
si la obscuridad y estilo entrincado de Ovidio 
(que en lo de Ponto y en lo de Tristibus fue tan 
claro como se ve, y tan obscuro en las 
Transformaciones). da causa a que, vacilando el 
entendimiento en fuerza de discurso, trabajindole 
(pues crece con cualquier acto de valor), alcance 
lo que asf en la lectura superficial de sus 
versos no pudo entender, luego hase de confesar 
que tiene utilidad avivar el ingenio, y eso nacib 
de la obscuridad del poeta. (172)
G6ngora’s parallel use of "obscuridad" and "estilo 
entrincado” indicates that he considers obscurity to be 
distinct from the linguistic, material manifestation of the 
poem, and assumes that language is independent of its
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referent. The attribution of the obscurity to the author 
rather than to the text, however, serves to blur the 
distinction between poet and poem, between thought and 
language. Just how language, the concento. and the thing 
in the world are perceived by Gbngora is not yet clear.
Much more insight into the philosophical basis for 
Gdngora’s poetics is revealed by his description of the 
hermeneutical process as "the understanding vacillating by 
virtue of discourse, working at it." The uncertain 
hesitation between alternative significations and the 
etymological “running about" of "discourse" result in the 
growth of understanding with each effort. The process ends 
when the understanding achieves what a superficial reading 
cannot, a fixed referential meaning. Gdngora makes no 
mention here of the reader’s understanding as constitutive 
of meaning; on the contrary, in the following sentence, he 
writes of the referent as something that exists beneath 
language and that is to be uncovered: "Eso mismo hallarA
V. m. en mis Soledades. si tiene capacidad para quitar la 
corteza y descubrir lo misterioso que encubren" (172). The 
image (which predates but reminds one of Lope’s reference 
to the Silenus statues of the Symposium) is reminiscent of 
the task of the resemblant epistemology’s interpreter in 
discovering the secrets of the primal Text. At the same 
time, there is the insulting insinuation that Lope is not 
among those capable of understanding the poem.
As for the second criterion, "honrosa," Gbngora writes
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that hs considers himself ennobled by the poetry in two 
ways. First he claims to have succeeded in the Spanish 
quest to elevate the Castiiiian language and thus to merit 
honor: "si entendida para los doctos, causarme ha
autoridad, siendo lance forzoso venerar que nuestra lengua 
a costa de mi trabajo haya llegado a la perfeccidn y alteza 
de la latina" (172). This heroic language, he repeats, "ha 
de ser diferente de la prosa y digno de personas capaces de 
entendelle" (172). Continuing the theme of the capable 
reader, G6ngora returns to that of obscurity as he explains 
the second way in which the poem honors him:
Dem&s que honra me ha causado hacerme escuro a 
los ignorantes, que esa es la distincidn de los 
hombres doctos, hablar de manera que a ellos les 
parezca griego; pues no se han de dar las piedras 
preciosas a animales de cerda. (172)
The language of the last clause, and the image of the bark 
that hides something mysterious, point to the Renaissance 
Neoplatonic tradition.
In discussing Lope’s third criterion, the satisfaction 
or pleasure the poem must cause, Gbngora reveals more of 
his epistemological ideas, describing the delight his poems 
give as intellectual rather than sensual. He explains that 
si deleitar el entendimiento es darle razones que 
le concluyan y se midan con su contento, 
descubriendo lo que est& debajo de esos tropos, 
por fuerza el entendimiento ha de quedar
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convencido, y convencido, satisfecho. (172). 
Intellectual pleasure, then, results when the back-and- 
forth motion of the understanding is halted by the 
discovery of determining reasons. Covarrubias explains 
that "Concluyr a uno es convencerle y atarle con razones, " 
and he also defines it as "Terminar, acabar, resumir, 
cerrar una cosa, cenirla y difinirla" (346). Gdngora’s 
placement of the entendimiento as the passive component, 
acted upon by determiners seen to be hidden beneath the 
language, demonstrates that he does not visualize the 
interpreter as construing meaning, but rather finding a 
meaning that already exists hidden within language.
Although Gdngora does refer to the concepto of the 
predominant "representative" episteme, the language he uses 
comes closer to that of the earlier epoch. He continues: 
demAs que, como el fin de el entendimiento es 
hacer presa en verdades, que por eso no le 
satisface nada, si no es la primera verdad, 
conforme a aquella sentencia de san Agustfn: 
Inauietum est cor nostrum, donee requiescat in 
te. en tanto quedarA mAs deleitado, cuanto, 
obligAndole a la especulacidn por la obscuridad 
de la obra, fuera hallando debajo de las sombras 
de la obscuridad asimilaciones a su concepto. 
(172-173)
Gdngora’s discourse is mainly that of Foucault’s 
“resemblant" epistemology. The "running about"
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("discurrir") of the understanding can truly be put to rest 
only by a "first truth," an ultimate guarantor of meaning. 
Without reaching that truth— which seems to be impossible 
during this life— only a lesser satisfaction is possible. 
Consequently, he explains, the nearer the imitation is to 
the first truth, the greater the pleasure of discovery. 
Gdngora’s mention of the intermediate conceptual image of 
that truth as the object of imitation indicates an 
acknowledgement that the truth lies ultimately outside of 
thought and language and can not be represented but merely 
imitated. *
As I indicated in the second chapter, Gdngora’s reply 
to the charge that he had been struck by some "ramalazo de 
Babel" also gives evidence of a resemblant epistemology. 
Gdngora replied that at Babel,
No los confundid Dios a ellos con darles lenguaje 
confuso, sino en el mismo suyo ellos se 
confundieron, tomando piedra por agua y agua por 
piedra; que esa fue la grandeza de la sabidurfa 
del que confundid aquel soberbio intento. (173) 
In Gdngora’s account, neither the language nor the world 
changed. Furthermore, language was not just "empty" words 
divorced from sense; it continued to signify something to 
its speakers. Otherwise, there would not have occurred the 
kind of confusion Gdngora describes. Thus, what was 
different was the connection between signifier and 
signified, a connection that could be interpreted as the
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third element in the Renaissance ternary conception of the 
sign. God, who had authored the signatures in the first 
place when he inscribed language in creation, did not erase 
them, but rather hid them, where they might be discovered 
by those capable of doing so.
In this letter, which is as much an attack as a 
defense, Gdngora*s discourse relies heavily on the language 
of the older episteme,2 describing meaning as something to 
be uncovered within language rather than something to be 
embodied and transmitted by language to the understanding 
of its interpreter. While he boasts of having raised 
Castillian poetic language to a level comparable to that of 
classical Latin, Gdngora does not discuss the means of his 
accomplishment nor does he defend the obscurity that 
results from it. However, his descriptive model of 
hermeneutics as a restless process is reflected in his 
culterano poetry that requires the reader’s understanding 
to probe and vacillate while "running about" and seeking 
the determiners that will close on a fixed meaning upon 
which it can rest. So, while he probably does not see his 
poems as requiring the reac-sr to construct meaning, Gdngora 
does recognize that they intensify the interpretive 
activity, making it a self-aware one in which certainty, as 
J&uregui so vehemently noted, is difficult to establish.
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1 R. 0. Jones uses this passage to justify a search 
for hidden meaning:
Through his quotation from St. Augustine (from 
Confessions. I) Gdngora more than hints that that 
theme is for him the ultimate truth of all. 
"Asimilaciones a su concepto" are (I see no 
alternative reading) to be interpreted as 
"asimilaciones [resemblances or approximations] 
al concepto de la primera verdad". Gdngora seems 
to be claiming that the mind, puzzling over the 
multitudinous images, allusions and tropes of the 
Soledades. is led to an understanding of the 
source of all truth; which, in terms of 
seventeenth-century orthodoxy, one might suppose 
to be God. And yet God is nowhere mentioned in 
the poem; . . . ("Neoplatonism" 1-2)
He employs this interpretation as a point of departure for 
a Neoplatonic reading of the poem.
Beverley, citing ambiguity, sees a second possible 
antecedent for the word "su." In addition to referring to 
"la primera verdad," it would be syntactically logical to 
attribute the concept to the "entendimiento.“ Thus, "the 
'asimilaciones a su concepto’ which intelligence is to find 
in the exercise the figures require may also be, in one 
sense, 'asimilaciones al concepto que el entendimineto 
tiene de sf mismo’" (16). He does not seem to make a point
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about the significance of his second interpretation, other 
than that it is an example of Gdngora's ambiguity.
Robin Louis McAllister, who constructs a Neoplatonic 
allegory of the "Soledades,” translates “freely" the 
statement as: "compelled to contemplation by the obscurity
of the style, the intellect proceeds to discover 'under the 
shadows of obscurity' equivalences to the intellect's own
innate idea of the "Truth" . . . (103).
2
Jones' and McAllister's interpretations of the 
"Carta" as indicating a hidden, Neoplatonic, allegorical 
meaning may be interpreted to indicate that Gdngora’s work 
was based on the Renaissance resemblant epistemology.
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Chapter 4
In Search of Structure: "Soleaad primera"
Martin Vdzquez Siruela; in writing to a commentator of 
the "Soledades," distinguished two obstacles to the 
interpretation of poetry that are pertinent to this study: 
Las interpretaciones de los poetas no han de ser 
despues de pasados muchos siglos . . . ; porque 
perdida o estragada la lengua que siempre estd en 
crecientes i menguantes como la luna, i las 
costumbres del siglo en que escribieron 
alterada[s], lo que en su misma edad es 
dificultoso quedara inaccesible: abiendose de
pelear despues con dos obscuridades, con la 
nativa del idioma Podtico que lo acompana desde 
la cuna, i con otra mayor inducida del tiempo. 
(392)
Such a statement assumes that the work is an unchanging 
verbal icon lying outside of time and beyond the language 
in which it is structured, an assumption shared by most 
interpretations of the "Soledades." Critics have generally 
sought to establish a definitive reading by uncovering the 
"true," "intended" signification, a "firme tronco" (to 
borrow J&uregui’s term) thought to lie beyond or beneath 
Gdngora’s ornate, contorted language. Such readings are 
valuable, but they should be recognized for what they are:
132
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constructs founded on assumptions as to how the world is 
known and how that knowledge is communicated.
It is, of course, now a commonplace that whatever a 
poet intended has always been, and will remain, 
inaccessible, no matter how convincingly "logical" a case 
one may build for a particular interpretation. The most 
important thing for a critic is to be aware of the process 
of constructing a context for interpretation, a necessary 
process in all hermeneutic situations. The focus of the 
present study will be to persuade those who read it that 
the "Soledades” resist interpretation when they are 
approached with epistemological assumptions that regard 
them (and all discourse) as embodying a fixed, knowable, 
referential meaning. In reading the "Soledades," I will 
attempt not to divide the work into the separate categories 
of form (language) and content (subject matter).1 I wish 
to avoid looking beyond language to find either a hidden 
meaning that refers allegorically to a single truth 
(Foucault’s principle of resemblance) or a referential 
level of meaning that is assumed to signify the concepts 
Gdngora had of the world (Foucault’s second episteme). 
Instead, this study proposes to examine how the "Soledades" 
tend to frustrate such a process, and to search for 
decentering mechanisms that prevent the reader from
O
constructing a unifying central core of meaning.
In exposing my assumption that determiners, whose 
existence is already relative to an interpretive community,
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are "different" in the "Soledades," I have presupposed a 
norm against which to measure them. Furthermore, the 
difference itself becomes a "firme tronco" for an 
interpreter who sees what he or she is seeking before even 
looking. This grounding occurs because any analysis— a 
project of an epistemology that accepts the premise that 
the world can be known and that a subject can be separated 
from that world— requires at least the semblance of a fixed 
ground to underlie the construction or to serve as a point 
of departure for entry into what is to be analyzed. One 
must dive from something into the ocean, even if it is 
merely a raft, or else all is ocean and there is no space 
outside it.
In order to execute my interpretive project, it will 
be necessary to heuristically posit a text, an "outside" of 
the text, and a reader who accepts that separation. The 
hypothetical reader will seek to interpret the text by 
attempting self-consciously to impose an ordering structure 
on it. He/she will also enter upon the project with the 
hypothesis that the poem’s protagonist is an interpreter of 
the world. The reader’s interpretive effort will become a 
second text, and it will be necessary to posit another 
"outside" and myself as interpreter in that "outside."
From that position, I will be analyse both texts. (I do 
not know the ground upon which I will stand to posit those 
necessary elements, nor how I came to be on that ground, 
for the "out-of-which" is unknown and unknowable.)
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Standing on my platform for analysis, I will construe 
a meaning that points up an anti-meaning.3 The passages I 
have selected allow me to do so without violating the norms 
of the interpretive community to which I belong and to 
which I am addressing this study. Paul Julian Smith has 
written, "The use of examples to develop an argument is a 
notoriously unfair method of critical analysis" (Writing 
49). Although Smith's principle is founded on a noble 
sense of fairness, it is also based on a presumption that 
one can make an argument without making reductions. Just 
as one must assume a ground for analysis, one must also 
perform reductions on the material to be analyzed in order 
to develop the hypothesis for which one is arguing.
In selecting the passages to be analyzed, I have 
attempted to choose specifically those with which I can 
best prove my thesis that the "Soledades” challenge the 
epistemological stance of their readers. In contrast with 
writing that ordinarily allows the reader to assume a 
framework by providing a site for the construction of 
meaning, the portions of text I have excerpted cause the 
interpreter to hesitate and "run about" (as Gdngora put it 
in his "Carta") more than "normal," precisely by denying 
that ground. To demonstrate how it does so, I will begin 
my analysis by describing an interpreter’s progress through 
four lines of text.^
Of course, since the undermining of the interpretive 
effort occurs more than "normal" throughout the poem, as
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the documents of the polemic have adequately demonstrated, 
my selections meet other criteria as well. They are 
passages that treat the protagonist's experience of coming 
to know the world of the poem. The first three passages 
will be construed as models of the three epistemological
I
systems I discussed in Chapter 1: the "Renaissance"
referential model based on resemblance, the "Classical” |
referential model founded on representation, and a "modern"
model based on relational semantics. Thus my purpose in
this chapter (and the next) is twofold: in showing how the
poem resists interpretation by my reader, I will at the
same time (through the efforts of that reader) construe
one. My construction of the poem as passages of fictional
epistemological processes will serve as a foundation for
speculation as to Gdngora’s beliefs about knowing the
world.
The first passage, lines 42-89 from the first 
"Soledad," treats the shipwrecked protagonist's journey of 
discovery into the hinterland, a pilgrimage which he begins 
in the uncertainty of twilight. As I indicated above, I 
will analyze very closely the first four lines from the 
point of view of an imaginary interpreter.
No bien pues de su luz los orizontes,
Que hazian desigual, confusamente 
Montes de agua, y pielagos de montes,
Desdorados los siente: . . . .  (11. 42-45)^
The reader begins with the negative particle that denies
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the assertion of what is to follow. The adverb "bien" 
provokes the reader to expect and then search for a verb, 
an adjective, or another adverb, in order to apply its 
attribute, but it must be held aside until the end of line 
45, when the reader arrives at the verb "siente."
Meanwhile, "pues" is another obstruction to the expected 
syntactic flow, one that evokes relatively little semantic 
input in its meaning of "well" or "then," although it might 
signify "since." The position of the prepositional phrase 
"de su luz" causes the reader to seek the noun it modifies, 
since ordinarily that noun occurs before the adjectival 
phrase. Also unclear is the antecedent of the possessive 
adjective "su," unless it refers back to the sun, the 
subject of the preceding clause (lines 38-41). The 
reader’s reaching the noun at the end of the line permits 
him/her to make some tentative syntactical connections.
"Los horizontes" may serve as the subject or object of a 
verb modified by "bien," and is probably the noun modified 
by the prepositional phrase. A return glance at “su" 
strengthens the reader’s hypothesis that the sun is its 
antecedent. The final comma signals with certainty another 
break in syntactical flow.
What appears at first glance to be a complete 
adjectival clause set off by commas raises other problems 
as the reader attempts to make expected connections in line 
43. “Los horizontes" may.serve as the antecedent for "que" 
and thus the subject for the plural verb, "hacfan," but
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
138
"desigual," being singular, must wait for a singular noun 
presumed to follow. The word "desigual" invokes a 
signification of unevenness, a declared inequality for 
which the differential nature of the relationship between 
things must be established. The next comma, since it does 
not close the clause, must signal another interruption. 
"Confusamente" causes one to seek a verb, and can modify, 
in addition to the as yet unknown verb, the reader’s 
process of seeking.
"Montes" could serve as the object of the verb 
"hacfan" and the projection can be tentatively 
substantiated by the following prepositional phrase. "De 
agua," however, belies "montes" as "mountains" and evokes 
the assignment of a signification of "waves." The addition 
of the following coordinate noun clause, "pielagos de 
montes, "— a structural repetition, but semantic inversion 
of the previous one— causes one to return to the verb 
"hacfan," of which they might be double direct objects.
The idea of something "making mountains of water and oceans 
of mountains" leaves the reader with the semantic choice of 
whether that "making" should be in the sense of generation 
or in the sense of conversion; that is, whether "de" should 
be construed as "of" or as “out of." The answer depends on 
the subject, "horizontes," which, while they do create 
things in the sense of defining limits between them, do not 
generate waves or mountains. Therefore, one can apply the 
sense of "out of" to "de" in the two phrases. The idea of
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mountains of water as waves then becomes less important 
(though no less valid) as a concept when the phrase is 
placed in juxtaposition with its inversion.
The participial adjective "Desdorados" modifies a 
masculine plural noun, either "horizontes" or both "montes" 
and "pielagos"; its signification of "ungilded" could apply 
to all three, as each is something that could be gilded by 
light. The participle can also compete with verbs for 
adverbial modifiers. The "los" which follows "desdorados," 
if an article, could signal yet another noun to vie for the 
participle’s modification, but the verb that follows and 
ends the clause eliminates that possiblity. "Los” must be 
a direct object pronoun, its referent something to be 
discovered. The third person, singular verb requires a 
subject other than "horizontes," which are also eliminated 
as a possibility since only animate objects may sense.
Having reached the colon that indicates the end of the 
clause, the reader may now attempt (if he/she has not 
already done so) to interpret the lines by imposing on them 
the order of a more commonly experienced syntax.
"Desigual" can now be assigned to "luz" as the only 
singular noun ("agua" is singular, but is in a parallel 
construction with a plural noun, "montes"). "Horizontes" 
must become the topicalized direct object that permits the 
use of the pronoun "los." "Desdorados" is applied to the 
horizon to indicate that the sun has passed the line of 
setting. The subject is the neregrino from the preceding
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verses, who does not sense well the horizons that make 
waves look like mountains and vice versa, since they are 
ungilded (because the sun has set) confusingly by the 
uneven (post sunset) light of the sun: "los horizontes no
los siente bien, pues desdorados confusamente de su luz 
desigual, que hacfan montes de agua y pidlagos de montes.1,6 
The interpretation that the reader construes is one of the 
wanderer's uncertainty resulting from his inability to see 
in the world the limits between things that define them, 
"the threshold above which there is a difference and below 
which there is a similitude" (Foucault xx). The sun, in 
crossing the boundary between day and night, delineated it 
brilliantly, and then in the twilight began erasing the 
threshold between knowing-by-seeing and not knowing.
The reading described above is that of an interpreter 
who is assumed to progress through the text from left-to- 
right and from top-to-bottom, and who waits until the end 
to construct a final product. Most readers would probably 
weave back and forth, making tentative constructions and 
modifying them as they went, having no qualms about looking 
ahead for clues that might serve as concluding "razones." 
For the remainder of this passage, I will eliminate much of 
the detail of the analysis, pointing out only those 
features that I believe most provoke the reader's 
attention.
The period continues:
Quando entregado el misero estrangero
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En lo que ya de el oar redimio fiero,
Entre espinas crepusculos pisando,
Riscos, que aun igualara mal bolando 
Veloz intrepida ala,
Menos cansado, que confuso escala. (46-51)
The uncertainty continues in the term "mfsero extranjero" 
of line 46, where the relatively unimportant yet unresolved 
distinction between "wretched foreigner" and "foreign 
wretch" must be left unclear. Separated noun and adjective 
"mar . . . fiero" further complicate a circumlocutory 
reference to the castaway's clothes as "that which he 
redeemed from the raging sea." In the periphrasis, there 
is no noun to relate figurally to the clothes; the 
displacement of meaning is to a mere pronoun of 
indeterminate gender ("lo") that offers no resemblance one 
might use in linking it to its referent.
The protagonist, "pisando crepdsculos entre espinas, " 
steps uncertainly between thorns. Briars that can be known 
in the day by the light that enables one to see them, and 
that sharply define themselves in the dark upon contact 
with the foot, are here made uncertainly knowable by 
twilight, a light between two lights (Covarrubias 369).
The space between things, Foucault's threshold, is made 
tentatively knowable by an indefinite light that falls 
between two defining functions in the sense that it is 
composed partially of both but fully of neither. There is 
not enough light for the wanderer to rely with confidence
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on his vision as a means to knowledge, but it is not dark 
enough to force him to turn to his other senses. The 
peregrino*s confusion in the vague light is greater than 
his fatigue as he scales the rocks, but he conquers them in 
spite of their height that would challenge swift and daring 
flying creatures.
In the following fragment, consisting of an ablative 
absolute— a somewhat rare structure discussed at length by 
DAmaso Alonso (Lengua 167-174}7— with double appositives 
and parallel prepositional phrases, a degree of certainty 
is restored as a boundary is clearly delineated:
Vencida al fin la cumbre 
De'l mar siempre sonante,
De la muda campaha
Arbitro igual, e inexpugnable muro; . . . .
(52-55)
The rock's summit is an impregnable wall between sea and 
plain, not even allowing sound from one side to cross to 
the other. (The linking of "campana" in juxtaposition 
with "mar" in parallel phrases is undermined to some degree 
by the preceding words related to sound— "sonante" and 
"muda"— that suggest "campana" instead.) More than just a 
wall, the ridge is also a judge that settles contention by 
drawing lines. As he passes from rocky seashore (itself an 
area in-between ocean and land) to the plain, the wanderer 
also crosses the limit between sound and silence, between 
day and night, adding the unseeable unknown to the unseen
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unknown. Beverley also notes the transition from ascent to 
descent (Aspects 34).
In the dark, uncertain night, however, the peregrino 
walks more surely, guided by a light that does not enable 
vision of the world, yet still aids him in interpreting it 
by providing orientation:
Con pie ya mas seguro 
Declina al vacilante
Breue esplendor de mal distinta lumbre,
Farol de vna cauana,
Que sobre el ferro esta en aquel incierto 
Golfo de sombras annunciando el puerto. (56-61) 
The wanderer has become a traveller with direction; he has 
a fixed destination indicated by a slight and wavering 
light that he interprets to be the lantern of some 
shepherd's hut. A metaphorical comparison of the light to 
a beacon anchored in the incertain gulf of darkness 
signaling a safe port can be construed in lines 60-61.
Jones interprets the passage as an allegorical fragment 
signifying a journey “from error to truth,“ but he ends 
that interpretation at this point. He explains that "in 
the darkness of his error or his confusion the wanderer 
sees the light of a port which, unlike himself, is firmly 
anchored" ("Poetic Unity" 193).
The interpreter's movement through the poem becomes 
travel as well. Hyperbaton is minimal both in frequency 
and in degree of displacement. The appositive "Farol de
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una cabana" is for explanatory purposes, not for 
amplification, and aids rather than hinders progress toward 
a goal. The reader as well has found direction and is no 
longer groping in the twilight, floundering as though 
shipwrecked in an ocean of unlimited and formless 
possibilities. Now he/she advances with confidence in 
darkness and on a solid ground toward an apparently fixed 
point. The interpreter has built a structure spanning the 
abyss, a wire tied at one end to the protagonist and at the 
other end to the light. On that wire can be hung whatever 
occurs between the "now" of interpretation and the future 
"then" of the reader's arrival, along with that of the 
protagonist, at their common goal. The light is assigned 
meaning (value), not just signification, by both the 
traveller and the reader.
The traveller proceeds inward and downward toward a 
light in the center of the darkness, a light seen by him to 
lie in the world and not in the intellect. His intellect 
compares the light metaphorically to a nautical lantern, 
recalling, and thus repeating, the previous action of the 
poem, the ndufrago's drifting on the sea. This time, 
however, inside the "corteza," the defining limits of beach 
and ridge, he can see the “misterioso," the goal that he 
wishes to attain. The metaphor is merely a concept that 
resembles the first truth, the self-defining goal; it is 
the only thing that is visible in the darkness, and is thus 
the sole knowable thing.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
The peregrino directs an apostrophe to the light, 
asking for closure to his interpretative act.
Rayos, les dize, ya que no de Leda 
Tremulos hijos, sed de mi fortuna 
Termino luminoso. (62-64)
The wanderer holds in mind and fears the alternate 
possibility that the light's source is the false fire of 
St. Elmo, associated with Castor and Pollux (Bulfinch 130), 
rather than a lantern signaling shelter and human presence, 
just another resemblance and not the sought-for truth.
With the travellers's doubt, the language has become 
convoluted again with enjambement and the location of 
adjectival prepositional phrases before the nouns they 
modify. The potentially ambiguous words "sed" and 
"termino" (unaccented in the Chacdn edition), with their 
two functions of noun and verb, are also, though briefly, 
impediments to interpretation.
As the narrative continues, the protagonist fears 
losing contact with his newly found direction:
Y recelando 
De inuidfosa barbara arboleda 
Interposicion, quando
De vientos no conjuracion alguna: . . . .
(64-67)
He does not trust the things that he does not see, even 
though he can feel and hear that there is no conspiracy 
between winds and woods to obstruct his vision. The
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invisible world is perceived to be hostile, as can be 
inferred from the words "invidiosa," "bArbara," and 
"conjuraciAn." The unseeable is known only through its 
potentiality to interfere with the attainment of his 
certain goal.
Seeking to avoid such an interruption, the traveller 
fixes intently on the light as he continues toward it:
Qual, haziendo el villano 
La fragosa montana facil llano,
Attento sigue aquella 
(Aun a pesar de las tinieblas bella, 
aun a pesar de las estrellas clara)
Piedra, indigna Thiara 
(Si tradicion appocripha no miente)
De animal tenebroso, cuya frente 
Carro es brillante de nocturno dia:
Tal diligente, el passo 
El louen apressura,
Midiendo la espesura 
Con igual pie, que el raso;
Fixo (A despecho de la niebla fria)
En el carbunclo, Norte de su aguja 
0 el Austro brame, 6 la arboleda cruja. (68-83) 
Neither the neregrino nor the reader succeeds in avoiding 
the obstacles. The word "qual" introduces a simile that is 
interrupted after line 69 and resumed eight lines later 
with "tal." Like the rustic who makes rough mountains into





easy flatlands through his familiarity with the terrain, 
the youth passes hurriedly through the thicket as if it 
were open country because of the guiding light. Both he 
and the reader, however, experience the interposed 
impediments. The walker must crash through the thicket 
while the reader must pass through parenthetical passages 
within the interpolated material. In line 70, the castaway 
begins attentively following but the reader must struggle 
past two interruptions to line 73-in order to find out what 
it is that he is pursuing. Confusion results when the word 
for the object followed is not the expected "lus" but 
rather "piedra." The interpolations that delayed the 
progress describe this stone (before it can be identified 
as such) as beautiful in spite of the darkness and bright 
despite the stars, indicating that it can be seen in the 
darkness and causing the reader to suspect a metaphorical 
displacement.
The adjective "indigna," which is not only separated a 
great distance from its noun ("frente”) but also placed 
next to one it could conceivably modify ("tiara"), and an 
appositive ("carro es brillante de nocturno dla"), offer 
further delays to certainty. The light, a stone, is now 
interpreted by the reader to be a crown for the unworthy
g
brow of a nocturnal animal that transports it, but a 
parenthetical clause suggests that the last displacement 
may not be true. The uncertainty of the appositive’s 
veracity is established by four words in the parenthetical
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insertion that cause the reader to doubt: the conditional
"si,“ "tradicibn" that is not necessarily true, "apbcrifa" 
of dubious origin, and, of course, "miente.”
The reader arrives at line 77 and the progress of the 
peregrino resumes. In spite of the cold fog, the 
protagonist's attention remains fixed on the stone/light, 
now identified as a ruby {"carbunclo"), which has the 
reputation of glowing in the darkness, and being 
astrologically related to both the sun and the Pleiades 
(Morales 274). Flecks of gold in the carbuncle (272, 274) 
(whose name signifies in Latin a small, glowing coal), 
which resemble the stars, the sun, the light that leads the 
shipwecked youth, and even the false fire of St. Elmo, are 
all connected by resemblance. The word "Norte" in 
apposition to "carbunclo" adds the signification of the 
navigationally important North Star. "Norte" also can be 
opposed to "Austro," the south wind, in the following line 
that, were it conspiring with trees to obstruct the vision 
of the wanderer as he had feared (line 67), would be 
overcome by his determined fixation on his goal, no matter 
how much the wind howled or the woods crackled.
It is the peregrino. however, who crashes through the 
thicket and alerts the dog that guards the fire:
El can ia vigilante
Convoca despidiendo al caminante
Y la que desuiada
Luz poca parecio, tanta es vezina
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Que iaze en ella la robusta encina,
Mariposa en cenizas desatada. (84-89)
Though intending to send away the intruder, the dog’s 
barking summons him, his masters, and the reader to a point 
of meeting. The function of "caminante" as direct object 
of both the verb "convoca" and the verbal "despidiendo," 
and the position of the word after its verbs, along with 
the signification of "convocar" as "to call together," all 
serve to narrow the interpreter’s energies to the rapidly 
approaching goal. The adjectives "poca" and “tanta," 
anchored to the same noun, "luz,“ also imitate the action 
of converging on a point, narrowing instead of amplifying 
with multiple appositives and metaphorical replications.
As he arrives, the traveller realizes that his 
interpretation of the remote light as a lantern was not 
correct; he finds instead a great fire. In the fire lies 
burning the trunk of an oak, the "firme tronco" of meaning 
that both he and the reader had projected and have been 
seeking. The goal has been attained. It is not, however, 
the true fixed point the pilgrim was seeking; it is only 
another which resembles it. The following appositive makes 
that clear, evoking two images that belie any sense of 
security in his achievement: the blazing log resembles a
butterfly with brilliant wings, a symbol of ephemerality, 
and also a moth that sought and found the light and now is 
being reduced to ashes, to nothing. The goal of certainty 
is undone.
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The peregrino* s journey from nowhere has reached only 
a -temporary stopping place. Looking back from whence he 
came, he can see only darkness. He did not acquire 
knowledge of the territory he traversed after crossing the 
threshold between day and night, seeing and not seeing.
The resemblant epistemology only allows knowledge of one 
thing, the principle of resemblance itself. He saw only 
light, o r d i n a r i l y  the invisible vehicle of knowledge, as an 
entity rather than merely a function. The reader’s task to 
this point has also been frustrated. The "wire" stretched 
earlier from the position of the traveller to the glowing 
destination has gone slack and has been reeled in, leaving 
only one point, the fire that is dying, and no framework on 
which to structure a projected interpretation. The reader, 
as the wanderer has done with light, has seen and struggled 
with language and is aware of it as an entity that requires 
a tying together in the poem in order to function. It is 
not the unobtrusive vehicle of knowledge it ordinarily 
seems to be in Foucault’s "Classical" episteme.
The second passage, lines 182-211, can support an 
interpretation recalling the principle of representation as 
the basis for knowledge, described by Foucault and 
discussed in Chapter 1. After singing a song in the 
tradition of "mensoprecio de corte y alabanza de aldea" 
(94-135) and passing the night as the guest of goatherds, 
the protagonist sets out the next morning to continue his 
journey.
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Agradecido pues el peregrino 
Dexa el aluergue, i sale acompanado 
De quien le lleua donde leuantado,
Distante pocos passes de’l camino,
Imperfoso mira la campana 
Vn escollo, apazible galeria,
Que festiuo theatro fue algun dia 
de quantos pisan Faunos la montana. (182-189) 
There has been nothing done or said in the intervening 
verses that would enable the reader to hypothesize a 
purpose or possible destination for the peregrino’s 
travels. The shepherd’s hut he leaves behind is 
figuratively signified by the word "albergue" in its 
ordinary sense of a resting place for travellers. Padre 
Guadix’s claim, however, that the word’s source is the 
Arabic "varga, “ indicating "chosa o casa pajiza" 
(Covarrubias 108), means that the link between signifier 
and signified may be construed as both figurative and 
literal.
In the parallel construction of line 183, two verbs—  
the transitive "deja" and intransitive "sale"— indicate 
dual aspects of a single action. In one motion the 
protagonist leaves behind the rustic hovel, an impermanent 
but relatively fixed structure of oak and straw, and sets 
forth, guided this time by a goatherd. The destination is 
mentioned with the use of the adverb "donde," permitting 
the reader to project an arrival. The journey there is
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short; to make it so, the interpreter must revise the 
initial impression of a long one, generated upon 
encountering the adjective "distante," as it is followed 
immediately by the undercutting adverbial noun clause 
"pocos passos." The seemingly offhand mention of a road 
(line 185) promises a foundation for structure; roads 
direct motion and enable future projections. Structure is 
delayed, however, as the serrano leads the youth away from 
the road to another stopping place.
The destination is a second fixed point, not a 
temporary edifice this time, but hard, permanent, natural 
rock. This elevated point "watches" ("mira") the 
countryside; the words "galerfa" and “teatro" also indicate 
watching. It is upon this point that the wanderer, 
JAuregui's “mirbn" (Antidoto 87), will stand in order to 
view and know the land.
Lleg6, i a vista tanta 
Obedeciendo la dudosa planta,
Immobil se quedo sobre vn lentisco,
Verde balcon de'l agradable risco. (190-193)
The abrupt shift to the preterite, accentuated by its being 
a one-word clause, definitively completes the journey as
Q
the peregrino arrives. The preterite also reinforces the 
phrase "immobil se quedo" as a fixed state.
Although the youth stands still on firm ground, his 
own foundation is "dudosa." The fixed point from which to 
view has been achieved, and the protagonist, from that
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vantage point "outside" (in this case above) the world, can 
know and appropriate space by seeing it as something 
distinct. The things that are differentiated become the 
ground that can support the projections necessary for 
constructing interpretations. The viewer, however, is 
fallible; he must be equal to the task. Possessing a 
ground serves no purpose if an observer is not capable of 
interpreting what he/she sees. The view that greets the 
castaway in his balcony awes him at first, making his own 
foundation "dudosa."
The reader is forced to share his confusion, unable to 
establish the dimensions of the "vista":
Si mucho poco mappa les despliega,
Mucho es mas lo que (nieblas desatando)
Confunde el Sol, i la distancia niega. (194-196) 
The reader's interpretation of the scene’s description, 
like that of the peregrino. begins on "dudosa planta" with 
the conditional "if." The juxtaposition of the mutually 
denying "mucho" and "poco" that follows further delays any 
semantic construction. The visible expanse opens, 
unfolding to the viewers as they project onto it an 
organizing system, "re-presenting" it to the intellect as a
map. That part of the prospect which cannot be seen, which
cannot be reduced and appropriated, however, is greater 
that what is visible. Obstacles to the watcher’s 
interpretation of the scene (and to the modern reader’s 
interpretation of the poem) are distance (Vazquez Siruela’s
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"muchos siglos"), fog (J&uregui's "obscuridad"), or 
excessive light that dissipates the fog (V&zquez's 
"espiendor"), all of which limit vision.
The watcher's reaction to the scene is one of 
astonishment:
Muda la admiracion habla callando,
Y ciega vn rio sigue, que luciente 
De aquellos montes hijo,
Con torcido discurso, aunque prolijo, (200)
Tiranniza los campos vtilmente:
Orladas sus orillas de frutales,
Quiere la Copia que su cuerno sea;
Si al animal armaron de Amalthea
Diaphanos cristales: (205)
Enga<r>zando edificios en su plata,
De muros se corona,
Rocas abraca, islas apprisiona 
De la alta gruta, donde se desata,
Hasta los jaspes liquidos, adonde (210)
Su orgullo pierde, i su memoria esconde. 
(197-211)
The youth, signified metonymically by his "admiracion, " 
expresses his astonishment paradoxically by not speaking. 
His vision, and thus his knowledge, is blinded by the 
immensity of what presents itself, signified by the "vista 
tanta" of line 190, the "mucho" of lines 194 and 195. He
is lost in the vast and indefinite prospect as he had been
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before, first in the ocean, and then in the "gclfo de 
sombras" (line 61). In the previous episode, he was led by 
a light that defined only itself in the darkness. This 
time he is sought out by a light that guides his vision to 
an identifiable object that he can use as a point of 
departure for knowledge of the surrounding country.
The sun's light, reflecting from the surface of a 
river, enables the castaway to see it. His vision can 
encompass the entirety of its twisted "discourse" that runs 
from its mountain origin to its dissolution in the sea 
(209-211). He can also distinguish the limits ("orillas") 
that give it form and direction. These boundaries are 
reduplicated ornamentally by lines of fruit trees which, 
ironically, owe their origin to the river's occasional 
"tyrannical" and fertilizing escape from its banks. The 
reader can project an allegorical resemblance to the poem 
itself, whose tortuous discourse tyrannizes "dtilmente" the 
interpreter. Imitating the river, the poem escapes from 
its banks— rigid, traditional, stylistic limitations— and 
nourishes the language with ornamental (trans)plants from 
Latin and Italian that bear pleasurable fruit for the 
patient interpreter.
The image of plenty is reinforced by reference to the 
origin of the mythological cornucopia, a reference to which 
the erudite interpreter may apply two competing versions. 
One account explains that the animal of Amalthea was the 
goat that suckled Zeus and of whose horn he made the
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cornucopia in gratitude to reward the nymph (Lempriere 36). 
The other version explains that it was a horn plucked by 
Heracles from the head of the river god Achelous who 
converted himself first into a snake and then into a bull 
in wrestling with Heracles for the hand of Deianira {Ovid 
245-247). Strabo interprets the latter story as 
originating in the nature of the river Achelous:
It resembled a bull’s voice in the noise of the
water; its winding and its reaches gave rise to
the story about his forming of himself into a 
serpent and about his horns; the formation of 
islands at the mouth of the river requires no 
explanation. His conquest by Heracles lastly 
refers to the embankments by which Heracles 
confined the river to its bed and thus gained 
large tracts of land for cultivation, which are 
expressed by the horn of plenty. (W. Smith 9) 
The resemblance between the river of the poem and Strabo’s 
description of the Achelous proposes the latter version as 
well. Two possibilities, either of which is applicable,
neither of which is privileged, do not allow the reader to
pin down a single referent.
In his edition of the "Soledades," DAmaso Alonso has 
retained a variant of the passage from an earlier version 
of the poem.^ It begins at line 202:
orladas sus orillas de frutales,
si de flores, tomadas, no, a la Aurora,
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derecho corre mientras no provoca
los mismos altos el de sus cristales; (205)
huye un trecho de s£, y se alcanza luego;
desvfase, y, buscando sus desv£os,
errores dulces, dulces desvarfos
hacen sus aguas con lascivo juego;
engazando edificios en su plata, (210)
de quintas coronado, se dilata
majestuosamente,
— en brazos dividido caudalosos
de islas, que parentesis frondosos
al per£odo son de su corriente—  . . . .
(202-215)
This rendering omits the mythological references to the 
cornucopia but describes in greater detail the progress of 
the river. The allegory of the interpretation of the poem 
is easier to construe here in the meandering of the 
stream's "discurso.“11 The places where the river "huye un 
trecho de si, y se alcanza luego" can be made to represent 
the separations that occur, like the discontinuity between 
the two parts of the simile already cited in lines 68 and 
77. The interpreter, like the river, ”desv£ase," follows
the "sweet errors/wanderings" and compounds them. The
12river connects (strings together) buildings; the reader 
links together constructions (edifices) he/she has made.
The river is crowned with farms, but the "quintas" that 
decorate the poem are like the contrapuntal fifths that
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ornament and complicate plainsong ("canto llano") 
(Covarrubias 892). The division of the river into branches 
might be associated with the poem's 'structural 
"plurimembraciones,“ analyzed thoroughly by Alonso, with 
their parallel grammatical elements (Estudios 341-436).
The metaphor of the islands as leafy parenthetical 
insertions in the sentence of the current needs no 
explanation to connect it to an allegorical interpretation. 
The period in both versions ends as the river reaches the 
sea where the limits that define it dissipate; it ceases to 
exist, losing its pride and hiding its memory.
In this passage, differentiation as the 
epistemological basis for knowledge (Foucault's second 
episteme) can be proposed. The peregrino singled out and 
seized on one object, the river, establishing it as a point 
of departure for ordering the view. He related the visible 
surrounding country to that point— mountains, sea, fruit 
trees, fences and farms— and then "re-presented" to the 
entendimiento what he saw, employing a concepto of river as 
written discourse. The concept of the "perfodo" reflects, 
as did that of the "mapa" in line 194, the viewer’s 
imposition of order on a world seen as "other."
In the passages analyzed so far, the n&ufrago has been 
passing from point to point in the trajectory of his 
journey. The fixed point in the first passage was elusive, 
always approachable, but always "inalcanzable." The second 
point was truly fixed, allowing him as a seeker of
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knowledge to stand outside of the world and impose order on 
it, but not permitting him to approach the object of his 
knowledge. He has left both points behind, however, 
without linking them to each other or to what follows. It 
is as if he were still in the ocean drifting past buoys 
without relating them. The poem's hypothetical interpreter 
experiences comparable success. A text may be woven by 
tying together lesser semantic elements, but no unifying 
design of greater proportions can be posited.
The "lack” of order becomes a pattern as the poem 
continues. The subject changes when the serrano signals 
and describes the ruins of a castle. Perception shifts 
from the visual to the auditory, from the peregrino's 
silent observation to his attentive listening to the sound 
of the goatherd’s utterance. The linking of the goatherd’s 
discourse with the previous passage that could serve as a 
basis for projecting a structure is interrupted by a group 
of rustics in pursuit of a wolf. The serrano leads the 
peregrino back to the road, effectively making 
parenthetical the view from the rock and the goatherd’s 
discourse. The road becomes the focus for the 
interpreter’s efforts, but the traveller is almost 
immediately detained by the sound of a musical instrument 
played by a serrana (237-240). The projection of future 
action is frustrated once more.
The process of interpretation is again exemplified as 
the peregrino pauses to observe the several montanesas
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engaged in various activities.
Remora de sus pasos fue su ofdo,
Dulcemente impedido
De canoro instrumento, que pulsado
Era de vna serrana junto A un tronco,
Sobre vn arroyo de quexarse ronco,
Mudo sus ondas, quando no enfrenado: . . . .  
(237-242)
The point of departure for ordering what he sees is this 
time a sound instead of a light or an object signalled by 
light. A spatial relationship between nouns can be quickly 
established with the adjectival and prepositional elements 
appearing in the lines, allowing an imposition of order on 
sound, instrument, girl, tree, stream, and silence. Beside 
the stream is another woman who drinks from the stream 
(243-246), another putting flowers in her hair (247-250), 
one slapping slates togther rhythmically (251-253), and yet 
another dancing (254-258).
Although he begins from a single point and passes from 
noun to noun, there is no ordering, other than the sequence 
in which he observes them. There is no “re-presentation" 
in terms of a preexisting ordering system, like the map or 
the sentence in the previous scene. At first, the youth 
sees the serranas unconnectedly, one at a time, until they 
become so numerous as to be referred to as an “Inundacion 
hermosa" (264). The shift of perception from individuals 
to group is an imposition of order in terms of relation.
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He groups them and then immmediately begins putting forward 
and discarding theories to explain not the phenomenon but 
to justify his ordering of it. This procedure is precisely 
what the reader is doing, attempting to project a larger 
structure that can encompass and order all the sequentially 
encountered points. The peregrino attempts to connect 
(“re-present“) what he sees (after imposing order on it) to 
the preexisting ordering system of myth.
El Sileno buscaua
De aquellas, que la sierra dio Bacchantes,
Ya que Nymphas las niega ser errantes 
El hombro sin aljaua:
6 si de'l Termodonte (275)
Emulo el arroiuelo, desatado 
De aquel fragoso monte,
Esquadron de Amazonas desarmado 
Tremola en sus riberas 
Pacificas banderas. (271-280)
The peregrino*s vantage point for observation is a hollow 
holm oak, into whose "concavo" he is "embebido" (267). He 
becomes one with the "tronco" that grounds his projections 
of order. The castaway does not know what the reader has 
been told (263-266), that the girls are members of a 
wedding party. With the youth's later invitation to the 
ceremony (516-530), the reader can base the projection of 
future direction along the route that the party will take 
to the village. Additionally, the marriage, as an act of
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joining together disparate elements, contributes to the 
reader’s attempt to construct unity in the poem.
Before arriving at the scene of the wedding, however, 
the wanderer must traverse some distance in company with 
the revelers. The road to be travelled, in addition to the 
knowledge of the journey’s goal, further orients the 
interpreter, but the road is hidden because of the large 
number of roontaneses (512). A point along the way serves 
as a brief stopping place, a locus amoenus described as a 
"Centro apazible vn circulo espacioso / A mas caminos, que 
vna estrella raios" (573-574).
The point’s status as goal and center and various 
references to light recall the neritfrino’s experience of 
the night before. In addition to the comparison of the 
crossroads with a star for its many rays, a fountain 
reflecting narcissi that surround a flint rock, gives off 
"centellas." Recurring also is the association of light 
and stone. Linking the two places further is the reference 
to the point as “meta" and "termino":
Este pues centro era
Meta vmbrosa al vaquero conuecino,
I delicioso termino al distante,
Donde, aun cansado mas que el caminante,
Concurria el camino. (580-584)^
After resting, the band continues on its way and 
arrives at the village of the betrothed couple:
Al pueblo llegan con la luz, que el dia
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Cedio al sacro Bolcan de errante fuego:
A la torre de luzes coronada,
Que el templo illustra, i A los aires vanos 
Artificiosamente da exhalada 
Luminosas de poluora saetas,
Purpureos no cometas. (645-651)
The sun's light gives way to that of fireworks that crown 
the tower of the church. The "saetas luminosas" are 
compared with the "fuego errante" of a volcano and with 
comets, transient, unstable forms of light. Even if the 
word "saetas" refers to the shafts of sunlight cast through 
the tower's small windows— also known as "saetas" from 
their military use as a place from which to launch arrows 
(Covarrubias 920)— that phenomenon too is transitory. For 
a second night, the peregrino has reached his goal only to 
have the fixed light he follows transform into something 
unstable.
The instability is reiterated as the celebration 
begins:
La gaita al baile solicita el gusto,
A la voz el psalterio;
Cruza el Trion mas fixo el Emispherio,
Y el tronco mayor danpa en la ribera;
El Echo (voz ia entera)
No ai silencio a que prompto no responda,
Fanal es del arroyo cada honda,
Lux el reflexo, la agua vidriera. (669-676)
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As in the scene of the previous night, there is a general 
convergence on a single point. This time the music of the 
pipes and psaltery, instead of the dog's barking, call 
together voice and echo. A great tree (analogous to the 
"troncoV'maripcsa") dances at the edge of the water.
Trion obeys the music of the celebration rather than that
14of the spheres, leaving its fixed place and moving across 
the firmament. Other lights reflect from the stream and 
are conceptualized as fanales in a repetition of the 
maritime navigational image. Instead of a single light, 
however, they appear in confusing proliferation as each 
dancing wave sends a guiding signal that also moves. The 
point of light is again illusory.
With the repetition of the previous night’s scene, the 
interpreter is furnished a foundation on which to erect a 
structure and project a future. Two points can be linked 
together because they can be construed to share seizable 
elements other than the passage of the wanderer. The 
completion of the day, a pattern known to be cyclical, also 
allows for the division of the narrative along temporal 
lines. The journey, by being measured against (and thus 
effectively reduced to) an outside standard, itself becomes 
knowable to the reader. Not only can another day be 
predicted to follow, but a day that will see the uniting 
action of a marriage.
The actions of the following day are the relatively 
predictable occurrences of a bucolic wedding— a description
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of the bride, wedding songs, a feast, dancing by the women, 
athletic competition for the men,15 and the consummation of 
the marital union. The sites of the various events were 
all located within the greater space of the village and its 
immediate environs, incorporated into a stable, defined 
spatial structure. Time passes predictably and the day, 
the actions, and the space (and the "Soledad primera") 
converge to a point of closure.
Guided by the music of “otra oampona" (1078), the 
novios return to their house:
Los desposados & su casa bueluen; (1080)
Que coronada luze
De estrellas fijas, de Astros fugitiuos,
Que en sonoroso humo se resueluen.
Llego todo el lugar, i despedido,
Casta Venus, que el lecho ha preuenido (1085)
De las plumas que baten mas s&aues 
En su bo1ante carro blancas aues,
Los nouios entra en dura no estacada:
Que siendo Amor vna Deidad alada,
Bien preuino la hija de la espuma (1090)
A batallas de amor campo de pluma. (1080-1091)
Space continues to converge as the couple approaches the 
marital union. Stars— both fixed ones and fleeting ones 
(fireworks)— form a “corona,’’ enclosing the house and 
initially reinforcing the exclusion of outside space, but 
they disappear in sonorous smoke. The villagers who
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accompany them are referred to as "todo el lugar, " a 
transformation of entities into space, and they, along with 
all outside space, are left behind as the couple enters the 
house. Within the walls, Venus introduces the novios into 
a yet smaller space, the marriage bed, described as a soft 
"stockade" ("estacada"). The "tronco" image that has 
appeared in previous focal points reappears in disseminated 
form as the stakes that form the palisade. The final image 
of the bed as a "campo," a battlefield of love, designates 
a broader space.
The space has narrowed as a series of concentric 
circles, but the (thus far) central space must be expanded 
to make room for yet another one that is left for the 
reader to project. Also to be inserted in the final scene 
and into the final space is the "firme tronco" that the
•I £.
reader has come to associate with such spaces. This 
reading is not Freudian, but conceptual; the stucture the 
reader has built invites him/her to continue to supply the 
razones that will complete his/her entendimiento.
Now that the interpreter has reached the end of the 
"Soledad primera" and the center that resembles the 
"primera verdad" of Creation, it is possible to return to 
the beginning of the poem and impose on it a larger, 
unifying structure. The structure is spatial, one of 
narrowing concentric circles, rather loose from the 
beginning, but tightening as the poem nears its end. The 
ultimate "outside," of course, is the sea from which the
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n&u-fT-flgn came and in which the reader first encountered 
him. (What lies beyond the ocean is also outside the 
interpreter's range of vision and knowledge.) The castaway 
leaves the sea and crosses the beach, an uncertain dividing 
line between water and land, and then a dividing ridge 
between shore and hinterland. His trajectory leads him and 
the reader past several intermediate points, which can be 
accounted for as false centers that resemble and point to 
the ultimate one, a resemblance that is generally expressed 
in terms of light images. The next circle is the space 
defined as the “pueblo” within which lie the circle of 
light, the house, the "lecho"/“estacada"/"campo, " and, 
ultimately, the vagina of the bride. The two extremes are 
connected with the final reference to ,,espuma“ which links 
Venus to the sea from which she originated.
It is most important to note that the limits that 
define the shrinking spaces are sometimes exclusive.17 The 
villagers, for example, remain outside the walls of the 
house of the newlyweds. Although the reader enters 
further, he/she is left only to imagine the ultimate scene. 
The instance of exclusion that is most important for the 
interpretation of the poem is that of the peregrino from 
the ultimate central point. He remains on the "outside," 
separated from the unifying center, as a pilgrim seeking 
something unknown to the reader. He continues that search 
in the "Soledad segunda."
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1 John R. Beverley notes the division of traditional 
Gdngoran criticism along the lines of form and content and 
cites a "need to integrate the methods and results of both
camps" (Aspects x).
2
Robin Louis McAllister’s reading of the "Soledades" 
is similar in that he also focuses on the difficulties of 
interpreting the poem, but he dees so for a different 
reason. According to his thesis, the protagonist is a 
Neoplatonic pilgrim
who seeks to discern an essential 'harmony’ 
underlying appearances, who seeks to return to 
the 'essence’ or origins underlying society and 
nature, and who manifests the contemplative 
raptures of divine inspiration. (25)
His pilgrim seeks an understanding of the world according 
to Foucault’s Renaissance episteme. The present study, 
however, will examine the peretfrino’s interpretive process 
without determining beforehand what it is that he is 
seeking.
Similarly, McAllister’s version of G6ngora’s projected 
reader is of the same epistemological bent as his pilgrim, 
seeking to discover Neoplatonic truth hidden in the poem by 
the author. McAllister asks:
What if the poet wants to exercise the reader’s 
powers of judgment rather than of passive 
contemplation? Would he not deliberately
168
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complicate the presentation of his subject in 
such a way that the language of the poem gives 
the illusion of choice and indeterminacy, a style 
that is on the borderline between "confusion" and 
"inspiration," demanding the intervention of the 
reader to discover a principle of clarity and 
intelligibility? (82-83)
He answers the question of why Gbngora employs so much 
ambiguity:
the function of this intentional ambiguity is to 
make a demand on the reader's critical faculties 
to clarify and complete form and order in the 
verses. In so doing, the reader will be 
exercising that faculty, according to Platonic
and Neoplatonic concepts of the soul, by means of
which he is most human and through the exercise 
of which he most defines his human condition.
(92)
McAllister sees Gdngora, then, as leading the reader on a 
pilgrimage of intellectual growth in order that he/she may 
at last discover the truth ("la primera verdad") that lies 
hidden in the world.
In these paragraphs, I intentionally use the first 
person style of writing in order to make clear the self- 
awareness with which I am constructing my interpretation.
I believe that too often, the avoidance of the first person
gives the impression that the author confers on the
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interpretation an air of anonymity that disguises his/her 
responsibility for it.
^ Mauricio Molho has similarly analyzed a selection of 
eleven lines (Sem&ntica pt. I, ch. 2). He focuses on the 
process of constructing meaning rather than on the 
obstacles to that construction. McAllister also examines 
passages closely, employing “a process of reconstruction 
and ordering" (84), but by selecting words and phrases that 
enable him to "reconstruct" the passage in such a way that 
it reflects his initial interpretation. My description 
differs in that it attempts to represent the hypothetical 
reader's process of construing any meaning, not just one 
pre-selected by the critic.
 ^ Parenthetical references following quotations from 
the "Soledades" will indicate lines. In longer passages, I 
have also inserted line numbers after each five lines for 
the reader’s convenience. The text employed is the edition 
of Alfonso Callejo and Maria Teresa Pajares, based on the 
Chacbn edition. The Chacdn manuscript was considered by 
the commentators Salcedo Coronel and Pellicer to be the 
most authoritative version of the poem (Beverley 10-11), 
and the Callejo and Pajares edition is the most faithful to 
it in orthography and graphic layout. Modernization of the 
orthography sometimes may result in the elimination of 
confusion resulting from homonyms whose spelling is now 
different, and the addition of accent marks removes initial 
hesitation between words in some cases. The Mille, Alonso,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
171
and Beverley editions also change the punctuation of the 
Chac6n manuscript, and break the extended silva form into
segments, thus imposing their interpretation on the text.
0
Compare Alonso’s prose version:
No bien siente nuestro desgraciado extranjero que 
la dorada luz desaparece del horizonte (de tal 
suerte que ya el crepttsculo finge a la vista, 
allA en la lejania, s61o una desigual confusibn 
de espacios de agua que parecen montes y de 
montes que semejan mares) . . . .  (Soledades
626-627)
7 Walter Pabst points out that the ablative 
construction in Spanish results in confusion by the elision 
of words: "De oraciones enteras sblo quedan dos o tres
palabras en las que estAn contenidas las asociaciones 
necesarias para formar el pensamiento completo" (27).
g
According to Beverley, "The 'animal tenebroso’ could 
be the tiger shining in the night . . . , the mystic stag 
whose antlers form a candelabra in the moonlight, or 'carro 
brillante de nocturno dfa’ in a nocturnal inversion of the 
myth of Phaeton" (Aspects 20). Leo Spitzer relates the
image to medieval legends of tigers and deer (155-157).
9
The "Llego" of line 180 repeats more concisely the 
"Llego pues el mancebo" of line 90 that marked the 
peregrino’s arrival at the goatherds’ fire.
10 Alonso asserts that Gbngora wrote the newer version 
in response to criticism he received from Pedro de Valencia
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
172
("Notas" 703).
Beverley affirms that "The Soledades are not 
allegory in the sense of being a presentation of details 
which mechanically convert, point by point, into a second 
order of signification" (24). He does see, however, an 
allegorical element in the passage in "the ingenious 
equation of the course of the river with the figuration of 
a rhetorical period and the consequent ismorphism of the 
sentence and that which it describes [which] may stand by 
itself as a miniature of the poem" (25). McAllister refers 
to the passage as an example of "a self-referentiality in 
the poem through which it 'does’ or enacts what it is
describing, and vice versa" (98).
12 Alonso has retained the Chac6n manuscript’s word 
"engazando," which various editors (Mille, Beverley, and 
Callejo and Pajares) have modernized by inserting an r to 
make "engarzando." Covarrubias spells the verb "engazar" 
(520).
*3 To the strange concept of the "tired road" can be 
applied Covarrubias’ explanation of the etymology of 
"cansado" as the Latin word "quassatus," meaning "broken," 
or the Greek "campsos," meaning "curved," since "el 
encorbarse un hombre y doblarse es serial de estar
quebrantado y cansado" (288).
14 R. 0. Jones discusses the importance of music m  
the "Soledades" in relation to his theories of a 
Neoplatonic basis for the poem ("Neoplatonism and the
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Soledades").
It is interesting to note that of the three 
events— wrestling, jumping and a footrace— the outcomes of 
two are undecidable. The distance of the long jump, from 
the "raya" of the starting line to the "huellas" the jumper 
leaves, is measured and expressed in terms of an outside 
standard, three dardos (995-998). The wrestlers, however, 
were equally matched directly with one another, and the 
runners arrived at their goal simultaneously.
The idea of the vagina as a space is more than just 
convenient for my interpretation. Although such a 
description of the female organ is a negative one, until 
recently it has been (if it is not still, unfortunately) 
the predominant image in Western culture. For an 
interesting discussion of female sexuality, see Luce 
Irigaray’s "This Sex Which Is Not One.“
17 L. J. Woodward discusses the recurring wall images 
in the two "Soledades," pointing out that they are probably 
important in the understanding of the poem, but he offers 
no all-encompassing structure of interpretation in which to 
insert them.
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Chapter 5
"Soledad segunda"
The beginning of the second of the "Soledades" 
continues to maintain the appearance of unity the reader 
established at the end of the first part of the poem, but 
it also begins to dismantle that unity. The link between 
the opening and ending scenes of the first division of the 
poem, indicated by the image of Venus as "hija de la 
espuma," is carried over to the second part with a 
description of the shoreline.
ENTRASE el mar por vn arroio breue,
Que A recebille con sediento passo 
De su roca natal se precipita:
I mucha sal no solo en poco vaso,
Mas su rdina bebe,
Y su fin (cristalina mariposa,
No alada, sino ondosa)
En el Farol de Thetis solicita. (1-8)
This beginning, with its seaside setting, returns the 
reader to the outside edge of the structure of concentric 
circles he/she had established at the end of the "Soledad 
primera. "
On the other hand, the opening lines could also be 
interpreted as the sentence that follows the one at the end 
of the first “Soledad." The conjugal act, left pending
174 1
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there, would be begun by the verb "Entrase" and continued 
allegorically as the sea/man enters through a small 
channel. The channel, also referred to as a "vaso," a word 
Covarrubias defines as "qualquier instrumento iddneo para 
recebir dentro de sf alguna cosa" (995), would, of course, 
be the vaginal space left to the reader’s imagination 
before. The lesser body, the stream/woman, rushes with 
desire ("sed") to receive ("bebe") the sea/man, and in the 
same act falls from virginity to her "rhina" and ends the 
independent existence of her body as she herself is 
swallowed up by the sea. The description of the moth as 
"cristalina, " a word associated in "Soledad primera" both 
with water and clear skin (243-246), may be used to further 
connect the stream and the woman.
Even as the reader continues with the action carried 
over from the final scene of the first part, echoes of 
other passages from throughout the "Soledad primera" tend 
to weaken the privileged link the reader has established 
between the present scene and that of the marriage bed.
The stream that loses its identity in the sea is a 
repetition of the river the peregrino viewed from the high 
rock. The "Farol de Thetis" recalls the wanderer’s 
metaphorical comparison of the distant light to a 
navigational "faro." The image of the stream as a moth 
that seeks its death in the flame also repeats that of the 
oak tree burning in the goatherds’ fire. The neatly drawn 
circles of the unifying structure begin to erode as
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resemblances compete for privilege.
Further contributing to the disintegration of order, 
the resemblance that links the opening of the two 
"Soledades" is one between uncertain boundaries. As in the 
beginning of the "Soledad primera," the limits between two 
separate dimensions are blurred. The stream and the sea 
become one as the smaller drinks the larger and is itself 
swallowed up. Other divisions disappear as well:
Muros desmantelando pues de arena 
Centauro ya espumoso el Occeano,
Medio mar, medio ria,
Dos vezes huella la campana al dia,
Escalar pretendiendo el monte en vano,
De quien es dulce vena 
El tarde ya torrente
Arrepentido, i aun retrocedente. (9-16)
Unstable walls of sand, the beach that divides sea from 
land, are torn down by the ocean. The water, half sea and 
half estuary, is compared to a centaur, half man and half 
horse. Further into the poem, the waters are described as 
"blancas ovas” and "espuma verde" (25), a misplacement of 
modifiers that signals the indistinguishable mingling of 
algae and foam. Twice daily the water mounts the land and 
attempts to gain the mountain, causing the stream that 
ordinarily flows down the mountain to seem to retreat.
Each time, however, the sea’s tidal surge is repulsed (17- 
26). The boundary between sea and land exists, but it is
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unfixed. The back-and-forth motion of the waves and tides 
does not allow for any permanent division.
Competing with the erasure of structure is its continuation 
in the allegory of the sexual act. The dismantling of 
walls suggests the breach of the hymen. The image of 
mixture ("Medio mar, medio ria"), the back and forth 
motion, and the foam can all be used to extend the 
metaphor. The allegory ends and the remnants of my 
hypothetical reader's structure dissipate.
The exclusion of the peregrino that had permitted the 
closure to be forged ends with his reappearance in the time 
between day and night, in this shifting, place between sea 
and land that itself disappears and reappears:
En la incierta ribera
(Guarnicion desigual & tanto espejo)
Descubrio la Alua A nuestro peregrino 
Con todo el viilanage vltramarino, (27-30). 
Accompanying him are some of the wedding guests who, lumped 
together with him and other villagers and visitors as "todo 
el lugar," had been excluded from the contracting space of 
the narrative in the earlier "Soledad." With his return, 
the point that had been seized and made central to the 
circular structure becomes just another in a series of 
points that the peregrino had approached and passed by or 
through, sites linked only by the sequence of his passing. 
The structure, inadequate for containing the entire poem, 
collapses, and the interpreter is again located with the
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castaway on the "incierta ribera" outside of understanding.
Viewed epistemclogically, the pilgrim’s quest (and 
that of the interpreter) seems to be one of attempting to 
leave behind the ground that lies outside of the world, the 
platform which separates the would-be knower from the world 
and creates subjects and objects. The search is, however, 
for more than just a way out; the pilgrim seeks to escape 
to something or some place. The spatial trajectory can be 
interpreted to indicate that the pilgrim is not merely 
seeking to flee the world, but to get "inside" it, to move 
from surface to interior, as it were. Neither he nor the 
interpreter have succeeded in knowing their objects, the 
world and the poem, either by acquisition through the 
imposition of structure, or by bridging the gap between the 
standpoint of the subject’s existence and that of the 
object. From the uncertain ground of the beach, then, the 
narrative resumes, the pilgrim continues to search, and the 
hypothetical interpreter, trapped in an analytical process 
that only permits construction, continues to seek a 
foundation for erecting another structure.
On the bay, two Pescadores are fishing from a boat, 
described as a "robre."1 One sings a plaintive song that 
further erases differences with its power "to solidify 
waves and liquify rocks" (41). The reference to the boat 
as an oak, together with similar equations of boats and 
trees in lines 32 ("pino") and 45 ("haya"), combines the 
idea of a fixed point with that of flux, and suggests
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another structure. The "oak, “ formerly rooted firmly in 
the ground, now floats upon the surface, but it still 
provides a movable, though relatively stable, foundation 
from which to fish.
The "beech,“ a second boat that comes to transport the 
wedding guests back to their own shore, "improuisa de vna, 
i de otra plaia / Vinculo desatado, instable puente" (47- 
48). These two lines abound in signifiers of 
disconnectedness. First of all, the verb "improvise," with 
its Latin meaning of "not to see ahead," indicates a lack 
of plan or pattern. The points to be joined by the bridge 
(which is not a bridge) are themselves unstable examples of 
the "incierta ribera" described above. The boat that links 
the two points is a beech tree, normally an object fixed 
firmly to the ground but now completely mobile. Described 
as a vinculum, the connection is a tie that is untied, 
another denial of the permanence necessary to permit a
2
construction. The bridge's instability repeats the denial. 
Any and all meaning in this passage must originate self­
consciously with the interpreter; the referents of the 
self-negating signifiers are obviously not knowable unless 
the reader supplies them. Although the providing of 
referents is the normal procedure for all interpretation, 
it is not ordinarily a self-aware process, and almost never 
is it as extreme as in this case. It was this kind of 
concept to which JAuregui objected when he complained that 
only after “largo espacio" of “la mAs profunda meditacibn"
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does one succeed in "darles fondo" (Antfdoto 97).
The passage could also be construed as a model for the 
reader's hermeneutic process. Not only does the poem 
refuse a definite spatial organization, it also will not 
support a temporal organization. "El dnico lazo," writes 
Molho, “entre los diversos episodios . . . , de 
imprevisible curso, es un errar" (79). The minimal order 
provided by the passage of days is merely sequential as 
well. Unable to see ahead in the narrative, the 
interpreter, like the boat, attempts to improvise a link 
between the present "incierta ribera" and the beach from 
the beginning scene of the past "Soledad." The link is 
unstable, since those ties that can be made between present 
and past continually erase themselves. Nor can any lasting 
connections be projected from the present into the 
unforeseeable future. The interpreter is trapped in a 
synchronic dimension in an indefinite space.
Molho wrote that the "Soledades" "rehdsa toda
3estructura formal aparente" (80). He develops the conceit 
of "selva"/"soledad"/"silva" that he constructs from the 
beginning four lines of the poem's dedicatory verses.
Molho describes the loose formal structure of the silva in 
conjunction with the poem’s title and the concept "woods," 
signified by both "selva" and "soledad" (39-63). The 
selva. he points out, quoting Pedro Mexfa, is a place 
"donde estdn las plantas y Arboles sin orden ni regia"
(79). One might observe, however, that in a forest, one
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can generally depend on the plants and trees to estar (in 
its etymological sense of "stand") in a fixed position.
Even that expected stability is denied from the first in 
the "Soledades." The peregrino is washed onto the beach, 
clinging to a drifting Pino (15). An encina. compared to a 
moth, lies disintegrating in flames of the goatherd’s fire 
(88-89). A tronco dances to the sound of the bagpipe 
(672). Tree limbs, chopped down by the wedding guests and 
used to feign a forest, are converted from bower to 
"umbroso Coliseo" where athletic games will be played (958- 
959). Here in the second "Soledad," robles. havas and 
pinos are mobile seacraft. It is no wonder, then, that 
JAuregui employed the image of a “firme tronco" to describe 
the "buena fAbula o cuento" that he saw as lacking in the 
poem (Antfdoto 139). The poem resists "re-presentation" 
even as the slightly structured image of uncharted forest.
The narrative continues as the youth, reversing the 
scene from the first "Soldedad," crosses the border from 
land to sea, embarking with the fishermen in their "robre" 
(60). One further structure that might serve the 
interpreter as a model for meaning in the poem emerges in 
the fishing scene that follows.
Dando el huesped licencia para ello,
Recurren, no A las redes, que maiores 
Mucho Oceano, i pocas aguas prenden,
Sino A las que ambiciosas menos penden,
Laberintho nudoso de marino
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Dedalo, si de leno no, de lino 
Fabrica escrupulosa, i aunque incierta,
Siempre murada, pero siempre abierta. (73-80)
The boat’s position on the water with no links to any 
stable thing or place is perhaps the least permanent space 
that the peregrino has occupied since coming ashore at the 
beginning of the first "Soledad." The tree/boat metaphor 
establishes the vessel as a ground, but only as a tentative 
one. The water’s surface offers nothing for orientation, 
nothing that can be singled out to which one can attach 
anything of permanence. The boat would be suspended in 
undifferentiated space were it not for the land that is 
visible in the distance, or the position of the sun, 
phenomena by which one may relatively orient oneself. In 
this case, the boat, as a ground for approaching an 
unknown, is closer to the object from which it is separated 
than ever before in the poem, in direct contact with the 
water’s surface, or outer edge. In addition, it is the 
boat alone that rests between the peregrino and the world 
to be explored, effectively separating them. Indeed, the 
intellectual ground that one "stands on" in order to 
approach an object is the boundary that defines one as 
subject by separating the "one" from the "other." It is 
the means by which one achieves a stance "outside" of the 
world in order to know the world, the same means that allow 
me to approach the "Soledades" and enable the reader of 
this dissertation to interpret it.
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From the unstable point of departure provided by the 
boat, the fishermen cast their net into the unknown, unseen 
depths. Manuel Serrano de Paz, a seventeenth-century 
commentator of the "Soledades, " allegorized the passage, 
constructing it on the similarity of the act of fishing and 
"los deseos de saber y alcangar la verdad" (qtd. in Alonso, 
"El Doctor” 714). He justifies the fishermen’s choice of 
the smaller net over a larger (74-76) for the reasons that 
los argumentos primeros de toda sabidurfa no son 
conceptos subidissimos, que essos mAs ofuscan que 
ensenan a los principiantes, sino unos principios 
llanos y conocidos, que todos puedan aprehender y 
alcangar para ir adestrando los ingenios . . . .  
(714)
Serrano de Paz’s thinking here reflects GAngora’s 
description of the process of acquiring knowledge explained 
in the "Carta en respuesta." The idea of "ir adestrando 
los ingenios" echoes Gdngora’s assertion that his poem is 
useful in "avivar el ingenio," both claims relying on the 
belief that the entendimiento "crece con cualquier acto de 
valor" ("Carta" 172).
The net itself is an instrument for differentiating 
fish from the unseen underwater world they inhabit, an act 
it performs beyond the sight of its users. When it is 
hauled in to where its catch can be seen and known, the 
net’s yield is already defined. Viewed as a model for 
interpreting the world, the red is like language, a
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structure that has already defined objects as yet unseen by 
its users, so that they appear to already know the objects 
without consciously performing an operation of 
differentiation.
The net is called a labyrinth, which Covarrubias 
defines as "Qualquiera cosa que en sf es prolixa, intricada 
y de muchas entradas y salidas. . ." (746). Its 
fabrication is described as “scrupulous." According to 
Covarrubias, a scruple can be "una duda que tenemos de 
alguna cosa, si es assi o no es assf. . . . "  Such 
uncertainty “nos trae inquietos y desassossegados, hasta 
que nos satisfacemos y enteramos de lo aue es . . . " (542). 
Although "uncertain," the red is a structure that is, like 
a labyrinth but unlike it as well, always walled yet always 
open.
The act of fishing described in the second "Soledad" 
repeats a recurring combination of elements in the first, 
that of a space from which the wanderer is excluded and the 
presence of a "tronco." The net, which is linked on one 
end to the boat, penetrates the unknown space of the 
underwater world. The instrument of penetration, it is 
operated by the fishermen; the peregrino is a passive 
observer. The red can also be considered a “tronco" in the 
sense that it is a labyrinth "si de leho no, de lino." In 
the same way that a "vinculo desatado" remains a "vinculo," 
the marine labyrinth (a net of flax) remains a labyrinth 
(the Labyrinth of Dedalus, which was made of wood). So,
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just as he did not fully reach the source of light in the 
goatherds’ fire where a trunk lay burning, and as he was 
similarly excluded from the consummation of the rustic 
marriage, the pilgrim is not a party to the net’s entrance 
into the sea. He continues outside of the penetrated 
water. The peregrino remains a subject, a desterrado cut 
off from a direct experience of the world.
In a plaint of “quexas graues" that he sings from the 
fishing boat (lines 116-171), the youth gives a veiled 
account of his history, explaining his exile and the end 
his pilgrimage seeks. The regularity of the song of eight 
strophes of seven lines each (rhyme scheme ABBCCAA, 
syllabification 7-11-7-11-7-11-11) contrasts with the 
erratic regularity of the silva form in which most of the 
rest of the poem is written. The peregrino begins his 
que.ia with an apostrophe to the sea, and then shifts to 
address the last three strophes to the “enemiga amada" 
whose disdain sent him wandering.
The fourth strophe describes the act for which he was 
exiled and condemned to wander:
Audas mi pensamiento
El Cenith escalo, plumas vestido,
Cuio buelo atreuido
Si no ha dado su nombre A tus espumas,
De sus vestidas plumas
Conseruaran el desvanecimiento
Los annales diaphanos del viento. (136-143)
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This much quoted stanza, sometimes treated as if it were 
the voice of Gdngora himself (Hauser 312; Beverley, 
Soledades 127n), is very much in the Petrarchan amorous 
tradition.^ The Icarian myth is employed to describe the 
youth’s disastrous attempt to approach his beloved in his 
thoughts.^ The conventional "amada" is proud and scornful 
and is compared to the sun for her radiant beauty. The 
pilgrim’s fate was worse than that of Icarus, however, in 
that he did not die in the attempt and must bear the shame 
of his failure for the remainder of his life. In addition, 
whereas Icarus at least gained a sea, the peregrino’s 
failure gained him nothing, and that failure is recorded 
forever on the nonexistent pages of the "anales diAfanos 
del viento.“
In discussing this strophe, which he calls an 
"Alegoria de la escritura como atrevimiento amoroso- 
intelectual," Beverley makes two interesting points.
First, he notes that the Icarus myth was used during the 
period to illustrate the principle of noli altum sanere in 
regard to "los lfmites del conocimiento humano . . . "
(Soledades 127n). It served as an injunction against 
seeking sublime knowledge. A second idea he puts forth is 
"el sentido de Icaro como arquetipo del intelectual, muy 
difundido en el siglo XVII: el que se atreve
peligrosamente a revelar arcana naturae, los secretos de la 
naturaleza" (127n). Both of these points dealing with 
hidden, sublime knowledge indicate the resemblant episteme.
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One must keep in mind, however, the danger of assuming that 
a song, sung by a literary character, is an utterance of 
its author that accurately expresses his personal thoughts 
and beliefs. The fact that one can write literature in a 
certain tradition does not mean that one subscribes 
completely to all the tenets that may be associated with 
it.
The scorned lover’s approach to his amada was effected 
through an intellectual medium; it was with his thoughts 
that he dared to draw near to the sun. It was necessary 
for him to leave the ground, both the physical earth of the 
metaphor and the intellectual foundation, in order to 
launch himself, in his thoughts, toward his object. The 
object, however, proved itself greater than the youth’s 
construct that allowed him to approach it, dismantled the 
device, and sent him crashing back to the physical (and his 
intellectual) ground.
The visualization of the peregrino’s thought as a 
flight toward a light that attracts but destroys provokes 
the reader to recall the image of the moth that seeks its 
own destruction in a flame. The image has appeared twice 
before in the poem: the burning oak of the goatherds’ fire
(1: 88-89) and the stream that seeks oblivion in the "Farol 
de Thetis" (2: 6-8). The invited comparison of the pilgrim 
with a butterfly— Spanish does not distinguish between 
butterfly and moth, as is evident in the two passages 
cited— can^be expanded by noting the resemblance between
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the former’s wandering and the latter’s erratic pattern of 
flight from flower to flower.
The peregrino’s wandering is the topic of the 
following stanza that links his past to the present of the 
song:
Esta pues culpa mia
El timon alternar menos seguro,
Y el baculo mas duro
Vn lustro ha hecho &. mi dudosa mano,
Solicitando en vano
Las alas sepultar de mi osadia
Donde el Sol nace, o donde muere el dia.
(144-150)
In the verse, the youth’s rejection is converted into guilt 
(“culpa") that for five years has caused the pilgrim to 
wander over sea and land. The image of the "dudosa mano" 
and the walking stick, suggesting the riddle of the Sphinx, 
hint that the youth has aged more than the "lustro" that 
his travels have lasted. The alternation between sea and 
land, the indecisive hand, the unsure rudder, and the staff 
that indicates wandering, individually and together, affirm 
that the pilgrim’s progress, which has been followed by the 
interpreter for the preceding 1200 lines, is the 
continuation of a pattern harking back to the beginning of 
his exile.
The object of the peregrino’s wandering has not been 
merely negative; he has been seeking a goal, a way to rid
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
189
himself of "the wings" of his daring that carried him to 
his downfall. The naming of the places he seeks, “where 
the sun is born, or where the day dies" (150), does more 
than indicate the travel toward bot-1 ist and west that 
Alonso adds in his prose version (Soledades 667).  ^ in 
addition to the fact that these are "lugares inalcanzables" 
for a post-Copernican reader, other meanings can be 
constructed. The birthplace of the sun, in an epistemology 
in which vision is knowledge, can be made the equivalent of 
the source of knowledge. Likewise, the point of the day’s 
death marks the boundary between knowing and not knowing. 
The pilgrim seeks to lose the shameful reminders of his 
failure either by understanding through the enlightenment 
of knowledge, or by forgetting through the obscuring of 
memory. The phrase "en vano" can indicate that he has 
attempted both solutions unsuccessfully.
The peregrino’s stated purpose in seeking this place, 
"Las alas sepultar de mi osadia," presents the reader with 
another dilemma of interpretation. In the sixth stanza, he 
mentions his wish that his guilt might die: "Muera
(enemiga amada) / Muera mi culpa" (151-152). His guilt 
that he carries, the wings that enabled him to commit his 
now regretted act, are what he wishes to bury. Although 
his reference in the second strophe of the song to the 
sea’s having saved him from death indicates that it is not 
the end of his own existence that he seeks (123-129), he 
speaks later in the song of his death:
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Naufragio ya segundo,
0 filos ponga<n> de homicida hierro
Fin duro a mi destierro:
Tan generosa fe, no facil honda,
No poca tierra esconda:
Vrna suya el Occeano profundo,
1 Obeliscos los montes sean de’l mundo.
(158-164)
It appears that he sees his guilt and his existence as 
inseparable, that, understanding or forgetting having been 
found unattainable, no solution other than that of his own 
death can end his misery. The phrase, "Fin duro a mi 
destierro," used to refer to his death, points to that 
conclusion. The line also serves to equate existence and 
"destierro." The reader must conclude, then, that his/her 
interpretive dilemma may be resolved by envisioning 
pilgrim’s existence as a dilemma. The youth is presented 
with two hard choices, he can continue wandering, which 
would perpetuate the misery of his existence, or he can 
stop suffering but only at the cost of ending his life as 
well. He chooses to live, and so he remains trapped 
"outside" of his desired world on the "tierra" that is his 
"destierro.“
The lament, as an utterance, is taken by the reader to 
be a true account that conveys accurate information about 
the unknown past and inner present of the scorned lover.
The knowledge gained is welcomed as an aid to the difficult
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task of interpreting the present without knowing the past 
or being able to see into the present hidden interior of 
the protagonist. Although the information touches on these 
themes, as well as the future end of his searching, it 
offers little insight. The song’s account of the cause for 
the wanderer’s exile is wrapped in mystery, his goal is 
unreachable, and the view of his interior state merely 
reveals the same directionless uncertainty that has marked 
the poem’s narrative until this point. Thus unsatisfied, 
the interpreter must continue to wander with the pilgrim, 
exiled from the poem that he or she sees as separate, 
seeking stability in the text in order to link it with the 
analytical ground on which he/she stands.
The episode that follows offers such a stable place, 
the island where the two fishermen live with their father 
and six sisters.
lace en el mar, si no contintiada 
Isla, mal de la tierra diuidida,
Cuya forma tortuga es perezosa.
Diganlo quantos siglos ha que nada
Sin besar de la plaia espacidsa
La arena de las ondas repetida. (190-195)
The island is compared to a slow-moving turtle that has 
swum for centuries without changing its position in 
relation to the land.7 It is a fixed point, both spatially
O
and temporally, in a shifting sea.
Within this delimited space, signs of unity, harmony,
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and stability are amassed. Three of the daughters are 
weaving snares: "enganos construyendo estan de hilo”
(219). There are nests in trees that the old man had woven
for pigeons: "Texio en sus ramas inconstantes nidos"
(269). Six ivy vines embrace six poplars, all surrounded 
by a circle of lilies (328-336). Natural harmony is 
epitomized in the music of birds perched in twining ivy,
g
accompanied by a melodious stream (349-357). In a scene 
that echoes the chorus and marriage in the enclosed spac' 
of the village in the first "Soledad,” two fishermen 
"weave" an amoebaean song (546-611) and their plaint 
results in the promise of marriage and an embrace (645- 
647). Signs of fixedness are present in the trees that are 
rooted in the ground. The youth's wandering foot stumbles 
against that of a pine, its root (317-318). Poplars, 
although their branches are "inconstantes," serve as a site
for birds' nests (269). An ash, although "caduco,"
provides a site in its hollow for the construction of a 
beehive (283-293). Trees that are not planted, the encina 
and fresno. provide a base for eating as table and dish, 
respectively (340-342, 347-348).
The youth praises the anciano and advises him not to 
leave the secure space of the island:
Pisad dichoso esta esmeralda bruta
En marmol engastada siempre vndoso, . . . .
(367-368)
He speaks of the island in terms of stability and
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permanence, employing the image of one stone set within 
another. Gaspar de Morales writes of the emerald:
Dizen los naturales, que no ay color mas 
apacible a la vista, que el de la Esmeralda, 
verbi gratia, si las yervas en el campo con su 
verdor y frescura alegran, y regozijan, siendo 
perecederas, con quanta mas razon, lo que es 
natural, y durable regozijara, y agradara mas, 
que no lo perecedero: . . . .  (229-230)
In addition to its physical permanence, the gem’s many 
virtues include one against destabilizing ’’passiones del 
corazon" (236). It was further claimed by Albertus Magnus 
that the emerald also “da buena memoria . . . y ahuyenta la 
tempestad" (Morales 232-233), two other virtues of 
permanence and stability. Marble, defined by Covarrubias 
as “genus lapidis durissimi et solidissimi" (790), is also 
known for its durability. The concept of the sea as wavy 
marble combines the ideas of the permanence of the striated 
stone and the eternal ("siempre") motion of the ocean. The 
island, itself conceived as a stone, is firmly grounded in 
the temporal permanence of another stone, the ocean.
The youth continues his discourse:
Pisad dichoso esta esmeralda bruta 
En marmol engastada siempre vndoso,
Iubilando la red en los que os restan 
Felices anos; i la humedecida,
0 poco rato enjuta
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Proxima arena de esa oppuesta playa,
La remota Cambaia
Sea de oi mas a vuestro leno ocioso; . . . .  
(367-374)
He encourages 'the old man "bo retire his net, an instrument 
for probing the sea, and his boat, a mobile ground by means 
of which he may "desterrarse" from the stable ground of the 
island. He further emphasizes the island's constancy by 
contrasting it with the wave-washed impermanence of the 
sands of the mainland beach. The boat ("leno") and the net 
("no leno"), mobile troncos. are to be put to rest.
Further into his discourse, the desterrado again 
counsels the old fisherman to remain within the confines of 
the small island:
De’l pobre aluergue & la barquilla pobre 
Geometra prudente el orbe mida 
Vuestra pianta impedida 
Si de purpureas conchas no histriAdas,
De tragicas rdinas de alto robre,
Que (el tridente accusando de Neptuno)
Menos quiza dio astillas
Que exemplos de dolor a estas orilias.
(380-387)
Alonso’s prose version unravels the first part of the 
passage thus:
Contentese vuestra planta en medir, como prudente 
gedmetra, la distancia entre el pobre albergue
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. . . y . . . la pobre barquilla . . . , y 
recorriendo mesuradamente esa distancia, dese por 
satisfecha como si en ella abarcara todo el orbe.
(Soledades 675-676).
The concept of the island as "orbe", combined with the 
appositive "geometer," etymologically signifying "earth 
measurer," effectively equates the island with the earth. 
The neregrino is asking the old fisherman to make the 
island his world. Measurement, an application of an 
external standard in order to determine quantity, creates 
knowledge about its object, thus helping the knower to 
possess it. The adjective "prudente," with its Latin 
etymological signification of "seeing ahead" (providens), 
contrasts with the "improvising" (“not seeing ahead") of 
the pilgrim in the poem (and with that of the interpreter). 
The youth, speaking from his contrary experience, advises 
him to remain within a world that he can see and know.
The impediments to the old man's measuring, or 
knowing, would not be the striped, purple shells, but the 
splintered remains of a tall oak, a shipwreck that resulted 
from the storm-causing powers of Neptune’s trident.
Again here, images can be created that can serve as signs 
of stability. The oak tree has come to rest on the island 
and no longer roams the sea or suffers from storms, and the 
storm-resisting power of the emerald island counteracts the 
effects of the sea god’s staff.
The juxtaposition of "planta" (“foot") and “impedida"
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(from Latin "impedire," whose particle "in-" signifies 
"without" and whose stem "pes, pedis" signifies "foot") is 
similar to the construction "vinculo desatado" of line 48. 
In this case, however, the agent for the participial 
action, the "robre," is a now-stable point, whereas in the 
earlier concept, there was no agent. Here, the act of 
impeding merely stops motion; it does not destabilize the 
underlying ground. The dissolution of the link in the 
image of the boat, on the other hand, removed the ground 
for establishing a structure.
The exiled wanderer exhorts the enisled denizen to 
remain within the limits of his knowable world, to cling to 
the "firme tronco" of his existence. The pilgrim himself, 
however, choses to continue on his journey, departing the 
following morning in a boat rowed by two other youths.
They leave the island and approach the shore of the
mainland. Before they arrive, there is another scene to be
observed:
I de la firme tierra el heno blando
Con las palas segando, (690)
En la cumbre modesta
De vna desigualdad de’l Orizonte,
Que dexa de ser monte 
Por ser culta floresta,
Antiguo descubrieron bianco muro; (695)
Por sus piedras no menos,
Que por su edad magest&osa cano;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
197
Marmol al fin tan por la Pario puro,
Que al peregrino sus ocultos senos 
Negar pudiera en vano. (689-700)
The description of the view begins as the boat, though 
still offshore on the surface of the water, passes just 
above firm ground, its oars touching (figuratively 
"segando") the grasses that grow from the shallow bottom.
The reader shares with the pilgrim the process of 
coming to know the object of vision by revising 
(etymologically "seeing again") the interpretations as to 
what it is. The foundation of what is to be discovered is 
described as an irregularity ("desigualdad") of the horizon 
that "dexa de ser monte / Por ser culta floresta, . . . "  
(693-694). In the two words that serve as versions of the 
irregularity, "monte" and "floresta," there are three 
significations because of the ambiguity of "monte," which 
can signify both "high ground" and "woods." As the viewers 
approach the irregularity, it is interpreted to be first a 
hill ("monte"), and then a wood ("floresta"), as a nearer 
view provides clarifying details. It then shifts from 
being a wild forest (again "monte") to a cultivated grove 
with the differentiation offered by the adjective “culta." 
The use of the verb "ser" ("dexa de ser A por ser B") 
points up the fact that a knower must relate to his or her 
interpretation as truth, equating appearance and existence. 
It also can be interpreted to indicate that the "seeing" 
that is equated with knowing is an active visualization,
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rather than a reception of the world as it is.
Atop the elevated point is a wall, a structure 
designed to exclude. Although the pilgrim is again outside 
an enclosure, this time his vision is able to penetrate to 
the interior ("senos") that the wall hides. DAmaso Alonso 
holds that the walls are of such fine Parian marble as to 
be actually transparent (Soledades 687). More plausible is 
the idea that the walls are figuratively penetrated by 
constructions of the peregrino's imagination. The 
conventional association of such whiteness with the skin of 
an “amada,“ ana the coldness and hardness of marble paired 
with the disdain of an "amada enemiga," vaguely suggest an 
allegorical reference to the youth’s past. Lending support 
to the traditional metaphor of woman as castle are the 
multiple significations of "seno" as "breast," "the hollow 
made between the clothes and the breasts," and "womb. "
What the pilgrim sees through the walls is not revealed to 
the reader.
The youth looks at the sun, mirrored faithfully in the 
silver spheres of the castle's capitals:
Quantas de’1 Oceano
El Sol treneas desata
Contaua en los raiados capiteles,
Que espejos (aunque esphericos) fieles 
Brunidos eran oualos de plata. (701-705)
The sun reflected in orbs recalls the Petrarchan lyric 
conceit of the beloved’s eyes as suns, continuing the
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possible allegorical interpretation. The reader might 
construe that this scene is a repetition of the passage in 
the first "Soledad" in which the pilgrim views the rustic 
bride but sees his own "Sol, que & olvido le condena . . . " 
(737). In viewing the castle, he again sees the one who 
rejected him.
Echoes of another scene occur as well, with the 
mention of the youth’s reaction of admiration before a 
magnificent view.
La admiracion que al arte se le deue 
Anchora de’1 batel fue, perdonando 
Pocc a lo fuerte, i a lo bello nada 
De’l edificio: quando 
Ronca les salteo trompa sonante,
Al principio distante,
Vezina luego, pero siempre incierta. (706-712) 
Before, confronted with the undifferentiated, vast 
prospect, the wayfarer’s footing became uncertain although 
he was standing on a solid rock foundation (I, 190-211). 
This time, the sublime artifice of the construction 
steadies the unsure, moving ground of the boat.
The occupants of the boat are assaulted and robbed of 
their awestruck contemplation of the sight by the harsh 
sound of a horn. The earlier claim that the eyes of the 
peregrino had penetrated the walls is denied by the mystery 
the blast raises. The horn’s sound is labelled “incierta," 
even though it can be heard and determined to be first
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distant from, then near to, the point of reception. The 
uncertainty could be due to the horn's pitch, which might 
be wavering because of the movement of the horse from whose 
back it is blown; the varying volume could indicate that 
the point of origin is in motion. Or the uncertainty could 
be that created in the mind of the hearers, unable to 
determine the purpose of the horn, whether it be a battle 
alarm or merely a hunting horn.
The latter uncertainty is resolved as the castle gate 
opens and a hunting party emerges:
Llaue de la alta puerta
El duro son, vencido el fosso breue,
Leuadiga offrecio puente no leue 
Tropa inqufeta contra el aire armada. (713-716) 
Two barriers are crossed, the wall with the opening of the 
gate, and a previously unmentioned moat with the lowering 
of a drawbridge. The unknown source of the sound that had 
been hidden in the castle’s interior of the castle becomes 
known when it is seen; the gap between mystery and 
knowledge is bridged.
Differently from the previously discussed scenes of 
observation, in this case knowing emerges voluntarily from 
within a hidden place. While it is true that in the 
fishing scene fish emerged from a hidden place, they were 
drawn out with a net. The hunting party is self-revealing, 
a mystery that removes its own “corteza" without an 
observer’s having to use any instrument or, for that
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matter, exert any conscious willful effort in order to 
arrive at the "raz6n" that will complete his/her 
understanding. In that sense, the hunters are like spoken 
words, emerging unbidden from an interior that can only be 
penetrated by imaginative projections. To conclude the 
tentative extended metaphor of the woman and castle, the 
reader can assign to the castle's gate a correspondence to 
the mouth of the “amada." The armed, unquiet troop that 
emerges armed against the air, then, could be understood 
metaphorically as a repetition of the hostile words of 
disdain pronounced by the "enemiga" against the youth.
The hunt scene that follows invites further 
allegorical interpretation with its different types of 
birds of prey, victims, and patterns of killing. The 
peregrino continues in his role of "mirdn” with the boat as 
his vantage point until, his vision "vencida, " the rowers 
and hunters approach a miserable village. It is another 
place between sea and land where huts are built on the 
water's edge. Before the expected convergence, the poem 
abruptly ends.
Why Gbngora ended his poem here is unknown.12 Jones 
wonders:
Might this be because the subject was getting out 
of hand? It may be that he reached the limit of 
what he could say within the closely disciplined 
form of pastoral he was attempting; more could 
only be said through an extended plot, for which
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he had no great talent. ("Poetic Unity" 203) 
Beverley notes similarly that "The Soledades seem in the 
end like a discourse which has emptied itself of any 
possibility of fresh poetic life" (Aspects 110).
It is also useless to speculate as to what would have 
happened next. Competing theories claim there were to be 
four "Soledades," but they differ as to the nature of the
1 O
organization. The events have occurred in such an 
unpredictable manner that even certain knowledge of a 
greater design, such as those offered by a framework of
four "Soledades," would offer nothing concrete upon which
14
to project the completion of the poem.
The reader is left adrift with the pilgrim, eternally 
excluded from the world of the poem. Like the wanderer, he 
or she has in vain attempted to reach the place "Donde el 
Sol nace." Throughout the two "Soledades," the reader has 
been frustrated in attempts to construct an overarching 
structure that can neatly account for all the elements of 
the poem. In addition to the syntactical difficulties, 
demonstrated in the analysis of lines 42-45 of the first 
"Soledad," and the general difficulty and abundance of 
concepts, the reader has "discerned" a tendency in the poem 
to undermine the construction of meaning. The 
protagonist’s seemingly directionless wandering through the 
events of the unpredictable narrative, the nebulous or 
ephemeral delimitation between spaces, and the metaphorical 
fluidity of objects normally conceived of as fixed, all
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contribute to the constant tentativeness of the 
interpretive visualizations that must be formulated and 
then withdrawn.
The reader is forced to be a self-conscious subject, 
excluded from what he/she sees as the poem's meaning, 
thwarted in efforts to impose an organization that will 
permit knowledge by appropriation. Beverley concludes that 
"The effect of Gbngora's truncation of the Soledad segunda 
is to alienate the reader from the poem . . . "  (Aspects 
112). I believe, however, that the reader has been 
alienated from the world of the poem from the beginning.
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Notes
1 The reference to boats as wood is not original with 
Gdngora. Covarrubias notes that "En lengua toscana leno 
suele sinificar el navi'o o galera, o otro qualquier vaso 
para navegar, por ser la materia de que consta y porque 
ordinariamente es pino; los latinos le dieron esta mesma 
sinificacidn . . . ” (761). He then quotes an example from 
Horace in which "pinus" serves to refer to a vessel.
2 Molho discusses the role of the adjective in 
maintaining the two ideas of “bridge" and "not bridge” in 
the concept (35-36).
3
His declaration does not stop him, however, from 
imposing a "representacidn" on the "Soledades" as an 
"espiral que gira sin fin sobre sf misma sin encontrar su 
fin" (80).
Antonio Vilanova demonstrates how the peregrino of 
the "Soledades" is in the tradition of the Renaissance 
lyric in his article "El peregrino de amor en las 
‘Soledades' de Gdngora."
 ^McAllister cites the stanza as evidence of 
Neoplatonic influence, noting that “The pilgrim does not 
use the word ‘love,' however, to refer to the ‘daring 
intention’ that has led to his ‘fall”. . ." (39).
 ^Alonso did not claim that his prosification in any 
way was a translation of the "significacidn poetica" of the 
"Soledades" (Soledades 548).
7 Juan Eduardo Cirlot notes interestingly,
204
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An engraving in the Hypnerotomachia Poliphili 
. . . depicts a woman holding a pair of outspread 
wings in one hand and a turtle in the other. The 
counterbalancing of one with the other would 
suggest that the turtle is the inversion of the 
wings; that is, that since the wings signify 
elevation of the spirit, the turtle would note 
the fixed element of alchemy although only in its 
negative aspect" (354).
The juxtaposition of the pilgrim’s Icarian wings and 
turtle-like, fixed island that occurs in the poem is 
somewhat similar. Although there is no reason to believe 
that Gbngora practiced alchemy, it is possible that he was 
familiar with the widely disseminated Hypnerotomachia 
Poliphili, published in 1499 (Cirlot xxii).
g
McAllister interprets the island as an unstable 
place, "so indeterminate in form that at first it seems 
neither island nor peninsula, an island in perpetual 
motion, described as a turtle perpetually swimming, but 
never quite reaching the shore" (50).
9
Jones treats this scene in two articles, which he 
says "shows a fundamental harmony in the apparent anarchy 
of nature" ("Poetic" 202). See also "Neoplatonism and the 
Soledades." p. 10. J. F. G. Gornall places this scene of 
"the 'music’ of Nature" in contrast with “the music of the 
court" as a conceit connected with the theme of 
"menospricio de corte, alabanza de aldea" (319).
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10 The theme of "menosprecio de corte" and "alabanza 
de aldea" treated by many critics (among them Jones, Robert 
Jammes, and Beverley), may be supported by the image of the 
seashells used for purple dye that do not impede the 
progress of the old man. Noydens’ 1674 addition to 
Covarrubias’ definition of "pdrpura" explains that the 
shellfish had powerful tongues with which they could 
penetrate other shells ("a vezes las de su mesmo genero") 
in order to extract and eat the inside. He adds, "Y assf 
fueron geroglffico de los hombres maldicientes cuyas 
lenguas pican y traspassan qualquier fama, . . . "  (889).
The youth’s claim that the "pdrpuras" would not bother the 
old man could be interpreted as indicating that away from 
the "corte," such phenomena do not occur. It is certainly 
consistent with his song of the first "Soledad," "6 
bienauenturado / Aluerge . . . "  (94-135).
11 Melody Joy Duran associates the falcons with the 
Icarus myth and the moth/butterfly images that occur in the 
poem, concluding that "Gdngora shows that the rise and fall 
of the falcon’s flight parallels man’s inherently doomed 
atempt to imitate nature" and that he "perhaps suggests 
that main’s attempted disruption of nature reveals human 
mutability" (48). Beverley makes numerous references to
the violence of the scene (Aspects).
12 Alonso notes that the poem ended originally at 
verse 840 of the "Soledad segunda." A later version added 
the hawking scene, extending the poem through line 936.
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The final 43 lines were added, according to Pellicer, at
the request of Antonio Chac6n ("La Primitiva" 425).
13
Ioseph Pellicer stated that there were to be four 
"Soledades" corresponding to four stages of life: youth,
adolescence, virility and senility (qtd. in Vilanova 428). 
Di’az de Ribas agreed with the figure of four parts, but 
classified them "por el lugar donde sucedieron." He 
describes them thus:
La Primera Soledad se intitula la Soledad de los 
canpos. y las personas que se introducen son 
pastores; la segunda, la Soledad de las riberas: 
la tercera, la Soledad de las selbas: y la 
quarta, la Soledad del yermo. (Gates 86n4)
14 Antonio Vilanova does make such a projection, 
noting an increasing degree of "soledad" in the four 
divisions proposed by Dfaz. He predicts that the third 
"Soledad" would be "habitada por algtin lefiador or fiera 
alimana," and the fourth would be a "paisaje de est riiidad 
y de la nada, donde s61o puede morar alg&n pobre ermitaho" 
(430-431).
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Conclusion
Understanding Gdngora’s “Soledades" in terms of 
appropriating knowledge is difficult but possible. Here, 
one might recall that Collard defined two targets of 
seventeenth-century criticism, with works written “Contra 
lo defectuoso de la sustancia poetica y contra los excesos 
de su poesfa, su oscuridad y confusi6n“ (84). Since the 
present study has focused on hermeneutics, it would be 
appropriate to refer to the two problem areas as the 
product and process of interpretation. The aim of the 
hermeneutic process is ordinarily to arrive at a product, 
to understand or know the object being studied. The 
"Soledades" thwart, or at least retard, that project in 
various ways. One manner of making the process difficult 
is the use of stylistic "excesses" discussed so competently 
by Dfas de Ribas and V&zques Siruela. G6ngora’s poetic 
language has been treated at great length as a major focus 
of post-1927 criticism.
This study’s reading has encountered other ways in 
which the "Soledades" resist interpretation. The 
deployment of space in the narrative frustrates structural 
organization. Many fixed points and boundaries that are 
normally considered to be stable in the world and that 
ordinarily serve as a ground for the construction of an 
interpretation are presented in such a manner that the 
reader must construe them as existing in a state of
208
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instability. They are not reliable anchors for the 
attachment of meaning, and that attachment is what must 
occur in order for "space" to become “place." The 
definable places that do exist— seashores, the goatherds' 
camp, a promontory, a road, a crossroad, a village, an 
island, a castle— are unconnected except for the trajectory 
of the peregrino's wandering. There is no revisiting, no 
return even in memory or dialogue, that would allow one to 
weave a web of relationships between them.
A second way the poem frustrates understanding is by 
tightly controlling the hermeneutic process. For readers 
(like those of seventeenth-century Spain) in whose 
epistemology knowing or understanding is equated with 
seeing, the "Soledades" hinder interpretation by not 
allowing them to see.1 To be more specific, they are not 
allowed to assume that they are engaged in a receptive 
activity of perceiving ("dis-covering") a pre-existing 
order. Most of the seeing readers are allowed to do is 
through a self-aware act of visualization that generates 
order. The narrator does not share his omniscience with 
the reader, who only once in the "Soledad primera" knows 
for a few lines something that the protagonist does not, 
that the group of serranas is en route to a wedding (263- 
266). At other times, the reader discovers the poem's 
world as it is revealed to the pilgrim and is forced to 
share in his interpretive experience. The reader's vision 
is limited to the narrative present both temporally and
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spatially, thus not allowing him/her to construct a 
context. He/she is not provided knowledge of the pilgrim’s 
past, and has no basis for projecting a future. Nor is 
there, as JAuregui complained, any indication of place name 
or spatial orientation that would allow the reader to link 
the imagined space of the poem to his/her own world.
Another limiting factor to the reader’s knowledge is the 
absence of dialogue that excludes the him/her from the 
peregrino’s interiority. Two songs, a brief apostrophe to 
the goatherds’ campfire, and a discourse of praise and 
advice to the old fisherman are the only signs of the 
protagonist’s thoughts.
Although a single thread of narrative (JAuregui’s 
"fAbula") can finally be constructed, the end product of 
the hermeneutic process is not knowledge in the sense to 
which one is accustomed in either of Foucault’s referential 
epistemes. The reader knows little more about the poem’s 
protagonist or narrative plot than when he/she began. (Of 
course, the fact that the poem is unfinished can be used, 
at least in part, as an explanation for that ignorance.) 
Knowledge, as it was generally understood in seventeenth- 
century Spain, is denied to those who seek it in the 
"Soledades.” The reader who enters the interpretive effort 
seeking resemblances that point to an ultimate truth (like 
McAllister’s Neoplatonic reader) discovers only failure to 
arrive at that truth. The interpreter who reads expecting 
to receive and possess a conceptual representation of an
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ordered world presumed to exist "outside" of language is 
also frustrated, left with a picture that seems incomplete.
What, then, did Gdngora believe about knowing the 
world? In this poem, his reader is required to become a 
subject, a self-aware construer of meaning, a role not 
known to contemporary thought. Does that indicate that he 
believed that the world was not knowable in predominantly 
accepted ways? In the interpretation of the "Soledades, " 
the reader is alienated from the poem’s world, trapped in 
an eternal, existential "here and now." Such a status 
departs radically from the Renaissance idea of the human as 
integrated into a meaningful whole in which there is no 
"other." It also opposes the post-Tridentine conception of 
the world as an engano that effectively denies the reality 
of the "other" and makes the "one" subject to a truth lying 
beyond his/her present existence. Does that alienation 
indicate a belief on Gdngora’s part that self-consciousness 
doomed humans to pay the price of being "one" to the 
world’s "other" either by suffering endlessly or by dying?
These questions could only be answered by Gdngora, of 
course. It would be futile and misleading to project, on
the basis of one poem, the whole of a person’s
2
epistemological assumptions. One can conclude, however, 
that in the "Soledades" Gdngora was concerned with the 
problems of interpretation and knowledge of language and 
meaning, and that he required his readers to share his 
concern, by challenging their fundamental assumptions.
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Notes
1 Interestingly, forms of the verb "ver" occur with 
much less frequency than in Gbngora’s sonnets and his 
"Polifemo." In the 3052 lines of Gbngora's 218 sonnets, 
there are 66 instances of "ver" in various forms (Richards 
176-177), a rate of approximately 2.2 occurrences per 100 
lines. In the "Polifemo," "ver" appears 14 times in its 
504 lines (Gdngora, F&bula 123-125), a rate of 2.8 
instances per 100 lines. In the "Soledades,“ however, with 
16 appearances in 2107 lines (F&bula 123-125), the rate is 
.8 per 100 lines.
O
Gbngora’s "F&bula de Polifemo y Galatea," for 
example, which appeared at about the same time is radically 
different from the "Soledades." On the level of poetic 
language, the poems share many similarities, but the 
"fibula," as Jiuregui would call it, is a "firme tronco.“ 
There is a known story to which the poem refers, the place,
r.
Sicily, is defined, and the time is set within the 
mythological past. Spatial relations are stable and can be 
mapped. The characters have names and histories; they 
behave in predictable patterns, and everything is tied up 
neatly at the end. In its regular form of octava real, 
almost all of the stanzas end with a period, encompassing a 
definable block of the narrative. The narrator shares his 
omniscience with the reader, the reader sees and 
understands what happens. Only the language and concepts 
are difficult. So it would erroneous to assume that the
212
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"Soledades" express Gdngora’s philosophy. The 1963-1966 
dispute between R. 0. Jones and C. Colin Smith, for 
example, began when Smith objected to Jones’ Neoplatonic 
speculation about the "Polifemo" after Jones had studied 
principally the "Soledades" (Jones, "Neoplatonism," 
"Gdngora"; Smith, "Approach”).
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